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Program reductions are used widely to simplify reasoning about the correctness of concurrent and distributed
programs. In this paper, we propose a general approach to proof simplification of concurrent programs based
on exploring generic classes of reductions. We introduce two classes of sound program reductions, study their
theoretical properties, show how they can be effectively used in algorithmic verification, and demonstrate that
they are very effective in producing proofs of a diverse class of programs without targeting specific syntactic
properties of these programs. The most novel contribution of this paper is the introduction of the concept of
context in the definition of program reductions. We demonstrate how commutativity of program steps in some
program contexts can be used to define a generic class of sound reductions which can be used to automatically
produce proofs for programs whose complete Floyd-Hoare style proofs are theoretically beyond the reach of
automated verification technology of today.
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1 INTRODUCTION
A reduction of a program is generally another program, with a subset of the behaviours of the
original program, that faithfully represents it. Program reductions have been studied extensively
[Desai et al. 2014; Elmas et al. 2009; Genest et al. 2007; Hawblitzel et al. 2015; Lipton 1975; von
Gleissenthall et al. 2019] in the context of simplifying reasoning about concurrent and distributed
programs. The earliest and perhaps most well-known approach to reduction is due to Lipton
[Lipton 1975] who proposed to simplify concurrent program proofs by inferring large atomic
blocks of code (when possible) in order to reap the benefits of sound sequential reasoning inside
these blocks. The inference of the large atomic blocks is carried out based on commutativity
specifications of individual program statements. In the past 40 years, Lipton’s work has inspired
many reduction schemes for concurrent program analysis [Flanagan and Qadeer 2003; Flanagan
et al. 2005] and verification [Elmas et al. 2009; Hawblitzel et al. 2015]. In a different context,
commutativity specification of program statements have been used for an entirely different type
of reduction. There, the aim is to reduce the sizes of the communication buffers used in message-
passing programs. The equivalent program with smallest buffer sizes can be viewed as an almost
synchronous variation of the original asynchronous program. The key insight is that the proof of
correctness for the synchronous program is simpler; for program with bounded buffers the proof
need not include complex invariants such as those that universally quantify over unbounded buffer
contents.
The two groups of reduction approaches strive for seemingly contradictory targets. Lipton’s
approach opts for reductions in which the threads try not to yield for as long as possible, while
synchronous reductions would force a yield right after each send operation in order to execute its
matching receive. The former seems appropriate for shared memory concurrent programs and the
latter for message-passing concurrent and distributed programs. This sparks several interesting
questions: is this truly a rigid dichotomy? Can shared memory concurrent programs benefit from
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certain types of synchronous reductions where arbitrary program statements (other than just
sends and receives on channels) are synchronized? What sort of reductions can deal with message-
passing concurrent programs where reasoning has to be extended to the part of the program that
manipulates the data? Can we not commit to a particular reduction scheme in advance and let
the verifier pick the ideal reduction for the input program, depending on what is required for the
the specific combination of the program and the property? In this paper, we provide some initial
answers to these questions.
We propose an automated verification approach that combines the search for a proof with the
search for a sound reduction of the program. The high level idea is to give a chance to automated
verification to succeed by finding a correctness proof for a reduction of the program, where it
would fail otherwise if it attempted to prove the original program correct. The key distinction with
regards to most of the relevant literature is that instead of fixing a particular reduction in advance,
we propose to let a new automated verification algorithm search for an ideal reduction within a
generic universe of (infinitely many) sound reductions. The simple insight is that committing to the
wrong reduction in advance, for example attempting to infer large atomic blocks for a distributed
message-passing program, could set one up for failure. Our target programs are principally those
where proof simplification is the difference between the existence and nonexistence of a safety proof
within a fixed (decidable) language of assertions commonly used in automated verification. Without
simplification, the proof involves complicated invariants with elements such as quantification over
arrays and buffers or non-linear arithmetic for data variables which are currently the Achilles heel
of automated verification techniques. Therefore, the main accomplishment of our methodology is to
leverage the proof simplification power of reductions to expand the reach of automated verification
to instances that are theoretically out of its scope.
Our refinement loop maintains a proof candidate at each round, and checks if there exists a
reduction of the input program that is proved correct by this proof. To be able to implement this
subsumption test algorithmically, one needs an effective way of representing the set of all program
reductions. We introduce two novel classes of (infinitely many) program reductions and use finite
state (tree) automata, with nice algorithmic properties, to represent each class. The first class is
inspired by semi-trace monoids [Diekert and Rozenberg 1995] defined by a semi-commutativity
relation between program statements. Unfortunately, checking whether a proof subsumes a re-
duction of the program according to such a semi-trace monoid is in general undecidable (more on
this in Section 4). Therefore, the contribution of this paper critical to algorithmic verification is
devising a subclass, which we call S-reductions with a decidable subsumption check.
The most significant contribution of this paper is the second proposed class of reductions,
namely contextual reductions. For this class, the commutativity properties of the program statements
depend on the context from which the corresponding statements are executed. Two statements
may commute in one context and not in another. Contexts have been exploited in special cases for
proofs before. For example, in message-passing programs, a receive can be commuted to the left of
a send operation that is not its matching send, determined by by context.
To the best of our knowledge, general contexts have never been exploited for program proofs
before, and certainly not for automated verification.
Inspired by a language-theoretic notion of context from generalized Mazurkiewicz traces, we
define a set of (infinitely many) contextual reductions that is recognized by finite state automata. The
elegance of this definition is that it does not commit to a particular contextual commutativity relation
in advance. The automaton models a universe of reductions based on a universe of contextual
commutativity specifications. Our proposed algorithm then decides if there exists a sound contextual
commutativity specification in this universe, which induces a sound contextual reduction of the
program that is covered by a current valid proof candidate. Therefore, beyond making progress
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in proof construction, the refinement loop also infers assertions that substantiate the soundness
of a larger contextual commutativity relation through refinement. This goes against the classical
approach to automated program verificationwhere one first chooses a (static) mostly non-contextual
commutativity specification, then a reduction induced by the chosen specification, and finally then
tries to search for a proof for the given reduction. Our proposed refinement loop performs all these
three searches simultaneously. In summary, the following are the contributions of this paper:
• We introduce a class of semi-commutative reductions and present the theoretical properties
of this class that make it a good candidate for algorithmic proof simplification (Section 4).
• We introduce a novel class of contextually commutative reductions essential to proof simplifi-
cation for both shared-memory and message-passing concurrent programs, and theoretically
argue why they are suitable for algorithmic use (Section 5).
• We present a counterexample-guided refinement loop for verification which can incorporate
the above classes of reductions. This algorithm effectively performs a search for a triple
consisting of a contextual commutativity relation, a program reduction induced by it, and a proof
of correctness for the reduction. We discuss the soundness, completeness, and convergence
conditions for the algorithm. Moreover, we present two interesting insights that accommodate
the development of a novel algorithm for proof checking with an improved time complexity
upper bound. (Sections 7 and 8).
• We provide an in-depth comparison of the reductions presented in this paper and the two
most well-known reduction schemes from the concurrent program verification literature
(Section 6): (1) Lipton’s reduction for the inference of large atomic blocks, and (2) reductions
based on the idea of existential boundedness [Genest et al. 2007] which use commutativity-
based transformations to reduce message buffer sizes to simplify proofs of message-passing
concurrent/distributed programs.
• Our approach is implemented in a tool, called Slacker . Using a rich set of benchmarks,
mostly with required invariants beyond the reach of previous automated verification tools,
we demonstrate how the technique is effective in producing (automatically generated) proofs
for these benchmarks (Section 9).
2 MOTIVATING EXAMPLES
We start by motivating the two classes of reductions proposed in this paper through two examples.
In our first example, proof simplification is not essential, in that a proof for the program exists and
can be discovered using a standard verification algorithm [Heizmann et al. 2009]. By using the class
of semi-commutative reductions in this paper, however, one can produce a simpler proof (about
half the number of distinct assertions in the proof) in less than one third of the time. We then
i = 0;
while (i < N) {
inc(y);
i++;
}
j = 0;
while (j < M) {
dec(y);
j++;
}
inc(x: int)
{
atomic {
x = x + 1
}
}
dec(x: int)
{
atomic {
assume(x > 0);
x = x - 1;
}
}(a) (b)
(c)
Precondition: {N = M ^ y = 0}
Postcondition: {y = 0}
Fig. 1. Semi-commutativity example.
make a small modification to the code to get our second exam-
ple, for which a proof for the whole program does not exist in
the decidable assertion language of linear integer arithmetic
(LIA). Moreover, even though the program does admit a semi-
commutative reduction, a proof does not exist for that reduction
either. This will motivate our contextual reduction class, which
includes a sound reduction of the program with a simpler proof
that is quickly discovered by Slacker .
Consider the simple methods inc() and dec() defined in
Figure 1(a,b), and a simple concurrent program using them listed
in Figure 1(c), along with its corresponding pre/post-conditions.
Note that dec() is a blocking statement and therefore not all
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program runs terminate. For a safety proof, it suffices to show that those that do satisfy the given
pre/post-condition. It is straightforward to see that a full Floyd-Hoare style proof of this program
exists in the decidable logical language of linear integer arithmetic.
Observe that inc() soundly semi-commutes with dec() in the sense that it is sound to swap a
dec() statement to the right of a following inc() statement, without changing program behaviour.
The inverse, however, is not true. Swapping a decrement to the left of an increment may make
it block in some program runs where it was not blocking in its original position. Adding this
to the fact that i and j are thread-local and therefore all statements referencing them commute
(against the statements of the other thread), indicates that a full proof for the program is not strictly
necessary. It is sufficient to provide a proof for a subset of the program runs that soundly represent
the program, and this subset may admit a strictly simpler proof. The discovery of this simple proof
is the goal of the methodology presented in this paper.
The sequential program illustrated in Figure 2 is a sound reduction of the program in Figure 1. In
this reduction, all decrements are postponed to the end using the semi-commutativity of dec() and
i = 0;
while (i < N) {
inc(y);
i++;
}
j = 0;
while (j < M) {
dec(y);
j++;
}
Fig. 2. A reduction.
inc(). The full commutativity of the rest of the actions is then used to bring
relevant steps of each thread together. Our proposed set of S-reductions includes
this sequential program as well as (infinitely) many other reductions that are
equivalent to the program up to the aforementioned (semi-) commutativity
properties of the statements. Our proposed algorithm attempts to verify at
least one member of the entire set in a refinement loop. Our tool, Slacker ,
discovers a simpler proof (about half the number of distinct assertions in the
proof) in about a third of the time of the original (without reductions). Note
that the reduction, for which Slacker discovers a proof may not match the
one in Figure 2 precisely.
The reader familiar with Lipton’s reductions [Lipton 1975] and the concept of left/right movers
would be curious about the connection between this transformation and Lipton’s atomic blocks
reductions. Note that dec() is a right-mover, and respectively, inc() is a left mover, and every
other statement is both 1. Therefore, one can soundly declare each thread as one atomic block and
end up with a reduced program that runs these two atomic blocks in parallel. This program has
additional behaviours compared to the (sequentialized) reduction of Figure 2. The difference is not
substantial in this case. Next, we will look at a slight modification of this program which would
i = 0;
while (i < N) {
inc(y, C);
i++;
}
j = 0;
while (j < M) {
dec(y,C);
j++;
}
inc(x: int, d: int)
{
atomic {
x = x + d
}
}
dec(x: int, d: int)
{
atomic {
assume(x >= d);
x = x - d;
}
}(a) (b)
(c)
Precondition: {N = M ^ C > 0 ^ y = 0}
Postcondition: {y = 0}
Fig. 3. Contextual commutativity example.
render both Lipton style reductions and our S-reductions
entirely useless for proof simplification.
Consider the modified code illustrated in Figure 3. The
methods inc() and dec() operate as before, but now take
an extra parameter determining the increment/decrement
delta. The program uses a global (uninitialized) positive
constant C as this delta, and otherwise operates as be-
fore. Note that this program admits the same sequential
reduction in the style of Figure 2, since the new inc()
and dec()methods satisfy the same (semi-) commutative
properties as in the previous example. The problem is,
however, that this sequential reduction does not admit a
proof in the decidable LIA fragment. The proof needs to
1In fact, since Lipton’s original definition in [Lipton 1975] is quantified over all reachable program contexts, inc() and
dec() would be both-movers according to his original definition. But, folklore usage of his technique, which quantifies over
all contexts (reachable or not), would declare them only left and right mover respectively.
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establish at the end of the first loop that y = N × C, so that by the end of the second loop, y can
be proved to go back to zero. This requires a non-linear loop invariant y = i × C for the first loop.
Lipton’s reductions are also not effective for the same reason. Luckily, there is another reduction of
this program that does admit a proof in the LIA fragment.
Any program trace that has a different number of increments and decrements is infeasible,
and this can be reflected in the proof by simple invariants relating i, j, M, and N. All feasible
program traces will have an equal number of increments and decrements. To avoid having to use
multiplicative assertions like y = N × C, of all the equivalent feasible interleavings of the program,
the one in which increments and decrements appear in alternate order is the preferred one:
inc(y,C) . . .dec(y,C) . . .inc(y,C) . . .dec(y,C) . . . .
For these interleavings, the invariants need to only capture the fact that y goes up by C and then
comes back to zero when the matching decrement happens. The reduction that only includes these
interleavings is in some sense the opposite of the sequential reduction of Figure 2. In the sequential
one, an entire thread is executed as an atomic block, while in this one, threads are forced to yield
after each increment to let the matching decrement execute. It is interesting how a small change in
the program can have a big impact on the appropriate reduction for proving it correct.
Let us now argue why the suggested reduction is sound. The key is the concept of contextual
commutativity. Note that inc(y) and dec(y) fully commute if y ≥ C. Only for values of y < C, do
they semi-commute (as discussed above). Under this contextual commutativity relation, one can
show that the interleaving proposed above is equivalent to all other interleavings of the program.
The high level argument is: we already know that all decrements can be postponed to the end, due
to the (non-contextual) semi-commutativity relation. Therefore, every interleaving is equivalent to
one with all the decrements appearing at the end. Starting from that interleaving, the decrements
can be pulled forward one by one to appear next to a (matching) increment, because we know y ≥ C
is true before each decrement (that has a matching increment in the prefix of the run). Note that
this last step cannot be performed under the static semi-commutativity assumption. A decrement
does not commute to the left of an increment.
The main observation is that contexts matter. At the beginning, before any increments or decre-
ments have been executed, the two operations do not commute (when y = 0). Once an increment is
executed, then y ≥ C is established and then the operations commute.
Our proposed set of contextual reductions, called C-reductions, includes this preferred reduc-
tion and (infinitely) many more equivalent ones. In a refinement loop, our algorithm infers such
contextual commutativity information, and uses it to discover a sound contextual reduction of
the program that can be proved correct. The proof is in the pudding: the algorithm decides which
reductions are sound and among those which can be proved correct by actually producing proofs
of soundness of reductions and correctness of at least one specific reduction. Slacker can discover
a proof for the program in Figure 3 in a few seconds.
3 BACKGROUND
3.1 Programs and Proofs
Programs as Regular Languages. St denotes the (possibly infinite) set of program states. For
example, we haveSt = Z×Z for a programwith two integer variables. LetA ⊆ P(St) be a (possibly
infinite) set of assertions. Σ denotes a finite alphabet of program statements. For multithreaded
programs, statements are annotated with thread identifiers to distinguish the same statement of
different threads. We assume a bounded number of threads.
We refer to a finite string of statements as a (program) trace. For each statement a ∈ Σ, we
associate a semantics JaK ⊆ St × St and extend J−K to traces via (relation) composition. A trace
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τ ∈ Σ∗ is said to be infeasible if Jτ K(St) = ∅, where Jτ K(St) denotes the image of Jτ K under St .
Note that the set of program traces is a superset of the set of concrete program executions (i.e.
feasible program traces).
Without loss of generality, we define a program as a language of traces. The semantics of a
program P is simply the union of the semantics of its traces JPK = ⋃x ∈P JxK. Concretely, one may
obtain the language of program traces by interpreting the edge-labelled control-flow graph of the
program as a deterministic finite automaton (DFA): each location in the control flow graph is a DFA
state, and each edge in the control flow graph is a DFA transition. The control flow graph entry
location is the initial state of the DFA and all its exit locations are the DFA final states. We do not
define programs to necessarily be regular languages, but we do require our input programs to be
regular and many important results require this.
Program Safety. In the context of this paper, a program P is safe if all traces of P are infeasible, i.e.JPK(St) = ∅. Standard partial correctness specifications can be represented as safety via a simple
encoding. Given a precondition ϕ and a postconditionψ , the validity of the Hoare-triple {ϕ}P{ψ }
is equivalent to the safety of [ϕ] · P · [¬ψ ], where [] is a standard assume statement (or the singleton
language containing it), and · is language concatenation.
A proof is defined based on a finite set of assertions Π ⊆ A that includes true and false.
One can associate a regular language to each set of assertions Π by defining the NFA ΠN FA =
(Π, Σ,δΠ, true, {false}) where
δΠ(ϕpre ,a) = {ϕpost | JaK(ϕpre ) ⊆ ϕpost }.
We refer to L(ΠN FA), abbreviated as L(Π), as a proof. Intuitively, L(Π) consists of traces that can
be proven infeasible using only assertions in Π. The following proof rule is therefore sound [Farzan
et al. 2013, 2015; Heizmann et al. 2009]:
∃Π ⊆ A. P ⊆ L(Π)
P is safe
(Safe)
When P ⊆ L(Π), we say that L(Π) is a proof for P . A proof does not uniquely belong to any
particular program; a single language L(Π) may prove many programs correct. When both P and
L(Π) are regular, this check is decidable and polynomial on the sizes of their corresponding DFAs.
3.2 Reductions
A safe program may not admit a safety proof in a given language of assertions, or it may admit one
but the proof may be prohibitively complex. This has inspired the notion of program reductions.
The reduction of a program P is a simpler program P ′ that may be soundly proved safe in place of
the original program P . Below is a very general definition of program reductions.
Definition 3.1 (semantic reduction). If for programs P and P ′, P ′ is safe implies that P is safe, then
P ′ is a semantic reduction of P (written P ′ ⪯ P ).
The definition immediately gives rise to the following sound proof rule for proving safety:
∃P ′ ⪯ P ,Π ⊆ A. P ′ ⊆ L(Π)
P is safe
(SafeRed)
A program is safe if and only if ∅ is a valid reduction of the program, which means discovering a
semantic reduction and proving safety are mutually reducible to each other. Therefore, verifying
the existence of a semantic reduction is in general undecidable. Therefore, a very particular choice
of reduction is often used [Desai et al. 2014; Lipton 1975; von Gleissenthall et al. 2019].
There are instances in the literature [Farzan and Vandikas 2019; Lipton 1975] where a restricted
class of reductions have been used instead. For example, Lipton’s reductions are technically a family
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of choices of atomic blocks based on left/write-movers in the program. If one restricts the set of
possible reductions from all reductions (given in Definition 3.1) to a proper subset which more
amenable to algorithmic checking, then the rule becomes more amenable to automation. Fixing a
set R of (semantic) reductions will change the rule to:
∃P ′ ∈ R. P ′ ⊆ L(Π) ∀P ′ ∈ R. P ′ ⪯ P
P is safe
(SafeRed2)
In [Farzan and Vandikas 2019] one candidate for R was presented in the form of a set of syntactic
reductions which are called sleep set reductions. In this paper, we take a major step in defining a far
more general (yet decidable) set of semantic reductions as a candidate for R.
3.3 Tree Automata for Classes of Languages
It is possible to automate the checking of the first premise of the rule SafeRed2 through automata
theoretic techniques.
true
false
false
false false false
a ba
a
b
b
true
Fig. 4. Infinite tree representing
the language {a,ba}.
An infinite tree can encode a (potentially infinite) language of
finite words. Consider the tree on the right where nodes are labeled
with booleans and arcs are labeled with alphabet letters. A word
belongs to the language represented by such a tree if it labels a
path from the root to a true labeled node of the tree. A set of
languages can then be encoded as a set of infinite trees. Certain
sets of infinite trees are recognized by (finite state) automata over
infinite trees. Looping Tree Automata (LTAs) are a subclass of
Büchi Tree Automata where all states are accept states [Baader
and Tobies 2001]. The class of Looping Tree Automata is closed
under intersection and union, and checking emptiness of LTAs is
decidable. Unlike Büchi Tree Automata, emptiness can be decided
in linear time [Baader and Tobies 2001].
Definition 3.2. A Looping Tree Automaton (LTA) over |Σ|-ary, B-labelled trees is a tuple M =
(Q, Σ,∆,q0) where Q is a finite set of states, ∆ ⊆ Q × B × (Σ→ Q) is the transition relation, and q0
is the initial state.
Formally, M’s execution over a tree L is characterized by a run δ ∗ : Σ∗ → Q where δ ∗(ϵ) = q0
and (δ ∗(x),x ∈ L, λa. δ ∗(xa)) ∈ ∆ for all x ∈ Σ∗. The set of languages accepted byM is then defined
as L(M) = {L | ∃δ ∗. δ ∗ is a run ofM on L}.
Theorem 3.3 (from [Farzan and Vandikas 2019]). Given an LTAM and a regular language L,
it is decidable whether ∃P ∈ L(M). P ⊆ L.
Note that Theorem 3.3 is effectively providing an automation recipe for the proof rule SafeRed2.
In [Farzan and Vandikas 2019], a construction was given for a Looping Tree Automaton (LTA) that
recognizes a specific family of reductions, called sleep-set reductions of an input program P , which
were shown to be useful in proving hypersafety properties of programs. In this paper, we will
provide two extensions: a family of static semi-commutative reductions and a family of contextual
reductions which are specifically useful for simplification of concurrent program proofs.
4 SEMI-COMMUTATIVE REDUCTIONS
We introduce a class of reductions inspired by semi-commutative Mazurkiewicz traces (aka semi-
trace monoids) and Lipton’s [Lipton 1975] left/right-movers.
Let I ⊆ Σ × Σ be an irreflexive (but not necessarily symmetric) semi-independence relation. Let
⊑I be the smallest preorder satisfying σabρ ⊑I σbaρ for all σ , ρ ∈ Σ∗ and (a,b) ∈ I . The upwards
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and downwards closures of a language L ⊆ Σ∗ with respect to ⊑I are respectively denoted by ⌈L⌉ I
and ⌊L⌋ I and defined as:
⌈L⌉ I = {u | ∃v ∈ L.v ⊑I u} ⌊L⌋ I = {u | ∃v ∈ L.u ⊑I v}
A language L is upwards-closed (resp. downwards-closed) with respect to ⊑I if L = ⌈L⌉ I (resp.
L = ⌊L⌋ I ).
If I is a symmetric relation, then ⊑I becomes an equivalence relation and its equivalence classes
are known as Mazurkiewicz traces [Diekert and Métivier 1997]. As is the case with Mazurkiewicz
traces, relation I is of interest in program verification when it is sound, i.e. JabK ⊆ JbaK for all
(a,b) ∈ I .
Definition 4.1 (semi-commutative reduction). A program P ′ is a semi-commutative reduction of a
program P , denoted by P ′ ⪯I P , if P ⊆ ⌊P ′⌋ I .
Intuitively, in the reduction P ′, it is safe to remove smaller traces (with respect to ⊑I ) in favour
of larger ones. I is sound if σ ⊑I ρ =⇒ JσK ⊆ JρK. Sound relations define sound reductions for
safety verification. Formally:
Lemma 4.2. If I is a sound semi-independence relation and P ′ ⪯I P then P ′ ⪯ P .
Proof. Since I is sound, it follows that σ ⊑I τ implies JσK ⊆ Jτ K for any σ ,τ ∈ Σ∗. Then for any
a,b ∈ St we have
(a,b) ∈ JPK =⇒ ∃σ ∈ P . (a,b) ∈ JσK
=⇒ ∃σ ∈ ⌊P ′⌋ I . (a,b) ∈ JσK
=⇒ ∃σ . ∃τ ∈ P ′. σ ⊑I τ ∧ (a,b) ∈ JσK
=⇒ ∃σ . ∃τ ∈ P ′. σ ⊑I τ ∧ (a,b) ∈ Jτ K
=⇒ ∃τ ∈ P ′. (a,b) ∈ Jτ K
=⇒ (a,b) ∈ JP ′K
so JPK ⊆ JP ′K and therefore P ′ ⪯ P . □
Example 4.3. Recall the example from Section 2 illustrated in Figure 1. inc() semi-commutes
with dec() in the sense that it would be sound to have (dec(), inc()) ∈ I . But, the inverse is
not true: (inc(), dec()) < I . The sequential program of Figure 2 is a sound semi-commutative
reduction of the program in Figure 1.
Ideally, the set of all (sound) semi-commutative reductions of a program would replace R in
the premise of the rule SafeRed2. Unfortunately, this is not possible. It has already been argued
in [Farzan and Vandikas 2019] that the premise check ∃P ′ ∈ R .P ′ ⊆ L(Π) is undecidable for an
arbitrary Π for the special case where I is symmetric. Considering our scenario is strictly more
general, the undecidability result follows straightforwardly. Fortunately, there exists a suitable
approximation of the set of semi-commutative reductions that can be used as a candidate for R
rendering the premise decidable.
4.1 A Representable Class of Semi-Commutative Reductions
Recall from Section 3.3 that a language can be represented by an infinite labelled tree, where the
arcs are labelled with program statements. To reduce a language in a constructive way (in contrast
to Definition 4.1), one can prune this infinite tree in a style inspired by partial order reduction
[Godefroid 1996]. Pruning the tree is equivalent to removing words from the language, which
defines a reduction.
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Consider the tree depicted in Figure 5(i) which corresponds to the language of all traces of a simple
program a ∥ bcd . Assume that we have I = {(b,a), (d,a)}. Imagine a (depth-first) traversal of the
tree in prefix order starting from the root. Once the left-most branch of the tree is explored, which
corresponds to the program run abcd , the algorithm explores the right branch at the root. Here,
the algorithm chooses not to explore the run bacd , since (b,a) ∈ I (and therefore bacd ⊑I abcd)
and abcd has already been explored. This branch is greyed out in Figure 5(ii) to indicate that it is
pruned. The algorithm continues its exploration and decides to prune bcda since bcda ⊑I bcad and
bcad is explored beforehand.
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Fig. 5. An example illustrating reductions as prunings of the tree representing the program language.
Now let us slightly tweak the algorithm’s traversal strategy. At the root, we choose to go right
first (instead of left as before). At every other internal node, we do prefix traversal as before. Now,
the algorithm sees bacd first, bcad second, and as before, prunes bcda since bcda ⊑I bcad . This is
illustrated in Figure 5(iii). Then finally, it gets to the leftmost branch from the root and explores
abcd . Note that abcd cannot be pruned. We have bacd ⊑I abcd , but the inverse is not true, that is
abcd ̸⊑I bacd . The change of the traversal strategy changes the reduction that is acquired.
A particular reduction is parametric on the non-deterministic choices made about which branch to
explore first. They determine what program traces are pruned in favour of others visited before them
which are larger with respect to ⊑I . Different non-deterministic choices lead to different reductions.
Two such reductions are depicted in Figure 5(ii,iii) for two different choices of exploration strategy
at the root. Note that one can change the exploration strategy at every internal node (with more
than one successor) to enumerate more reductions of this particular language. Reductions are
then characterized by an assignment O : Σ∗ → Lin(Σ) of nodes to linear orderings on Σ, where
(a,b) ∈ O(σ ) means that at node σ (i.e. the node labeled by string σ from the root), we explore
the child σa after the child σb. Each O combined with the semi-independence relation I defines a
reduction P↓I,O of the program P :
P↓I,O = P \ {ρaσbτ | ρ,σ ,τ ∈ Σ∗ ∧ (a,b) ∈ O(ρ) ∧ ∀c ∈ aσ . (c,b) ∈ I }
where smaller (with respect to ⊑I ) strings are pruned away in favour of the larger ones. If program
P is upwards closed, then the aggressive pruning defined above is sound:
Lemma 4.4. For all O : Σ∗ → Lin(Σ), if P is upwards-closed then P↓I,O ⪯I P .
Proof. First, we define the following order on traces:
σaτ1 <O σbτ2 ⇐⇒ (b,a) ∈ O(x) ∧ |τ1 | = |τ2 |
This relation is a variation of the standard lexicographical well-ordering on strings of the same
length, and is a well-order as well.
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Assume σ ∈ P . It suffices to show that σ ∈ ⌊P↓I,O ⌋ I . We proceed by induction on σ using <O
with the induction hypothesis σ ′ <O σ =⇒ σ ′ ∈ ⌊P↓I,O ⌋ I for all σ ′ ∈ P .
If σ ∈ P↓I,O then there is nothing left to prove.
If σ < P↓I,O , then by the definition of P↓I,O we have σ = σ1aσ2bσ3 for some σ1,σ2,σ3 ∈ Σ∗
and a,b ∈ Σ such that (a,b) ∈ O(σ1) and (c,b) ∈ I for all c ∈ aσ2. Define σ ′ = σ1baσ2σ3. Then
we have σ = σ1aσ2bσ3 ⊑I σ1baσ2σ3 = σ ′ which implies σ ′ ∈ P (since P is upwards-closed). Since
(a,b) ∈ O(σ1) we also have σ ′ <O σ , and therefore by the inductive hypothesis and transitivity of
⊑I we have σ ∈ ⌊P↓I,O ⌋ I . □
The set of all such reductions for a program and a fixed semi-independence relation I can then
be defined by enumerating all such order relations.
Definition 4.5 (S-Reduction). For a sound semi-independence relation I and an upwards closed
program P , the set of S-reductions of P is defined as
SRedI (P) = {P↓I,O | O : Σ∗ → Lin(Σ)}.
a3a1 a2 a4
a3a1 a4b2
 
{a3}
{a1}
(a3, a2) 62 I
(a2, a1) 2 I
The good news is that S-reductions can be effectively repre-
sented as the language of an LTA (Looping Tree Automaton) as
defined in Section 3.3. The intuition behind the construction of
the LTA recognizing SRedI (P) is as follows. The state of the LTA
keeps track of the set of transitions that can be ignored during the
exploration, referred to as sleep sets. The idea is that the sleep set at
the root of the tree is always empty, since nothing can be ignored
there. The child node inherits the sleep set of the parent node,
adds to it the transitions that have already been explored from the
parent node (which is retrievable from O(σ )) and removes from
it anything that is not semi-independent on the transition taken
from the parent to the child. Ignored transitions define ignored nodes in a tree in a straightforward
manner: a node is not ignored if there is a path of (all) unignored transitions to it from the root. For
example, in the figure on the right, if at node σ , the transition a3 can be ignored, then it means
all the descendents of σa3 are also ignored. If ai ’s are traversed in ascending order of i’s, then by
the time we get to σa2, we have already explored σa1 and its descendants. At σa2, we can ignore
a1 in addition to a3 which is already in the sleep set of σ . However, it is assumed that (a2,a3) < I .
Therefore, we have to remove a3 from the inherited sleep set. Therefore, at σa2, a1 is the only thing
that can be ignored. The LTA effectively accepts all such trees for all possible choices of O(σ ) at
each node σ by maintaining these (finite) sleep sets in its state. The full construction, which is
inspired by the one given in [Farzan and Vandikas 2019] for a symmetric I , appears in the proof of
the Theorem below:
Theorem 4.6. For any regular language P and semi-independence relation I , the set of S-reductions
of P defined by I is recognized by an LTA.
Proof. First, observe that the set {ρaσbτ | ρ,σ ,τ ∈ Σ∗ ∧ (a,b) ∈ O(ρ) ∧ ∀c ∈ aσ . (c,b) ∈ I }
that appears in the definition of P↓I,O is equivalent to the set ignoreI,O , defined as the smallest set
satisfying
σ ∈ ignoreI,O =⇒ σa ∈ ignoreI,O
a ∈ sleepI,O (σ ) =⇒ σa ∈ ignoreI,O
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where sleepI,O (σ ) is defined recursively as
sleepI,O (ϵ) = ∅
sleepI,O (σa) = (sleepI,O (σ ) ∪O(σ )(a)) ∩ I (a).
The recursive nature of these definitions lend themselves to a simple LTA construction for SRedI (P).
LetAP = (Q, Σ,δ ,q0, F ) be aDFA recognizing P .We define our LTA constructionMP = (QP , Σ,∆P ,q0P )
where
• QP = Q × B × P(Σ),
• ∆P = {((q, ι, S),B, f ) | ∃O ∈ Lin(Σ).
(B ⇐⇒ q ∈ F ∧ ¬ι) ∧
∀a. f (a) = (δ (q,a), ι ∨ a ∈ S, (S ∪O(a)) ∩ I (a))}
,
• q0P = (q0,⊥, ∅).
It follows by a simple inductive proof that any δ ∗P : Σ
∗ → QP is a valid run of MP iff there exists
some O : Σ∗ → Lin(Σ) such that δ ∗P (σ ) = (δ ∗(q0,σ ),σ ∈ ignoreI,O , sleepI,O (σ )) for all σ ∈ Σ∗.
This implies that L(MP ) = SRedI (P). □
Since the set of S-reductions is parametric on I , it is interesting to explore the connection
between two different reduction sets SRedI (P) and SRedJ (P) when I ⊆ J . It is tempting to think
that I ⊆ J =⇒ ∀P . SRedJ (P) ⊆ SRedI (P). The more liberal semi-independence relation, in this
case J , permits more aggressive prunings and hence produces smaller reductions. But its reductions
are not reductions of I , specially if I ⊂ J . The following statement is true, which has the same
desired positive effect for proof checking:
Proposition 4.7. Given a program P , two semi-independence relations I and J , and an ordering
function O : Σ∗ → Lin(Σ), if I ⊆ J then P↓J ,O ⊆ P↓I,O .
Proof. Recall the definitions of sleepI,O and ignoreI,O from Lemma 4.6, and that P↓I,O =
P \ ignoreI,O . A simple inductive proof gives us ∀σ . sleepI,O (σ ) ⊆ sleepJ ,O (σ ). This in turn implies
(again by a simple inductive proof) ∀σ . ignoreI,O ⊆ ignoreJ ,O , which implies P↓J ,O ⊆ P↓I,O . □
This means that if the program has a proof up to a reduction with a weaker semi-independence
relation, it will always have a proof for a reduction according to a stronger semi-independence
relation. It also implies in a straightforward manner that these reductions subsume the reductions
proposed in [Farzan and Vandikas 2019] based on symmetric independence relations.
In the special case where I is symmetric (as is the case in [Farzan and Vandikas 2019]), each L ∈
SRedI (P) is guaranteed to be optimal in the sense that the elements of L are pairwise incomparable
[Farzan and Vandikas 2019]. Unfortunately, this does not hold for a general (non-symmetric) I .
For example, the language defined by the tree in Figure 5(iii) is a strict superset of the language
defined by the tree in Figure 5(ii). Specifically, the language of the tree in Figure 5(iii) contains both
abcd and bacd , and the latter trace is redundant because bacd ⊑I abcd . Therefore, some program
reductions defined by SRedI (P) contain redundant traces and are non-optimal.
4.2 Computing a Sound Semi-Independence Relation
LTA-representability of the class of S-reductions (Theorem 4.6) is the key result of Section 4.
Soundness of S-reductions relies on Lemmas 4.2 and 4.4. Lemma 4.4 requires that the program P is
upwards-closed with respect to the independence relation I and Lemma 4.2 requires that I is sound.
Here, we outline how a relation I that satisfies both criteria can be constructed, with the help of a
theorem prover. Proposition 4.7 implies that one should try to obtain as large of an independence
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relation as possible in order to maximize the likelihood that there exists a reduction with a proof.
One can show that every program P admits a maximal semi-independence relation IP .
The (Brzozowski) derivative of a language P and a string σ is defined as
σ−1P = {τ ∈ Σ∗ | στ ∈ P}.
Theorem 4.8. The relation IP defined as IP = {(a,b) | a , b ∧ ∀σ . (σab)−1P ⊆ (σba)−1P} is the
largest (with respect to ⊆) semi-independence relation such that P = ⌈P⌉ IP (upwards closedness of P ).
Proof. First we show P = ⌈P⌉ IP . Clearly P ⊆ ⌈P⌉ IP , so it suffices to show ⌈P⌉ IP ⊆ P .
Assume σ ∈ ⌈P⌉ IP . Since σ is in the upwards closure of P , there must exist something in P that is
below σ , so we obtain some τ ∈ P such that τ ⊑I σ . Then τ can be obtained from σ by performing
some finite number of swaps n; we shall use τ ⊑nI σ to denote this. We proceed by induction on n,
with the inductive hypothesis τ ′ ⊑n−1I σ =⇒ σ ∈ ⌈P⌉ IP for all τ ′ ∈ P whenever n > 0.
If n = 0, then τ = σ , so clearly σ ∈ P .
If n > 0, then τ = τ1abτ2 for some τ1,τ2 ∈ Σ∗ and a,b ∈ Σ such that (a,b) ∈ IP and τ1baτ2 ⊑n−1IP σ .
By the definition of IP we have τ1baτ2 ∈ P from τ1abτ2 ∈ P , and by the inductive hypothesis we
have σ ∈ P .
Next, we show that IP is maximal. It suffices to show that P is not upwards closed for any
semi-independence relation I that includes a pair (a,b) ∈ I such that (σab)−1P ⊈ (σba)−1P for
some σ ∈ P . By the definition of the derivative there exists some τ such that σabτ ∈ P and σbaτ < P .
Then σabτ ⊑I σbaτ , which violates upwards closedness. □
When P is regular (as is the case for all of our input programs), it is possible to construct IP
directly, as the proposition ∀σ . (σab)−1P ⊆ (σba)−1P is equivalent to a subsumption relation on
states of the DFA recognizing P [Diekert and Rozenberg 1995].
Theorem 4.9. If P is regular, then IP is computable.
Proof. Let A = (Q, Σ,δ ,q0, F ) be the minimal DFA representing P . We define Aq to be the DFA
obtained by replacing q0 with q in A. Then we have
(∀σ . (σab)−1P ⊆ (σba)−1P) ⇐⇒ (∀σ ,τ . σabτ ∈ P =⇒ σbaτ ∈ P)
⇐⇒ (∀σ ,τ . δ ∗(q0,σabτ ) ∈ F =⇒ δ ∗(q0,σbaτ ) ∈ F )
⇐⇒ (∀σ ,τ . δ ∗(δ ∗(q0,σab),τ ) ∈ F =⇒ δ ∗(δ ∗(q0,σba),τ ) ∈ F )
⇐⇒ (∀q,τ . δ ∗(δ ∗(q,ab),τ ) ∈ F =⇒ δ ∗(δ ∗(q,ba),τ ) ∈ F )
⇐⇒ (∀q.L(Aδ ∗(q,ab)) ⊆ L(Aδ ∗(q,ba)))
Since regular language inclusion is decidable, it follows that we can compute IP by iterating over
all possible pairs of statements. □
IP may be unsound. One can always obtain a maximal sound semi-independence relation by
removing from IP all statements a and b that do not satisfy JabK ⊆ JbaK. This last step needs to be
performed by making calls to a theorem prover. Note that since a and b are program statements,
the computation of this relation takes place once at the beginning of the verification process by
making a quadratic number (in the program size) of calls to a solver.
5 CONTEXTUAL REDUCTIONS
We introduce the notion of context for program reductions through the definition of a contextual
semi-independence relation. The independence relation is strengthened through the consideration
of the context information, where statements can be declared (semi-) commutative only in some
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contexts. Context is typically considered to be a state (or a set of states) from which the transitions
are being considered [Godefroid and Pirottin 1993; Katz and Peled 1992]. We propose a different
notion of context which is more useful in our language-theoretic setting, where the history of the
trace is used as context.
Concretely, a contextual semi-independence relation is a function I : Σ∗ → P(Σ × Σ) from traces
to irreflexive relations. Intuitively (a,b) ∈ I(σ ) should hold for statements a and b and a program
trace σ where a can be swapped with b in context σ , that is JσabK ⊆ JσbaK. Note that contextual
semi-independence subsumes normal semi-independence, which can be considered as the special
case of a constant function; i.e. the same independence relation is assigned to all contexts.
Define ⊑I to be the smallest preorder satisfying σabρ ⊑I σbaρ for all σ , ρ ∈ Σ∗ and (a,b) ∈ I(σ ).
Upwards and downwards closure and closedness are defined as before. We say I is sound ifJσabK ⊆ JσbaK for all σ ∈ Σ∗ and (a,b) ∈ I(σ ).
Example 5.1. Recall the example of Figure 3, where we discussed the idea of contextual commu-
tativity of inc() and dec() at the high level in Section 2. Concretely, (inc(), dec()) ∈ I(σ ) and
(dec(), inc()) ∈ I(σ ), for all σ where the number of inc() statements is strictly larger than the
number of dec() statements in σ .
Since our contexts are defined language-theoretically, the definition of ↓ can be naturally extended
to support contexts. Define
P↓I,O = P \ {σaρbυ | σ , ρ,υ ∈ Σ∗ ∧ (a,b) ∈ O(σ ) ∧ ∀τc ≤· aρ. (c,b) ∈ I(στ )}
where ≤· is the prefix relation on strings. Similar to the definition of semi-commutative reductions,
strings are soundly pruned from the program language to obtain each reduction P↓I,O , where
O is an order that determines the exploration strategy for the particular reduction. The set of all
reductions is then defined as
CRedI(P) = {P↓I,O | O : Σ∗ → Lin(Σ)}.
When I is a constant function, which makes the contextual relation collapse into the standard
semi-independence relation of Definition 4.1, CRedI(P) is representable as an LTA (by Theorem
4.6). This does not hold true for a general I. Since the goal of this paper is the development of
algorithms for enumerating reductions effectively, we are strictly interested in cases where for a
given I, the set of reductions CRedI(P) is LTA representable.
5.1 A Representable Class of Contextual Reductions
A contextual semi-independence relation I : Σ∗ → P(Σ × Σ) can be alternatively viewed as
an infinite tree labelled by a standard semi-independence relation. Thus we call I regular if it
corresponds to a regular tree. An infinite tree is regular iff it contains a finite number of unique
subtrees. Equivalently, an infinite tree is regular iff it can be generated by a modified DFAwith states
marked with arbitrary labels (in our case, semi-independence relations) instead just being labelled
as final or non-final. Since O : Σ∗ → Lin(Σ) can be viewed as an infinite tree, its regularity can be
accordingly defined. Program reductions induced by regular contextual independence relations are
LTA-representable:
Theorem 5.2. If I is regular, then CRedI(P) is representable as an LTA.
Proof. First, observe that the set {σaρbυ | σ , ρ,υ ∈ Σ∗∧(a,b) ∈ O(σ )∧∀τc ≤· aρ. (c,b) ∈ I(στ )}
that appears in the definition of P↓I,O is equivalent to the set ignoreI,O , defined as the smallest
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set satisfying
σ ∈ ignoreI,O =⇒ σa ∈ ignoreI,O
a ∈ sleepI,O (σ ) =⇒ σa ∈ ignoreI,O
where sleepI,O (σ ) is defined recursively as
sleepI,O (ϵ) = ∅
sleepI,O (σa) = (sleepI,O (σ ) ∪O(σ )(a)) ∩ I(σ )(a).
The recursive nature of these definitions lend themselves to a simple LTA construction forCRedI(P).
Let AP = (QP , Σ,δP ,q0P , FP ) and AI = (QI , Σ,δI ,q0I , FI) be automata recognizing P and I,
respectively. We define our LTA constructionMPI = (QPI , Σ,∆PI ,q0PI) where
• QPI = QP ×QI × B × P(Σ),
• ∆P = {((qP ,qI , ι, S),B, f ) | ∃O ∈ Lin(Σ).
(B ⇐⇒ qP ∈ FP ∧ ¬ι) ∧
∀a. f (a) = (δP (qP ,a),δI(qI ,a), ι ∨ a ∈ S, (S ∪O(a)) ∩ FI(qI)(a))}
,
• q0PI = (q0P ,q0I ,⊥, ∅).
It follows by a simple inductive proof that any δ ∗PI : Σ
∗ → QPI is a valid run ofMPI iff there exists
someO : Σ∗ → Lin(Σ) such that δ ∗PI(σ ) = (δ ∗P (q0P ,σ ),δ ∗I(q0I ,σ ),σ ∈ ignoreI,O , sleepI,O (σ )) for
all σ ∈ Σ∗. This implies that L(MPI) = CRedI(P). □
Similar to the semi-commutative case (stated in Theorem 4.8), every program P has a maximal
contextual semi-independence relation IP , defined as
IP (σ ) = {(a,b) | a , b ∧ (σab)−1P ⊆ (σba)−1P}.
One can naturally lift ⊆ to functions, where I1 ⊆ I2 iff ∀σ .I1(σ ) ⊆ I2(σ ). This provides an order
on the set of contextual relations with respect to which one can define maximality. This leads us to
the contextual analog of Theorem 4.8:
Theorem 5.3. IP is the largest (with respect to ⊆) semi-independence relation satisfying P = ⌈P⌉IP .
Proof. First we show P = ⌈P⌉IP . Clearly P ⊆ ⌈P⌉IP , so it suffices to show ⌈P⌉IP ⊆ P .
Assume σ ∈ ⌈P⌉IP . Since σ is in the upwards closure of P , there must exist something in P that is
below σ , so we obtain some τ ∈ P such that τ ⊑I σ . Then τ can be obtained from σ by performing
some finite number of swaps n; we shall use τ ⊑nI σ to denote this. We proceed by induction on n,
with the inductive hypothesis τ ′ ⊑n−1I σ =⇒ σ ∈ ⌈P⌉IP for all τ ′ ∈ P whenever n > 0.
If n = 0, then τ = σ , so clearly σ ∈ P .
If n > 0, then τ = τ1abτ2 for some τ1,τ2 ∈ Σ∗ and a,b ∈ Σ such that (a,b) ∈ IP (τ1) and
τ1baτ2 ⊑n−1IP σ . By the definition of IP we have τ1baτ2 ∈ P from τ1abτ2 ∈ P , and by the inductive
hypothesis we have σ ∈ P .
Next, we show that IP is maximal. It suffices to show that P is not upwards closed for any
contextual semi-independence relation I that includes a pair (a,b) ∈ I(σ ) such that (σab)−1P ⊈
(σba)−1P for some σ ∈ P . By the definition of the derivative there exists some τ such that σabτ ∈ P
and σbaτ < P . Then σabτ ⊑I σbaτ , which violates upwards closedness. □
When P is a regular language, IP is a computable function. In fact, a stronger result holds:
Theorem 5.4. If P is regular then so is IP .
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Proof. Let A = (Q, Σ,δ ,q0, F ) be a DFA for P . Define A′ = (Q, Σ,δ ,q0, F ′) where F ′ : Σ∗ →
P(Σ × Σ) is defined as
F ′(q) = {(a,b) | a , b ∧ L(Aδ ∗(q,ab)) ⊆ L(Aδ ∗(q,ba))}.
Then
(a,b) ∈ IP (σ ) ⇐⇒ a , b ∧ (σab)−1P ⊆ (σba)−1P
⇐⇒ a , b ∧ (∀τ . σabτ ∈ P =⇒ σbaτ ∈ P)
⇐⇒ a , b ∧ (∀τ . δ ∗(q0,σabτ ) ∈ F =⇒ δ ∗(q0,σbaτ ) ∈ F )
⇐⇒ a , b ∧ (∀τ . δ ∗(q0,σabτ ) ∈ F =⇒ δ ∗(q0,σbaτ ) ∈ F )
⇐⇒ a , b ∧ (∀τ . δ ∗(δ ∗(q0,σab),τ ) ∈ F =⇒ δ ∗(δ ∗(q0,σba),τ ) ∈ F )
⇐⇒ a , b ∧Aδ ∗(δ ∗(q0,σ ),ab) ⊆ Aδ ∗(δ ∗(q0,σ ),ba)
⇐⇒ (a,b) ∈ F ′(δ ∗(q0,σ ))
which is the acceptance condition for A′. □
As in the semi-commutative case, there is no guarantee that IP is sound, and one may obtain a
maximal sound contextual semi-independence relation IsoundP by removing the unsound elements:
IsoundP (σ ) = IP (σ ) \ {(a,b) | JσabK ⊈ JσbaK}.
Unlike the semi-commutative case, where any semi-commutative relation defines an LTA-representable
set of reductions, there is no guarantee that CRedIsoundP (P) is LTA-representable.
Theorem 5.5. The set CRedIsoundP (P) generally cannot be represented by an LTA.
Proof. We reduce representability ofCRedIsoundP (P) to safety. For a contradiction, assumeCRedIsoundP (P)
is representable by an LTA for any regular P .
Let P ′ be any regular program, and let a and b be two statements that do not appear in P ′, are
always enabled, and only soundly commute in an inconsistent context, i.e. JaK and JbK are total
and a and b only commute in context σ if σ is infeasible. For example, one can take statements
x ← 0 and x ← 1.
Let P = P ′ · {ab,ba}. By our initial assumption, CRedIsoundP (P) is representable by an LTA. By
definition, CRedIsoundP (P) is non-empty. Every non-empty LTA contains a regular language [Farzan
and Vandikas 2019], so we obtain a regular language R ∈ CRedIsoundP (P). Since R is a reduction of P
and a subset of P , it follows that P is sound iff R is sound.
Every trace in R ends in either ab or ba. If P is sound, then for any σ ∈ P we cannot have both
σab ∈ R and σba ∈ R: σ is infeasible, which means a and b are independent in context σ , which
means that at least one of these strings will be pruned (depending on whether a or b is explored
first at σ ).
Conversely, if P is unsound then so is R, and there must exist a feasible trace σab ∈ R. Since a
and b are always enabled, it follows that σ is also feasible. Since σ is feasible, it follows that a and b
do not commute in context σ , so R must also include σba.
Thus P is unsafe iff R contains a pair of traces σab and σba. Since R is regular, this can easily be
checked by examining the states of the DFA accepting R. Thus we have a decision procedure for
safety, which is not possible. □
This makes IsoundP unsuitable for use in automated verification. Fortunately, we have a solution
for this problem. Recall that the ultimate goal is to find some reduction P↓I,O that can be proven
safe, and to this end, it is not necessary that I be maximal. It is difficult (if not impossible), without
Proc. ACM Program. Lang., Vol. 1, No. POPL, Article 1. Publication date: January 2020.
1:16 Azadeh Farzan and Anthony Vandikas
knowing anything about the proof, to make a correct choice about I in advance. Therefore, we
can be clever and handle the choice of I in the same way that we handle the choice of a particular
exploration order O for a reduction: we construct the set of all possible P↓I,O over all possible I
and O . It will be left to the verification algorithm to discover the right choices for both I and O .
a1 ak
 
. . .
...
inde
pa1,a2
indepak 1 ,ak
Since not all independence relations are sound, we ensure our
reductions are valid by adding additional soundness constraints
to each reduction in the form of additional traces that can
only be proven correct if the underlying independence relation
is sound. This is done via an additional set of independence
statements Σindep = {indepa,b | a,b ∈ Σ} with the semanticsJindepa,bK = JabK \ JbaK. Intuitively, each indepa,b is infeasible
iff it is executed in a state where statement a commutes to the
right of b. As illustrated on the right, for every node σ , and
each pair of outgoing transitions ai and aj , a new independence
transition with the label indepai ,aj is added to a new fresh state. The states/transitions illustrated in
blue are the new additions. The set of soundness constraints for a particular independence relation
I : Σ∗ → P(Σ × Σ) is then defined as
sound(I) = {σ · indepa,b | (a,b) ∈ I(σ )}.
Intuitively, this corresponds to unreachability of all newly added (blue) states in the schematic
figure above, which is formalized in the lemma below:
Lemma 5.6. I is sound iff Jsound(I)K = ∅.
Proof. Assume I is sound and let σ · indepa,b be any trace in sound(I). ThenJσ · indepa,bK = JσK ◦ Jindepa,bK
= JσK ◦ (JabK \ JbaK)
= (JσK ◦ JabK) \ (JσK ◦ JbaK)
= JσabK \ JσbaK
= ∅,
so soundness of I implies safety of sound(I).
For the other direction, assume σ ∈ Σ∗ and a,b ∈ Σ such that Jσ · indepa,bK = ∅. By the above
derivation we have JσabK \ JσbaK = ∅, which implies JσabK ⊆ JσbaK. □
At this point, we can claim P is safe if both P↓I,O and sound(I) are safe. Since two programs are
safe iff their union is safe, we can treat P↓I,O and sound(I) as a single reduction by taking their
union.
Theorem 5.7. For any independence relation I : Σ∗ → P(Σ × Σ) and upwards-closed program P ,
P↓I,O ∪ sound(I) ⪯ P .
Proof. Follows trivially from Lemma 5.6 and soundness of C-reductions. □
Finally, we are ready to define our set of contextual reductions.
Definition 5.8 (C-Reductions). Given a program P , the set of C-reductions of the program is
defined as:
CRed∗(P) = {P↓I,O ∪ sound(I) | O : Σ∗ → Lin(Σ),I ⊆ IP }.
C-reductions, like S-reductions, are effectively representable for algorithmic verification:
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Theorem 5.9. For any regular program P the set of C-reductions (i.e. CRed∗(P)) of P is recognized
by an LTA.
Proof. Let AP = (QP , Σ,δP ,q0P , FP ) and AIP = (QIP , Σ,δIP ,q0IP , FIP ) be automata recognizing
P and IP , respectively. We define our LTA constructionMP ∗ = (QP ∗ , Σ,∆P ∗ ,q0P ∗ ) where
• QP ∗ = (QP ×QIP × B × P(Σ)) ∪ B,
• ∆P = {(B,B, λa.⊥)}
∪ {((qP ,qIP , ι, S),B, f ) | ∃I ⊆ FIP (qIP ),O ∈ Lin(Σ).
(B ⇐⇒ qP ∈ FP ∧ ¬ι) ∧
(∀a,b . f (indepa,b ) = ((a,b) ∈ I )) ∧
(∀a < Σindep. f (a) = (δP (qP ,a),δIP (qIP ,a), ι ∨ a ∈ S, (S ∪O(a)) ∩ I (a)))}
,
• q0P ∗ = (q0P ,q0IP ,⊥, ∅).
It follows by a simple inductive proof that any δ ∗P ∗ : Σ
∗ → QP ∗ is a valid run ofMP ∗ iff there exists
some I : Σ∗ → P(Σ × Σ) and O : Σ∗ → Lin(Σ) such that δ ∗P ∗ (σ ) = (δ ∗P (q0P ,σ ),δ ∗IP (q0IP ,σ ),σ ∈
ignoreI,O , sleepI,O (σ )), δ ∗P ∗ (σ · indepa,b ) = ⊤, and δ ∗P ∗ (σ · indepa,b · τ ) = ⊥ for all σ ∈ Σ∗,
τ ∈ (Σ ∪ Σindep)+, and a,b ∈ Σ. This implies that L(MP ∗ ) = CRed∗(P). □
Note that since the LTA represents the set of all reductions with all possible choices of I, it
includes the reductions with the specific choice of the maximal sound contextual relation IsoundP .
Therefore, reductions based on IsoundP will be considered for the proof without the need for them
to be captured by an LTA as a single set.
5.2 Finite Programs
There is research [Wang et al. 2009] that focuses on reductions in the context of bounded model
checking (i.e. bug finding) for concurrent programs. It is therefore worthwhile to mention that for
this special class of programs, where the program language includes only finitely many traces, an
appropriate regular reduction always exists.
Theorem 5.10. For any finite P , there exists a sound regular independence relation I ⊆ IP such
that CRedI(P) = CRedIP (P).
Proof. Any trace τ that is not a prefix of any trace in P is irrelevant as far as independence is
concerned. An independence relation may choose to declare any and all statements independent at
τ without affecting the set of traces to be pruned. There is nothing to prune anyways. Thus we
define I to be the restriction of IP to P :
I(σ ) = {(a,b) ∈ IP (σ ) | ∃τ . στ ∈ P}.
While I(σ ) may not have a finite representation, it is still computable (assuming the set of state-
ments are semantically within a decidable logic). Since P is finite, we may calculate exactly what
independencies should hold at each trace in P . An automaton accepting I(σ ) simply has to check
whether σ ∈ P . □
While the “ideal” independence relation IsoundP defined previously may not be regular (and
therefore may not satisfy the precondition of Theorem 5.2), Theorem 5.10 implies that we can
always construct another regular independence relation that produces equivalent reductions. This
implies that completeness with respect to reductions can be achieved for bounded programs, while
it is not achievable for general (unbounded) programs.
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6 RELATIONSHIP TO KNOWN REDUCTION TECHNIQUES
Now that we have introduced C-reductions, it is only natural to ask if they subsume some well-
understood and widely used reduction techniques specific to certain program classes. To this end,
we investigate the relation between C-reductions and the two known approaches of Lipton [Lipton
1975] and Existential Boundedness [Genest et al. 2007].
6.1 Lipton’s Atomic Block Reductions
In Lipton’s reductions, semi-commutativity properties of statements are used as sufficient conditions
to infer atomic blocks. Declaring a block of code atomic (and having it executed without interruption)
has the effect of reducing the number of thread interleavings that must be proved correct.
Lipton’s condition is based on left movers and right movers. A left mover (respectively right
mover) is a statement that soundly commutes to the left (respectively right) of every statement in
every other thread. A sequence of statements a1 . . . anbc1 . . . cm may be declared atomic if each
ai is a right mover and each c j is a left mover. First, note that Lipton’s original definition for
left/right-movers was a contextual definition. He defined an action to be a left/right-mover if it
left/right commutes from all concrete reachable program contexts. For a program with variables
ranging over infinite data domains, this implies infinitely many possible contexts. Therefore, a
corresponding contextual commutativity relation will be incomputable in general. Given a general
contextual left/right-mover specification, checking the soundness of it according to Lipton’s original
contextual definition is undecidable since determining the set of reachable states is undecidable
in general. This is perhaps why all instances of usage of Lipton’s reductions in the literature are
non-contextual. One can view our C-reductions as an attempt to provide a decidable approximation
of this original definition for program safety verification.
Let us now compare our (non-contextual) S-reductions against the commonly used non-contextual
definition of Lipton’s reductions. First, observe that Lipton’s reductions are not optimal, even if
maximal blocks of atomic codes are inferred. For example, consider a disjoint parallel program
a1a2 ∥ b1b2. Since every statement is both a left and a right mover, one can reduce the program
to A ∥ B where A = a1a2 and B = b1b2 are atomic blocks. Note that this reduction includes two
execution AB and BA which are equivalent. Therefore, one is redundant. The set of S-reductions of
this program will include reductions with no redundancies; there are 4 of them in total, and each
has a single trace in it.
Now, let us assume the program a1a2 ∥ b1b2 is not disjoint parallel anymore and a1 and b1 are
right movers. This means that P can still be reduced toA ∥ B with the same atomic blocks. Note that
Lipton’s definition of a right mover is strictly stronger than (and therefore implies) our definition
of semi-commutativity. That is, if a1 is a right mover, then for all l ∈ Σ, (a1, l) ∈ I . Therefore, we
have a sound semi-independence relation
I = {(a1,b1), (a1,b2), (b1,a1), (b1,a2)}.
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Fig. 6. S-reductions vs Lipton’s reductions.
The program is upwards-closed with respect to I . One
of the S-reductions of the program is illustrated in Figure
6. Assume that at every relevant node, the a transition
is explored first (which would correspond to the prefix
order traversal of the depicted tree). The figure illustrates
which runs are pruned (greyed out) and which remain in
the reduction. Specifically, the unexpected trace a1b1b2a2
has to remain in the reduction because the trace b1b2a1a2
which subsumes it is only visited later, and cannot be
used for pruning. Therefore, this particular s-reduction
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has an extra trace compared to Lipton’s reduction A ∥ B.
The rest of the choices of order (beyond always exploring
a’s before b’s at every point) will follow a similar pattern, and include other redundant runs. It
is easy to check that all four different S-reductions of this program include redundant traces in
addition to Lipton’s reduction.
The combination of the two examples demonstrate how our S-reductions and Lipton’s (non-
contextual) reductions are incomparable and therefore complementary. Note that for any concurrent
program (with a bounded number of threads), there are only finitely many choices for atomic
blocks. Therefore, one can imagine enumerating them all as a specialized reduction class. Since
there are finitely many possible reductions, the class of reductions is trivially recognizable by an
LTA. However, our generic C-reduction (or S-reduction) classes do not necessarily include all these
(finitely many) reductions.
6.2 Existential Boundedness
Programs operating on unbounded FIFO channels typically require quantified invariants for their
correctness proofs. For example, the simple code in Figure 7(a) requires an invariant stating that all
elements in transit at any given time are equal to 5. Note, however, that every trace of this program
is equivalent to a trace of the program in Figure 7(b) where every receive occurs right after its
corresponding send. For each trace in Figure 7(b), there is at most one element in transit at any
given time, which makes the program effectively finite state. The proposed approaches in [Desai
et al. 2014; von Gleissenthall et al. 2019], for example, verify the program in Figure 7(a) precisely
by transforming it to the one in Figure 7(b).
(a)
(b)
i = 0;
while (i < N) {
send(5);
i++;
}
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j = 0;
while (j < N) {
x = receive();
j++;
}
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i = 0;
while (i < N) {
send(5);
x = receive();
i++;
}
<latexit sha1_base64="RH2GOBpzrxhll7KlR6psgbiMvnQ=">AAAGiHicjVRtT9RAEC5ynlhf0Y9+cCMhQW1ID2P E4CUovvBFRREwuWvIdjs9Vval7m6BS9PfpX/Ff+P0rhjKXcBtmkxmnmfm2dndiTPBrQvDPzNXZltX29fmrvs3bt66fefu/L1dq3PDYIdpoc33mFoQXMGO407A98wAlbGAvfhwo4rvHYGxXKtvbphBJOlA8ZQz6tC1Pz/7e7EvrBOaJoKqQU4HY Ive9gE1WbQRbFHLqCj9EcaCK1JuEIy1uiuBoLX5PDildotszCj9U8a/0OuEBj45txgmsTpNEdkNJ8O4M86sGwro9p1LqeRi2I8RbTjYSfghDI+1SWrCqDlFLHIo/5EnOdYZrgYNioHkIgbTUoJyDcrAAKiLSFIbqIndnoh6NQ9PAz20jIr+Qnl xezoBmZr1dNPdwsLPgCs3Jc+0xrxHrnUfRsKnpD5beuXS0gKkpAGePAuQBsYFoGyOBQJJTwLJVWBBJQH2APgR/KfCr5Dsci3AXabv2aX6NrXEz2QH3MrtXAaEOi05+08he1wk287Q4xiMGV6mJvTx9scw4KqoXha+Ybxgpc9Jl4Rr/vEBF0CW OHlFPj0mRZWpas3S88drlX2CqLpLS2MPf/p0rcqIoEa+/bsL4XI4WmTS6NTGglevrf35mV/9RLO8uoMjvb1OmLmooMZxJgBL5BYyyg7xTvbQVFSCjYpRC0qyiJ6EpNrgrxwZec8yCiqtHcoYkZK6A3s+VjmnxXq5S1ejgqssd6DYuFCaC+I0qQ YWSTj2w4khGpQZjloJw/FEmcOx1qhSt8Y2d5Ic8czWezkZb8bHgXaGxxXTympB8SE2Q71qmEESFW/hB93Nt6myH7XSZRP0rRMVVVMq+X5DEcMxzcE0BTXhi30DCo6r2UBV8gRHSAIpzYUr3IlzJfFx4VF3zh/spLG7stwJlztfVhbWV+tDn/M eeI+8Ja/jvfDWvU1vy9vxWOth613rU+tz22+H7Rftl2PolZmac99rrPabvwPiBEE=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="RH2GOBpzrxhll7KlR6psgbiMvnQ=">AAAGiHicjVRtT9RAEC5ynlhf0Y9+cCMhQW1ID2P E4CUovvBFRREwuWvIdjs9Vval7m6BS9PfpX/Ff+P0rhjKXcBtmkxmnmfm2dndiTPBrQvDPzNXZltX29fmrvs3bt66fefu/L1dq3PDYIdpoc33mFoQXMGO407A98wAlbGAvfhwo4rvHYGxXKtvbphBJOlA8ZQz6tC1Pz/7e7EvrBOaJoKqQU4HY Ive9gE1WbQRbFHLqCj9EcaCK1JuEIy1uiuBoLX5PDildotszCj9U8a/0OuEBj45txgmsTpNEdkNJ8O4M86sGwro9p1LqeRi2I8RbTjYSfghDI+1SWrCqDlFLHIo/5EnOdYZrgYNioHkIgbTUoJyDcrAAKiLSFIbqIndnoh6NQ9PAz20jIr+Qnl xezoBmZr1dNPdwsLPgCs3Jc+0xrxHrnUfRsKnpD5beuXS0gKkpAGePAuQBsYFoGyOBQJJTwLJVWBBJQH2APgR/KfCr5Dsci3AXabv2aX6NrXEz2QH3MrtXAaEOi05+08he1wk287Q4xiMGV6mJvTx9scw4KqoXha+Ybxgpc9Jl4Rr/vEBF0CW OHlFPj0mRZWpas3S88drlX2CqLpLS2MPf/p0rcqIoEa+/bsL4XI4WmTS6NTGglevrf35mV/9RLO8uoMjvb1OmLmooMZxJgBL5BYyyg7xTvbQVFSCjYpRC0qyiJ6EpNrgrxwZec8yCiqtHcoYkZK6A3s+VjmnxXq5S1ejgqssd6DYuFCaC+I0qQ YWSTj2w4khGpQZjloJw/FEmcOx1qhSt8Y2d5Ic8czWezkZb8bHgXaGxxXTympB8SE2Q71qmEESFW/hB93Nt6myH7XSZRP0rRMVVVMq+X5DEcMxzcE0BTXhi30DCo6r2UBV8gRHSAIpzYUr3IlzJfFx4VF3zh/spLG7stwJlztfVhbWV+tDn/M eeI+8Ja/jvfDWvU1vy9vxWOth613rU+tz22+H7Rftl2PolZmac99rrPabvwPiBEE=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="RH2GOBpzrxhll7KlR6psgbiMvnQ=">AAAGiHicjVRtT9RAEC5ynlhf0Y9+cCMhQW1ID2P E4CUovvBFRREwuWvIdjs9Vval7m6BS9PfpX/Ff+P0rhjKXcBtmkxmnmfm2dndiTPBrQvDPzNXZltX29fmrvs3bt66fefu/L1dq3PDYIdpoc33mFoQXMGO407A98wAlbGAvfhwo4rvHYGxXKtvbphBJOlA8ZQz6tC1Pz/7e7EvrBOaJoKqQU4HY Ive9gE1WbQRbFHLqCj9EcaCK1JuEIy1uiuBoLX5PDildotszCj9U8a/0OuEBj45txgmsTpNEdkNJ8O4M86sGwro9p1LqeRi2I8RbTjYSfghDI+1SWrCqDlFLHIo/5EnOdYZrgYNioHkIgbTUoJyDcrAAKiLSFIbqIndnoh6NQ9PAz20jIr+Qnl xezoBmZr1dNPdwsLPgCs3Jc+0xrxHrnUfRsKnpD5beuXS0gKkpAGePAuQBsYFoGyOBQJJTwLJVWBBJQH2APgR/KfCr5Dsci3AXabv2aX6NrXEz2QH3MrtXAaEOi05+08he1wk287Q4xiMGV6mJvTx9scw4KqoXha+Ybxgpc9Jl4Rr/vEBF0CW OHlFPj0mRZWpas3S88drlX2CqLpLS2MPf/p0rcqIoEa+/bsL4XI4WmTS6NTGglevrf35mV/9RLO8uoMjvb1OmLmooMZxJgBL5BYyyg7xTvbQVFSCjYpRC0qyiJ6EpNrgrxwZec8yCiqtHcoYkZK6A3s+VjmnxXq5S1ejgqssd6DYuFCaC+I0qQ YWSTj2w4khGpQZjloJw/FEmcOx1qhSt8Y2d5Ic8czWezkZb8bHgXaGxxXTympB8SE2Q71qmEESFW/hB93Nt6myH7XSZRP0rRMVVVMq+X5DEcMxzcE0BTXhi30DCo6r2UBV8gRHSAIpzYUr3IlzJfFx4VF3zh/spLG7stwJlztfVhbWV+tDn/M eeI+8Ja/jvfDWvU1vy9vxWOth613rU+tz22+H7Rftl2PolZmac99rrPabvwPiBEE=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="RH2GOBpzrxhll7KlR6psgbiMvnQ=">AAAGiHicjVRtT9RAEC5ynlhf0Y9+cCMhQW1ID2P E4CUovvBFRREwuWvIdjs9Vval7m6BS9PfpX/Ff+P0rhjKXcBtmkxmnmfm2dndiTPBrQvDPzNXZltX29fmrvs3bt66fefu/L1dq3PDYIdpoc33mFoQXMGO407A98wAlbGAvfhwo4rvHYGxXKtvbphBJOlA8ZQz6tC1Pz/7e7EvrBOaJoKqQU4HY Ive9gE1WbQRbFHLqCj9EcaCK1JuEIy1uiuBoLX5PDildotszCj9U8a/0OuEBj45txgmsTpNEdkNJ8O4M86sGwro9p1LqeRi2I8RbTjYSfghDI+1SWrCqDlFLHIo/5EnOdYZrgYNioHkIgbTUoJyDcrAAKiLSFIbqIndnoh6NQ9PAz20jIr+Qnl xezoBmZr1dNPdwsLPgCs3Jc+0xrxHrnUfRsKnpD5beuXS0gKkpAGePAuQBsYFoGyOBQJJTwLJVWBBJQH2APgR/KfCr5Dsci3AXabv2aX6NrXEz2QH3MrtXAaEOi05+08he1wk287Q4xiMGV6mJvTx9scw4KqoXha+Ybxgpc9Jl4Rr/vEBF0CW OHlFPj0mRZWpas3S88drlX2CqLpLS2MPf/p0rcqIoEa+/bsL4XI4WmTS6NTGglevrf35mV/9RLO8uoMjvb1OmLmooMZxJgBL5BYyyg7xTvbQVFSCjYpRC0qyiJ6EpNrgrxwZec8yCiqtHcoYkZK6A3s+VjmnxXq5S1ejgqssd6DYuFCaC+I0qQ YWSTj2w4khGpQZjloJw/FEmcOx1qhSt8Y2d5Ic8czWezkZb8bHgXaGxxXTympB8SE2Q71qmEESFW/hB93Nt6myH7XSZRP0rRMVVVMq+X5DEcMxzcE0BTXhi30DCo6r2UBV8gRHSAIpzYUr3IlzJfFx4VF3zh/spLG7stwJlztfVhbWV+tDn/M eeI+8Ja/jvfDWvU1vy9vxWOth613rU+tz22+H7Rftl2PolZmac99rrPabvwPiBEE=</latexit>
Precondition: {x = 5}
<latexit sha1_base64="D6obtcJ4x8TF33PvxRpNR4MYREo=">AAACFnicdZDNSgMxFIUz/tb6V3XpJlgEN5YZtbYVhKIblxWsCp1S MmlGg5lkSO6IZZincOOruHGhiFtx59uYqRVU9ELgcM693NwviAU34Lrvztj4xOTUdGGmODs3v7BYWlo+NSrRlLWpEkqfB8QwwSVrAwfBzmPNSBQIdhZcHeb52TXThit5AoOYdSNyIXnIKQFr9UqbfhSom9Q3IW5pRpXs8zzYy3zsp35E4BIgvcnwPq5iP+uVym7Fa2w3Gi52Kzv1 Ws3btqK6u1Vt1LFXcYdVRqNq9Upvfl/RJGISqCDGdDw3hm5KNHAqWFb0E8NiQq/IBetYKUnETDcdnpXhdev0cai0fRLw0P0+kZLImEEU2M78o+Z3lpt/ZZ0Ewno35TJOgEn6uShMBAaFc0a4zy0KEAMrCNUWCMX0kmhCwZIsWghfl+L/xelWxbOsjnfKzYMRjgJaRWtoA3mohpr oCLVQG1F0i+7RI3py7pwH59l5+Wwdc0YzK+hHOa8fsZ+fsA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="D6obtcJ4x8TF33PvxRpNR4MYREo=">AAACFnicdZDNSgMxFIUz/tb6V3XpJlgEN5YZtbYVhKIblxWsCp1S MmlGg5lkSO6IZZincOOruHGhiFtx59uYqRVU9ELgcM693NwviAU34Lrvztj4xOTUdGGmODs3v7BYWlo+NSrRlLWpEkqfB8QwwSVrAwfBzmPNSBQIdhZcHeb52TXThit5AoOYdSNyIXnIKQFr9UqbfhSom9Q3IW5pRpXs8zzYy3zsp35E4BIgvcnwPq5iP+uVym7Fa2w3Gi52Kzv1 Ws3btqK6u1Vt1LFXcYdVRqNq9Upvfl/RJGISqCDGdDw3hm5KNHAqWFb0E8NiQq/IBetYKUnETDcdnpXhdev0cai0fRLw0P0+kZLImEEU2M78o+Z3lpt/ZZ0Ewno35TJOgEn6uShMBAaFc0a4zy0KEAMrCNUWCMX0kmhCwZIsWghfl+L/xelWxbOsjnfKzYMRjgJaRWtoA3mohpr oCLVQG1F0i+7RI3py7pwH59l5+Wwdc0YzK+hHOa8fsZ+fsA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="D6obtcJ4x8TF33PvxRpNR4MYREo=">AAACFnicdZDNSgMxFIUz/tb6V3XpJlgEN5YZtbYVhKIblxWsCp1S MmlGg5lkSO6IZZincOOruHGhiFtx59uYqRVU9ELgcM693NwviAU34Lrvztj4xOTUdGGmODs3v7BYWlo+NSrRlLWpEkqfB8QwwSVrAwfBzmPNSBQIdhZcHeb52TXThit5AoOYdSNyIXnIKQFr9UqbfhSom9Q3IW5pRpXs8zzYy3zsp35E4BIgvcnwPq5iP+uVym7Fa2w3Gi52Kzv1 Ws3btqK6u1Vt1LFXcYdVRqNq9Upvfl/RJGISqCDGdDw3hm5KNHAqWFb0E8NiQq/IBetYKUnETDcdnpXhdev0cai0fRLw0P0+kZLImEEU2M78o+Z3lpt/ZZ0Ewno35TJOgEn6uShMBAaFc0a4zy0KEAMrCNUWCMX0kmhCwZIsWghfl+L/xelWxbOsjnfKzYMRjgJaRWtoA3mohpr oCLVQG1F0i+7RI3py7pwH59l5+Wwdc0YzK+hHOa8fsZ+fsA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="hP+6LrUf2d3tZaldqaQQvEKMXyw=">AAAB2XicbZDNSgMxFIXv1L86Vq1rN8EiuCozbnQpuHFZwbZCO5RM 5k4bmskMyR2hDH0BF25EfC93vo3pz0JbDwQ+zknIvSculLQUBN9ebWd3b/+gfugfNfzjk9Nmo2fz0gjsilzl5jnmFpXU2CVJCp8LgzyLFfbj6f0i77+gsTLXTzQrMMr4WMtUCk7O6oyaraAdLMW2IVxDC9YaNb+GSS7KDDUJxa0dhEFBUcUNSaFw7g9LiwUXUz7GgUPNM7RRtRxz zi6dk7A0N+5oYkv394uKZ9bOstjdzDhN7Ga2MP/LBiWlt1EldVESarH6KC0Vo5wtdmaJNChIzRxwYaSblYkJN1yQa8Z3HYSbG29D77odBu3wMYA6nMMFXEEIN3AHD9CBLghI4BXevYn35n2suqp569LO4I+8zx84xIo4</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="tgzz++TxTovvjID8pAyU5FVOaVo=">AAACC3icbZBLSwMxFIXv+Kz1Vd26CYrgxjIjiCIIghuXFWwrdErJ pBkbmkmG5I60DPMr3PhX3LhQxL07/42ZtgtfBwKHcxJu7helUlj0/U9vbn5hcWm5slJdXVvf2KxtrbWszgzjTaalNrcRtVwKxZsoUPLb1HCaRJK3o+Fl2bfvubFCqxscp7yb0DslYsEouqhXOwyTSI/y0MakYTjTqi/K4qwISZiHCcUBYj4qyDk5JmHRq+35dX8i8tcEM7MHMzV6 tY+wr1mWcIVMUms7gZ9iN6cGBZO8qIaZ5SllQ3rHO84qmnDbzSdrFWTfJX0Sa+OOQjJJv7/IaWLtOInczfKj9ndXhv91nQzj024uVJohV2w6KM4kQU1KRqQvHAqUY2coMw4II2xADWXoSFYdhOD3yn9N66ge+PXg2ocK7MAuHEAAJ3ABV9CAJjB4gCd4gVfv0Xv23qa45rwZt23 4Ie/9C1DHnc8=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="/AhnAelSO12gVei+gtVJo2BeST4=">AAACC3icdZBBSxtBGIa/VWtjmmr02stQEXpp2DWmSQRB6KXHFJpE yIYwO5mNQ2ZnlplvJWHZX+HFv+LFg6X03lv/jbOJBZX6wsDL+87wzfdEqRQWff+vt7G59Wb7bWWn+q72fnevvl8bWJ0ZxvtMS20uImq5FIr3UaDkF6nhNIkkH0bzr2U/vOLGCq1+4DLl44TOlIgFo+iiSf1zmER6kYc2Jj3DmVZTURanRUjCPEwoXiLmi4KckRYJi0n90G8E3Wa3 6xO/cdJpt4OmM60vx61uhwQNf6VDeFRvUv8TTjXLEq6QSWrtKPBTHOfUoGCSF9UwszylbE5nfOSsogm343y1VkGOXDIlsTbuKCSr9OmLnCbWLpPI3Sw/al92Zfi/bpRh3BnnQqUZcsXWg+JMEtSkZESmwqFAuXSGMuOAMMIuqaEMHcmqg/BvU/K6GRw3Asfquw8V+AAf4RME0IZ z+AY96AODa7iFe/jp3Xh33q81rg3vkdsBPJP3+wHXcp4v</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="mikjuAEZlzipDuRVoVU1kC3lMVs=">AAACFnicdZDNSgMxFIUz/lv/qi7dBIvgxjKj1raCUHTjsoJVoVNK Js1oMJMMyR2xDPMUbnwVNy4UcSvufBszbQUVvRA4nHMvN/cLYsENuO6HMzY+MTk1PTNbmJtfWFwqLq+cGZVoylpUCaUvAmKY4JK1gINgF7FmJAoEOw+uj/L8/IZpw5U8hX7MOhG5lDzklIC1usUtPwrUbeqbEDc1o0r2eB7sZz72Uz8icAWQ3mb4AFewn3WLJbfs1XfqdRe75d1a tertWFHZ267Ua9gru4MqoVE1u8V3v6doEjEJVBBj2p4bQyclGjgVLCv4iWExodfkkrWtlCRippMOzsrwhnV6OFTaPgl44H6fSElkTD8KbGf+UfM7y82/snYCYa2TchknwCQdLgoTgUHhnBHucYsCRN8KQrUFQjG9IppQsCQLFsLXpfh/cbZd9iyrE7fUOBzhmEFraB1tIg9VUQM doyZqIYru0AN6Qs/OvfPovDivw9YxZzSzin6U8/YJsF+frA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="D6obtcJ4x8TF33PvxRpNR4MYREo=">AAACFnicdZDNSgMxFIUz/tb6V3XpJlgEN5YZtbYVhKIblxWsCp1S MmlGg5lkSO6IZZincOOruHGhiFtx59uYqRVU9ELgcM693NwviAU34Lrvztj4xOTUdGGmODs3v7BYWlo+NSrRlLWpEkqfB8QwwSVrAwfBzmPNSBQIdhZcHeb52TXThit5AoOYdSNyIXnIKQFr9UqbfhSom9Q3IW5pRpXs8zzYy3zsp35E4BIgvcnwPq5iP+uVym7Fa2w3Gi52Kzv1 Ws3btqK6u1Vt1LFXcYdVRqNq9Upvfl/RJGISqCDGdDw3hm5KNHAqWFb0E8NiQq/IBetYKUnETDcdnpXhdev0cai0fRLw0P0+kZLImEEU2M78o+Z3lpt/ZZ0Ewno35TJOgEn6uShMBAaFc0a4zy0KEAMrCNUWCMX0kmhCwZIsWghfl+L/xelWxbOsjnfKzYMRjgJaRWtoA3mohpr oCLVQG1F0i+7RI3py7pwH59l5+Wwdc0YzK+hHOa8fsZ+fsA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="D6obtcJ4x8TF33PvxRpNR4MYREo=">AAACFnicdZDNSgMxFIUz/tb6V3XpJlgEN5YZtbYVhKIblxWsCp1S MmlGg5lkSO6IZZincOOruHGhiFtx59uYqRVU9ELgcM693NwviAU34Lrvztj4xOTUdGGmODs3v7BYWlo+NSrRlLWpEkqfB8QwwSVrAwfBzmPNSBQIdhZcHeb52TXThit5AoOYdSNyIXnIKQFr9UqbfhSom9Q3IW5pRpXs8zzYy3zsp35E4BIgvcnwPq5iP+uVym7Fa2w3Gi52Kzv1 Ws3btqK6u1Vt1LFXcYdVRqNq9Upvfl/RJGISqCDGdDw3hm5KNHAqWFb0E8NiQq/IBetYKUnETDcdnpXhdev0cai0fRLw0P0+kZLImEEU2M78o+Z3lpt/ZZ0Ewno35TJOgEn6uShMBAaFc0a4zy0KEAMrCNUWCMX0kmhCwZIsWghfl+L/xelWxbOsjnfKzYMRjgJaRWtoA3mohpr oCLVQG1F0i+7RI3py7pwH59l5+Wwdc0YzK+hHOa8fsZ+fsA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="D6obtcJ4x8TF33PvxRpNR4MYREo=">AAACFnicdZDNSgMxFIUz/tb6V3XpJlgEN5YZtbYVhKIblxWsCp1S MmlGg5lkSO6IZZincOOruHGhiFtx59uYqRVU9ELgcM693NwviAU34Lrvztj4xOTUdGGmODs3v7BYWlo+NSrRlLWpEkqfB8QwwSVrAwfBzmPNSBQIdhZcHeb52TXThit5AoOYdSNyIXnIKQFr9UqbfhSom9Q3IW5pRpXs8zzYy3zsp35E4BIgvcnwPq5iP+uVym7Fa2w3Gi52Kzv1 Ws3btqK6u1Vt1LFXcYdVRqNq9Upvfl/RJGISqCDGdDw3hm5KNHAqWFb0E8NiQq/IBetYKUnETDcdnpXhdev0cai0fRLw0P0+kZLImEEU2M78o+Z3lpt/ZZ0Ewno35TJOgEn6uShMBAaFc0a4zy0KEAMrCNUWCMX0kmhCwZIsWghfl+L/xelWxbOsjnfKzYMRjgJaRWtoA3mohpr oCLVQG1F0i+7RI3py7pwH59l5+Wwdc0YzK+hHOa8fsZ+fsA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="D6obtcJ4x8TF33PvxRpNR4MYREo=">AAACFnicdZDNSgMxFIUz/tb6V3XpJlgEN5YZtbYVhKIblxWsCp1S MmlGg5lkSO6IZZincOOruHGhiFtx59uYqRVU9ELgcM693NwviAU34Lrvztj4xOTUdGGmODs3v7BYWlo+NSrRlLWpEkqfB8QwwSVrAwfBzmPNSBQIdhZcHeb52TXThit5AoOYdSNyIXnIKQFr9UqbfhSom9Q3IW5pRpXs8zzYy3zsp35E4BIgvcnwPq5iP+uVym7Fa2w3Gi52Kzv1 Ws3btqK6u1Vt1LFXcYdVRqNq9Upvfl/RJGISqCDGdDw3hm5KNHAqWFb0E8NiQq/IBetYKUnETDcdnpXhdev0cai0fRLw0P0+kZLImEEU2M78o+Z3lpt/ZZ0Ewno35TJOgEn6uShMBAaFc0a4zy0KEAMrCNUWCMX0kmhCwZIsWghfl+L/xelWxbOsjnfKzYMRjgJaRWtoA3mohpr oCLVQG1F0i+7RI3py7pwH59l5+Wwdc0YzK+hHOa8fsZ+fsA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="D6obtcJ4x8TF33PvxRpNR4MYREo=">AAACFnicdZDNSgMxFIUz/tb6V3XpJlgEN5YZtbYVhKIblxWsCp1S MmlGg5lkSO6IZZincOOruHGhiFtx59uYqRVU9ELgcM693NwviAU34Lrvztj4xOTUdGGmODs3v7BYWlo+NSrRlLWpEkqfB8QwwSVrAwfBzmPNSBQIdhZcHeb52TXThit5AoOYdSNyIXnIKQFr9UqbfhSom9Q3IW5pRpXs8zzYy3zsp35E4BIgvcnwPq5iP+uVym7Fa2w3Gi52Kzv1 Ws3btqK6u1Vt1LFXcYdVRqNq9Upvfl/RJGISqCDGdDw3hm5KNHAqWFb0E8NiQq/IBetYKUnETDcdnpXhdev0cai0fRLw0P0+kZLImEEU2M78o+Z3lpt/ZZ0Ewno35TJOgEn6uShMBAaFc0a4zy0KEAMrCNUWCMX0kmhCwZIsWghfl+L/xelWxbOsjnfKzYMRjgJaRWtoA3mohpr oCLVQG1F0i+7RI3py7pwH59l5+Wwdc0YzK+hHOa8fsZ+fsA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="D6obtcJ4x8TF33PvxRpNR4MYREo=">AAACFnicdZDNSgMxFIUz/tb6V3XpJlgEN5YZtbYVhKIblxWsCp1S MmlGg5lkSO6IZZincOOruHGhiFtx59uYqRVU9ELgcM693NwviAU34Lrvztj4xOTUdGGmODs3v7BYWlo+NSrRlLWpEkqfB8QwwSVrAwfBzmPNSBQIdhZcHeb52TXThit5AoOYdSNyIXnIKQFr9UqbfhSom9Q3IW5pRpXs8zzYy3zsp35E4BIgvcnwPq5iP+uVym7Fa2w3Gi52Kzv1 Ws3btqK6u1Vt1LFXcYdVRqNq9Upvfl/RJGISqCDGdDw3hm5KNHAqWFb0E8NiQq/IBetYKUnETDcdnpXhdev0cai0fRLw0P0+kZLImEEU2M78o+Z3lpt/ZZ0Ewno35TJOgEn6uShMBAaFc0a4zy0KEAMrCNUWCMX0kmhCwZIsWghfl+L/xelWxbOsjnfKzYMRjgJaRWtoA3mohpr oCLVQG1F0i+7RI3py7pwH59l5+Wwdc0YzK+hHOa8fsZ+fsA==</latexit>
Postcondition: {x = 5}
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Fig. 7. A Synchronous Reduction.
The program in Figure 7(b) is called universally bounded,
since there is a fixed bound k (= 1 in this case) where no
execution of the program has more than k messages in transit
at any given time. Conversely, the program in Figure 7(a)
is called existentially bounded, because every execution of
this program is equivalent to some execution where no more
than k messages are in transit at any given time. Universally
bounded programs are usually much easier to verify because
their channels are bounded. We argue that if a program is
existentially bounded then there exists a universally bounded
C-reduction. Note that our algorithm does not have to be
aware of the existential boundedness of its input. The claim
is that if the input is existentially bounded, the C-reductions will provide the opportunity for the
simpler proof to be found.
To provide the formal result, we use the setup similar to the one in [Genest et al. 2007] (in this
section only). We fix a finite set Chan of unbounded FIFO channels. For simplicity, we assume
programs can only perform send and receive actions on channels. Furthermore, we do not concern
ourselves with the particular contents of the channels; we only care about the number of messages
in transit at any given time. Formally, we instantiate our state set to St = (Chan → N) and our
alphabet to Σ = {send(c), recv(c) | c ∈ Chan}. We assign the semantics
Jsend(c)K = {(f , f [c 7→ f (c) + 1]) | f ∈ St}Jrecv(c)K = {(f , f [c 7→ f (c) − 1]) | f ∈ St , f (c) > 0}
where f [x → y] denotes function f with the output for x replaced with y.
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A trace τ is said to be k-bounded if the number of elements in transit in any given channel never
exceeds k . Formally, this means that for any prefix σ of τ , we have
(λ_. 0, f ) ∈ JσK =⇒ f (c) ≤ k
for all f ∈ St and c ∈ Chan. We say a program P is existentially k-bounded if every trace of P is
equivalent (with respect to the symmetric subset of ⊑IsoundP , which we shall denote by ∼IsoundP ) by a
k-bounded trace. We say P is universally k-bounded if every trace of P is k-bounded. With these
definitions in place, we present the main theorem:
Theorem 6.1. If P is an existentially k-bounded program, then there exists a universally k-bounded
reduction P↓IsoundP ,O ∈ CRedIsoundP (P) for some exploration ordering O : Σ
∗ → Lin(Σ).
Proof. We write chan(a) to denote the channel on which a statement operates, that is
chan(send(c)) = c
chan(recv(c)) = c
Define O(σ ) to return some ordering ≤Σ that explores statements in an order that minimizes
buffer sizes. For example, if buffer c has 4 elements after executing σ and buffer c ′ has 5, then
send(c) is explored before send(c ′). In all cases, receives are explored before sends.
Assume x ∈ P ↓IsoundP ,O and y is some k-bounded trace such that x ∼IsoundP y. It suffices to show
that x is also k-bounded.
We proceed by (indexed) lexicographical induction on y, using <O defined in the proof of Lemma
4.4. Our inductive hypothesis is: if y ′ is some k-bounded trace such that x ∼IsoundP y
′ and y ′ is
lexicographically smaller than y, then x is k-bounded.
If x = y, then weâĂŹre done, so assume x , y. Then x and y must have some common prefix z
followed by differing statements a and b such that
• x = zax1bx2, and
• y = zby1ay2
for some traces x1,x2,y1,y2 such that
• b is independent of ax1 in context z (i.e. zax1b ∼IsoundP zbax1), and• a is independent of by1 in context z (i.e. zby1a ∼IsoundP zaby1).
Since x ∈ P ↓IsoundP ,O the above implies that a is explored before b (i.e. (b,a) ∈ O(z)), or else x
would be pruned. Let y ′ = zaby1y2 (i.e. y ′ is the trace obtained by moving a to the left of by1). Then
y ′ ∼IsoundP y ∼IsoundP x and y
′ is lexicographically smaller than y. By the inductive hypothesis, it
suffices to show that y ′ is k-bounded.
We proceed by cases:
• Assume a = recv(q) for some queue q. Moving recv statements to the left never increases
k-boundedness, so y ′ is k-bounded.
• Assume a = send(q). A statement cannot commute with itself, so every statement in y1 must
either be recv(q) or some other operation not involving q. Let n be the number of recv(q)
statements in by1, such that by1 = y10 · recv(q) · . . . · recv(q) ·y1n where send(q), recv(q) < y1i
for each 0 ≤ i ≤ n.
– Assume n = 0. Moving send statements to the left of other operations on different queues
does not affect k-boundedness, so y ′ is k-bounded.
– Assume z is infeasible. Then moving a to the left of by1 cannot affect k-boundedness since
a never appears in a feasible position, so y ′ is k-bounded.
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– Assume n > 0 and z is feasible. We can move a to the left of each recv(q) statement in
by1 except for the first without affecting k-boundedness (i.e. zby10 · recv(q) · send(q) · . . . ·
recv(q) · y1ny2 is k-bounded). We can show this in two cases:
∗ If the first recv(q) is feasible, then q must have some numberm + 1 elements in it after
executing zy10, so k ≥ m + 1. After the first recv(q), q will havem elements, and after
executing send(q), q will once again have m + 1 elements. Thus moving the send(q)
does not affect the maximum number of elements that appear in q, which preserves
k-boundedness.
∗ If the first recv(q) is infeasible, then a never appears in a feasible position even if we
move it to the left of all the other recv(q)s, so k-boundedness is still preserved. Our final
task is to show we can push b past the first recv(q) without affecting k-boundedness.
Since (b,a) ∈ O(z), it cannot be the case that y10 = ϵ since that would imply b =
recv(q) and therefore (recv(q), send(q)) ∈ O(z), which is a contradiction because recv
statements are always explored before send(q) statements. Thus y10 is non-empty and
b ∈ {send(q′), recv(q′)} for some q′ , q. Once again, b cannot be a recv statement, so
b = send(q′).
Since (send(q′), send(q)) ∈ O(z), q must have at most as many elements as q′ after
executing z. If send(q) is executed first, then the maximum number of elements that
appear in either of the queues will still be the same, and therefore y ′ is k-bounded.
□
There are existing methods [Desai et al. 2014; von Gleissenthall et al. 2019], designed specifically
to transform asynchronous programs into synchronous ones. The significance of Theorem 6.1 is
that it demonstrates that even though our proposed technique is not specialized for this category,
it can potentially behave well on existentially bounded programs.
It should be noted that our technique cannot effectively use Theorem 6.1 unless it is also able to
come up with a soundness proof for IsoundP . This is not always possible because such proofs would
generally have to include assertions that somehow “count” the number of elements in each queue,
yielding a non-regular language. However, we conjecture that a weaker independence relation will
always suffice.
Conjecture 6.2. If P is an existentially k-bounded program, then there exists a universally k-
bounded reduction P↓I,O ∈ CRed∗(P) for some independence relation I : Σ∗ → P(Σ × Σ) and
exploration orderingO : Σ∗ → Lin(Σ) such that there exists a simple proof Π (i.e. Π is in linear integer
arithmetic) such that sound(I) ⊆ L(Π).
7 REFINEMENT-STYLE VERIFICATION ALGORITHM
Figure 8 illustrates the outline of our verification algorithm. It is a counterexample-guided abstrac-
tion refinement loop in the style of [Farzan and Vandikas 2019; Farzan et al. 2013, 2015; Heizmann
et al. 2009]. The algorithm starts with assertions true and false in the proof and iteratively discovers
more assertions until a proof is found. Unlike standard refinement loops, it suffices to discover the
proof for a sound reduction of the program and not the entire program.
To check the validity of any candidate proof Π, one has to check if there exists a reduction of the
program that is covered by Π. The results presented in this paper so far naturally give rise to an
algorithm for performing this check:
• The set of program reductions are LTA-representable (Theorems 4.6 and 5.2).
• A regular proof can be constructed based on a candidate set of assertions (see Section 3.1).
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<latexit sha1_base64="OAyMTkgU4O uIw7jjbEPk43cTki0=">AAACAnicbVDLSgMxFM34rPU16krcBIvgqswUsbqRgggu K9qHdIaSSe+0oZnMkGSEMhQ3/oobF4q49Svc+TemD0SrBwKHc+7h5p4g4Uxpx/m 05uYXFpeWcyv51bX1jU17a7uu4lRSqNGYx7IZEAWcCahppjk0EwkkCjg0gv75yG/ cgVQsFjd6kIAfka5gIaNEG6lt73oq9IJQgWSgPBEz0QGh8e3FddsuOEVnDOwUj0+ PSuUy/lbcKSmgKapt+8PrxDSNTJ5yolTLdRLtZ0RqRjkM816qICG0T7rQMlSQCJ SfjU8Y4gOjdHAYS/PM/rH6M5GRSKlBFJjJiOiemvVG4n9eK9XhiZ8xkaQaBJ0sCl OOdYxHfeAOk0A1HxhCqGTmr5j2iCRUm9bypgR39uS/pF4quk7RvSoVKmfTOnJoD +2jQ+SiMqqgS1RFNUTRPXpEz+jFerCerFfrbTI6Z00zO+gXrPcvelSXcg==</lat exit><latexit sha1_base64="OAyMTkgU4O uIw7jjbEPk43cTki0=">AAACAnicbVDLSgMxFM34rPU16krcBIvgqswUsbqRgggu K9qHdIaSSe+0oZnMkGSEMhQ3/oobF4q49Svc+TemD0SrBwKHc+7h5p4g4Uxpx/m 05uYXFpeWcyv51bX1jU17a7uu4lRSqNGYx7IZEAWcCahppjk0EwkkCjg0gv75yG/ cgVQsFjd6kIAfka5gIaNEG6lt73oq9IJQgWSgPBEz0QGh8e3FddsuOEVnDOwUj0+ PSuUy/lbcKSmgKapt+8PrxDSNTJ5yolTLdRLtZ0RqRjkM816qICG0T7rQMlSQCJ SfjU8Y4gOjdHAYS/PM/rH6M5GRSKlBFJjJiOiemvVG4n9eK9XhiZ8xkaQaBJ0sCl OOdYxHfeAOk0A1HxhCqGTmr5j2iCRUm9bypgR39uS/pF4quk7RvSoVKmfTOnJoD +2jQ+SiMqqgS1RFNUTRPXpEz+jFerCerFfrbTI6Z00zO+gXrPcvelSXcg==</lat exit><latexit sha1_base64="OAyMTkgU4O uIw7jjbEPk43cTki0=">AAACAnicbVDLSgMxFM34rPU16krcBIvgqswUsbqRgggu K9qHdIaSSe+0oZnMkGSEMhQ3/oobF4q49Svc+TemD0SrBwKHc+7h5p4g4Uxpx/m 05uYXFpeWcyv51bX1jU17a7uu4lRSqNGYx7IZEAWcCahppjk0EwkkCjg0gv75yG/ cgVQsFjd6kIAfka5gIaNEG6lt73oq9IJQgWSgPBEz0QGh8e3FddsuOEVnDOwUj0+ PSuUy/lbcKSmgKapt+8PrxDSNTJ5yolTLdRLtZ0RqRjkM816qICG0T7rQMlSQCJ SfjU8Y4gOjdHAYS/PM/rH6M5GRSKlBFJjJiOiemvVG4n9eK9XhiZ8xkaQaBJ0sCl OOdYxHfeAOk0A1HxhCqGTmr5j2iCRUm9bypgR39uS/pF4quk7RvSoVKmfTOnJoD +2jQ+SiMqqgS1RFNUTRPXpEz+jFerCerFfrbTI6Z00zO+gXrPcvelSXcg==</lat exit><latexit sha1_base64="OAyMTkgU4O uIw7jjbEPk43cTki0=">AAACAnicbVDLSgMxFM34rPU16krcBIvgqswUsbqRgggu K9qHdIaSSe+0oZnMkGSEMhQ3/oobF4q49Svc+TemD0SrBwKHc+7h5p4g4Uxpx/m 05uYXFpeWcyv51bX1jU17a7uu4lRSqNGYx7IZEAWcCahppjk0EwkkCjg0gv75yG/ cgVQsFjd6kIAfka5gIaNEG6lt73oq9IJQgWSgPBEz0QGh8e3FddsuOEVnDOwUj0+ PSuUy/lbcKSmgKapt+8PrxDSNTJ5yolTLdRLtZ0RqRjkM816qICG0T7rQMlSQCJ SfjU8Y4gOjdHAYS/PM/rH6M5GRSKlBFJjJiOiemvVG4n9eK9XhiZ8xkaQaBJ0sCl OOdYxHfeAOk0A1HxhCqGTmr5j2iCRUm9bypgR39uS/pF4quk7RvSoVKmfTOnJoD +2jQ+SiMqqgS1RFNUTRPXpEz+jFerCerFfrbTI6Z00zO+gXrPcvelSXcg==</lat exit>
NO
<latexit sha1_base64="mxYyW1Wtiggu9AkKEg6VNfojaFk=">AAACAXicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vqBvBTbAIrkJSBLuSghtXWsE+oAllMrlph04mYWYilFA3/oobF4q4 9S/c+TdO24BaPTBwOOce7twTpIxK5TifRmlpeWV1rbxe2djc2t4xd/faMskEgRZJWCK6AZbAKIeWoopBNxWA44BBJxhdTP3OHQhJE36rxin4MR5wGlGClZb65oEnIy+IJAgK0uMJ5SFwZV1d982qY9fdU6dWtxzbmeGbuAWpogLNvvnhhQnJYh0nDEvZc51U+TkWihIGk4qXSUgxGeEB9DTlOAbp57MLJtaxVkIrSoR+ev1M/ZnIcSzlOA70ZI zVUC56U/E/r5epqO7nlKeZAk7mi6KMWSqxpnVYIRVAFBtrgomg+q8WGWKBidKlVXQJ7uLJf0m7ZruO7d7Uqo3zoo4yOkRH6AS56Aw10CVqohYi6B49omf0YjwYT8ar8TYfLRlFZh/9gvH+BbvMlwg=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="mxYyW1Wtiggu9AkKEg6VNfojaFk=">AAACAXicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vqBvBTbAIrkJSBLuSghtXWsE+oAllMrlph04mYWYilFA3/oobF4q4 9S/c+TdO24BaPTBwOOce7twTpIxK5TifRmlpeWV1rbxe2djc2t4xd/faMskEgRZJWCK6AZbAKIeWoopBNxWA44BBJxhdTP3OHQhJE36rxin4MR5wGlGClZb65oEnIy+IJAgK0uMJ5SFwZV1d982qY9fdU6dWtxzbmeGbuAWpogLNvvnhhQnJYh0nDEvZc51U+TkWihIGk4qXSUgxGeEB9DTlOAbp57MLJtaxVkIrSoR+ev1M/ZnIcSzlOA70ZI zVUC56U/E/r5epqO7nlKeZAk7mi6KMWSqxpnVYIRVAFBtrgomg+q8WGWKBidKlVXQJ7uLJf0m7ZruO7d7Uqo3zoo4yOkRH6AS56Aw10CVqohYi6B49omf0YjwYT8ar8TYfLRlFZh/9gvH+BbvMlwg=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="mxYyW1Wtiggu9AkKEg6VNfojaFk=">AAACAXicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vqBvBTbAIrkJSBLuSghtXWsE+oAllMrlph04mYWYilFA3/oobF4q4 9S/c+TdO24BaPTBwOOce7twTpIxK5TifRmlpeWV1rbxe2djc2t4xd/faMskEgRZJWCK6AZbAKIeWoopBNxWA44BBJxhdTP3OHQhJE36rxin4MR5wGlGClZb65oEnIy+IJAgK0uMJ5SFwZV1d982qY9fdU6dWtxzbmeGbuAWpogLNvvnhhQnJYh0nDEvZc51U+TkWihIGk4qXSUgxGeEB9DTlOAbp57MLJtaxVkIrSoR+ev1M/ZnIcSzlOA70ZI zVUC56U/E/r5epqO7nlKeZAk7mi6KMWSqxpnVYIRVAFBtrgomg+q8WGWKBidKlVXQJ7uLJf0m7ZruO7d7Uqo3zoo4yOkRH6AS56Aw10CVqohYi6B49omf0YjwYT8ar8TYfLRlFZh/9gvH+BbvMlwg=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="mxYyW1Wtiggu9AkKEg6VNfojaFk=">AAACAXicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vqBvBTbAIrkJSBLuSghtXWsE+oAllMrlph04mYWYilFA3/oobF4q4 9S/c+TdO24BaPTBwOOce7twTpIxK5TifRmlpeWV1rbxe2djc2t4xd/faMskEgRZJWCK6AZbAKIeWoopBNxWA44BBJxhdTP3OHQhJE36rxin4MR5wGlGClZb65oEnIy+IJAgK0uMJ5SFwZV1d982qY9fdU6dWtxzbmeGbuAWpogLNvvnhhQnJYh0nDEvZc51U+TkWihIGk4qXSUgxGeEB9DTlOAbp57MLJtaxVkIrSoR+ev1M/ZnIcSzlOA70ZI zVUC56U/E/r5epqO7nlKeZAk7mi6KMWSqxpnVYIRVAFBtrgomg+q8WGWKBidKlVXQJ7uLJf0m7ZruO7d7Uqo3zoo4yOkRH6AS56Aw10CVqohYi6B49omf0YjwYT8ar8TYfLRlFZh/9gvH+BbvMlwg=</latexit>
Program P
<latexit sha1_base64="dtmzqoX9s6w /S8DiRsJ6d4OHEwE=">AAACCXicbVC7TgJBFL2LL8QHq5Y2E8HEiuzSaEm0sVwTeSR AyOwwCxNmZjczs0ay4Qv8BFv9ADtj61dY+yMOsIWCJ7nJyTn35tycMOFMG8/7cgobm 1vbO8Xd0t7+wWHZPTpu6ThVhDZJzGPVCbGmnEnaNMxw2kkUxSLktB1ObuZ++4EqzWJ 5b6YJ7Qs8kixiBBsrDdxyT0coUPFIYYGqQXXgVryatwBaJ35OKpAjGLjfvWFMUkGlI Rxr3fW9xPQzrAwjnM5KvVTTBJMJHtGupRILqvvZ4vEZOrfKEEWxsiMNWqi/LzIstJ6 K0G4KbMZ61ZuL/3nd1ERX/YzJJDVUkmVQlHJkYjRvAQ2ZosTwqSWYKGZ/RWSMFSbGd vUnRRv2OLOt+KsdrJNWveZ7Nf+uXmlc5/0U4RTO4AJ8uIQG3EIATSCQwjO8wKvz5Lw 5787HcrXg5Dcn8AfO5w+2DJm/</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="dtmzqoX9s6w /S8DiRsJ6d4OHEwE=">AAACCXicbVC7TgJBFL2LL8QHq5Y2E8HEiuzSaEm0sVwTeSR AyOwwCxNmZjczs0ay4Qv8BFv9ADtj61dY+yMOsIWCJ7nJyTn35tycMOFMG8/7cgobm 1vbO8Xd0t7+wWHZPTpu6ThVhDZJzGPVCbGmnEnaNMxw2kkUxSLktB1ObuZ++4EqzWJ 5b6YJ7Qs8kixiBBsrDdxyT0coUPFIYYGqQXXgVryatwBaJ35OKpAjGLjfvWFMUkGlI Rxr3fW9xPQzrAwjnM5KvVTTBJMJHtGupRILqvvZ4vEZOrfKEEWxsiMNWqi/LzIstJ6 K0G4KbMZ61ZuL/3nd1ERX/YzJJDVUkmVQlHJkYjRvAQ2ZosTwqSWYKGZ/RWSMFSbGd vUnRRv2OLOt+KsdrJNWveZ7Nf+uXmlc5/0U4RTO4AJ8uIQG3EIATSCQwjO8wKvz5Lw 5787HcrXg5Dcn8AfO5w+2DJm/</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="dtmzqoX9s6w /S8DiRsJ6d4OHEwE=">AAACCXicbVC7TgJBFL2LL8QHq5Y2E8HEiuzSaEm0sVwTeSR AyOwwCxNmZjczs0ay4Qv8BFv9ADtj61dY+yMOsIWCJ7nJyTn35tycMOFMG8/7cgobm 1vbO8Xd0t7+wWHZPTpu6ThVhDZJzGPVCbGmnEnaNMxw2kkUxSLktB1ObuZ++4EqzWJ 5b6YJ7Qs8kixiBBsrDdxyT0coUPFIYYGqQXXgVryatwBaJ35OKpAjGLjfvWFMUkGlI Rxr3fW9xPQzrAwjnM5KvVTTBJMJHtGupRILqvvZ4vEZOrfKEEWxsiMNWqi/LzIstJ6 K0G4KbMZ61ZuL/3nd1ERX/YzJJDVUkmVQlHJkYjRvAQ2ZosTwqSWYKGZ/RWSMFSbGd vUnRRv2OLOt+KsdrJNWveZ7Nf+uXmlc5/0U4RTO4AJ8uIQG3EIATSCQwjO8wKvz5Lw 5787HcrXg5Dcn8AfO5w+2DJm/</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="dtmzqoX9s6w /S8DiRsJ6d4OHEwE=">AAACCXicbVC7TgJBFL2LL8QHq5Y2E8HEiuzSaEm0sVwTeSR AyOwwCxNmZjczs0ay4Qv8BFv9ADtj61dY+yMOsIWCJ7nJyTn35tycMOFMG8/7cgobm 1vbO8Xd0t7+wWHZPTpu6ThVhDZJzGPVCbGmnEnaNMxw2kkUxSLktB1ObuZ++4EqzWJ 5b6YJ7Qs8kixiBBsrDdxyT0coUPFIYYGqQXXgVryatwBaJ35OKpAjGLjfvWFMUkGlI Rxr3fW9xPQzrAwjnM5KvVTTBJMJHtGupRILqvvZ4vEZOrfKEEWxsiMNWqi/LzIstJ6 K0G4KbMZ61ZuL/3nd1ERX/YzJJDVUkmVQlHJkYjRvAQ2ZosTwqSWYKGZ/RWSMFSbGd vUnRRv2OLOt+KsdrJNWveZ7Nf+uXmlc5/0U4RTO4AJ8uIQG3EIATSCQwjO8wKvz5Lw 5787HcrXg5Dcn8AfO5w+2DJm/</latexit>
Initial empty proof ⇧
<latexit sha1_base64="9VyRlQMR XaTOL+96pFaDC0EQacQ=">AAACBnicbZBLSwMxFIUzPmt9VV2KEGwFV2WmG 10W3eiugn1AO5RMmmlDM0lI7ghl6MqNf8WNC0Xc+hvc+W9MHwttPRD4OOde wj2RFtyC7397K6tr6xubua389s7u3n7h4LBhVWooq1MllGlFxDLBJasDB8F a2jCSRII1o+H1JG8+MGO5kvcw0ixMSF/ymFMCzuoWTjo2xreSAycCs0TDCG ujVIxLnRovdQtFv+xPhZchmEMRzVXrFr46PUXThEmggljbDnwNYUYMcCrYO N9JLdOEDkmftR1KkjAbZtMzxvjMOT0cK+OeBDx1f29kJLF2lERuMiEwsIvZ xPwva6cQX4YZlzoFJunsozgVGBSedIJ73DAKYuSAUOO6oJgOiCEUXHN5V0K wePIyNCrlwC8Hd5Vi9WpeRw4do1N0jgJ0garoBtVQHVH0iJ7RK3rznrwX79 37mI2uePOdI/RH3ucPvNuX/A==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="9VyRlQMR XaTOL+96pFaDC0EQacQ=">AAACBnicbZBLSwMxFIUzPmt9VV2KEGwFV2WmG 10W3eiugn1AO5RMmmlDM0lI7ghl6MqNf8WNC0Xc+hvc+W9MHwttPRD4OOde wj2RFtyC7397K6tr6xubua389s7u3n7h4LBhVWooq1MllGlFxDLBJasDB8F a2jCSRII1o+H1JG8+MGO5kvcw0ixMSF/ymFMCzuoWTjo2xreSAycCs0TDCG ujVIxLnRovdQtFv+xPhZchmEMRzVXrFr46PUXThEmggljbDnwNYUYMcCrYO N9JLdOEDkmftR1KkjAbZtMzxvjMOT0cK+OeBDx1f29kJLF2lERuMiEwsIvZ xPwva6cQX4YZlzoFJunsozgVGBSedIJ73DAKYuSAUOO6oJgOiCEUXHN5V0K wePIyNCrlwC8Hd5Vi9WpeRw4do1N0jgJ0garoBtVQHVH0iJ7RK3rznrwX79 37mI2uePOdI/RH3ucPvNuX/A==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="9VyRlQMR XaTOL+96pFaDC0EQacQ=">AAACBnicbZBLSwMxFIUzPmt9VV2KEGwFV2WmG 10W3eiugn1AO5RMmmlDM0lI7ghl6MqNf8WNC0Xc+hvc+W9MHwttPRD4OOde wj2RFtyC7397K6tr6xubua389s7u3n7h4LBhVWooq1MllGlFxDLBJasDB8F a2jCSRII1o+H1JG8+MGO5kvcw0ixMSF/ymFMCzuoWTjo2xreSAycCs0TDCG ujVIxLnRovdQtFv+xPhZchmEMRzVXrFr46PUXThEmggljbDnwNYUYMcCrYO N9JLdOEDkmftR1KkjAbZtMzxvjMOT0cK+OeBDx1f29kJLF2lERuMiEwsIvZ xPwva6cQX4YZlzoFJunsozgVGBSedIJ73DAKYuSAUOO6oJgOiCEUXHN5V0K wePIyNCrlwC8Hd5Vi9WpeRw4do1N0jgJ0garoBtVQHVH0iJ7RK3rznrwX79 37mI2uePOdI/RH3ucPvNuX/A==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="9VyRlQMR XaTOL+96pFaDC0EQacQ=">AAACBnicbZBLSwMxFIUzPmt9VV2KEGwFV2WmG 10W3eiugn1AO5RMmmlDM0lI7ghl6MqNf8WNC0Xc+hvc+W9MHwttPRD4OOde wj2RFtyC7397K6tr6xubua389s7u3n7h4LBhVWooq1MllGlFxDLBJasDB8F a2jCSRII1o+H1JG8+MGO5kvcw0ixMSF/ymFMCzuoWTjo2xreSAycCs0TDCG ujVIxLnRovdQtFv+xPhZchmEMRzVXrFr46PUXThEmggljbDnwNYUYMcCrYO N9JLdOEDkmftR1KkjAbZtMzxvjMOT0cK+OeBDx1f29kJLF2lERuMiEwsIvZ xPwva6cQX4YZlzoFJunsozgVGBSedIJ73DAKYuSAUOO6oJgOiCEUXHN5V0K wePIyNCrlwC8Hd5Vi9WpeRw4do1N0jgJ0garoBtVQHVH0iJ7RK3rznrwX79 37mI2uePOdI/RH3ucPvNuX/A==</latexit>
« a reduction of
P covered by ⇧?
<latexit sha1_base64="hFdybTTIp oS7RajQREdH92aoqGA=">AAACO3icbVC7TgMxEPTxJrwClDQrckhU0R0NdARo KINEAlIuiny+PbDw2SfbhxJF+R6+gk+gBVHTIVp6nEcBCStZGs3O7qwnzgU3N gjevbn5hcWl5ZXV0tr6xuZWeXunaVShGTaYEkrfxtSg4BIblluBt7lGmsUCb+ KHi2H/5hG14Upe216O7YzeSZ5yRq2jOuWzSCouE5QWIpOCH2HXmRofKGhMCjZ UgUoBIIpKft0Hptw6TCDuOXGd+6edciWoBqOCWRBOQIVMqt4pf0SJYkXmPJmg xrTCILftPtWWM4GDUlQYzCl7oHfYclDSDE27P/rqAA4ck0CqtHvu5hH7e6JPM 2N6WeyUGbX3Zro3JP/rtQqbnrT7XOaFRcnGRmkhwCoY5gYJ18is6DlAmebuVm D3VFNmXbp/XIzl3YFLJZzOYBY0j6phUA2vjiq180k+K2SP7JNDEpJjUiOXpE4 ahJEn8kJeyZv37H14n97XWDrnTWZ2yZ/yvn8AqgWsHg==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="hFdybTTIp oS7RajQREdH92aoqGA=">AAACO3icbVC7TgMxEPTxJrwClDQrckhU0R0NdARo KINEAlIuiny+PbDw2SfbhxJF+R6+gk+gBVHTIVp6nEcBCStZGs3O7qwnzgU3N gjevbn5hcWl5ZXV0tr6xuZWeXunaVShGTaYEkrfxtSg4BIblluBt7lGmsUCb+ KHi2H/5hG14Upe216O7YzeSZ5yRq2jOuWzSCouE5QWIpOCH2HXmRofKGhMCjZ UgUoBIIpKft0Hptw6TCDuOXGd+6edciWoBqOCWRBOQIVMqt4pf0SJYkXmPJmg xrTCILftPtWWM4GDUlQYzCl7oHfYclDSDE27P/rqAA4ck0CqtHvu5hH7e6JPM 2N6WeyUGbX3Zro3JP/rtQqbnrT7XOaFRcnGRmkhwCoY5gYJ18is6DlAmebuVm D3VFNmXbp/XIzl3YFLJZzOYBY0j6phUA2vjiq180k+K2SP7JNDEpJjUiOXpE4 ahJEn8kJeyZv37H14n97XWDrnTWZ2yZ/yvn8AqgWsHg==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="hFdybTTIp oS7RajQREdH92aoqGA=">AAACO3icbVC7TgMxEPTxJrwClDQrckhU0R0NdARo KINEAlIuiny+PbDw2SfbhxJF+R6+gk+gBVHTIVp6nEcBCStZGs3O7qwnzgU3N gjevbn5hcWl5ZXV0tr6xuZWeXunaVShGTaYEkrfxtSg4BIblluBt7lGmsUCb+ KHi2H/5hG14Upe216O7YzeSZ5yRq2jOuWzSCouE5QWIpOCH2HXmRofKGhMCjZ UgUoBIIpKft0Hptw6TCDuOXGd+6edciWoBqOCWRBOQIVMqt4pf0SJYkXmPJmg xrTCILftPtWWM4GDUlQYzCl7oHfYclDSDE27P/rqAA4ck0CqtHvu5hH7e6JPM 2N6WeyUGbX3Zro3JP/rtQqbnrT7XOaFRcnGRmkhwCoY5gYJ18is6DlAmebuVm D3VFNmXbp/XIzl3YFLJZzOYBY0j6phUA2vjiq180k+K2SP7JNDEpJjUiOXpE4 ahJEn8kJeyZv37H14n97XWDrnTWZ2yZ/yvn8AqgWsHg==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="hFdybTTIp oS7RajQREdH92aoqGA=">AAACO3icbVC7TgMxEPTxJrwClDQrckhU0R0NdARo KINEAlIuiny+PbDw2SfbhxJF+R6+gk+gBVHTIVp6nEcBCStZGs3O7qwnzgU3N gjevbn5hcWl5ZXV0tr6xuZWeXunaVShGTaYEkrfxtSg4BIblluBt7lGmsUCb+ KHi2H/5hG14Upe216O7YzeSZ5yRq2jOuWzSCouE5QWIpOCH2HXmRofKGhMCjZ UgUoBIIpKft0Hptw6TCDuOXGd+6edciWoBqOCWRBOQIVMqt4pf0SJYkXmPJmg xrTCILftPtWWM4GDUlQYzCl7oHfYclDSDE27P/rqAA4ck0CqtHvu5hH7e6JPM 2N6WeyUGbX3Zro3JP/rtQqbnrT7XOaFRcnGRmkhwCoY5gYJ18is6DlAmebuVm D3VFNmXbp/XIzl3YFLJZzOYBY0j6phUA2vjiq180k+K2SP7JNDEpJjUiOXpE4 ahJEn8kJeyZv37H14n97XWDrnTWZ2yZ/yvn8AqgWsHg==</latexit>
Program P is verified
<latexit sha1_base64="L54F5CQ0 Kff41ye3EvBjm5E0qBA=">AAACBXicbVC7TsMwFHXKq5RXgBEGixaJqUq6wF jBwhgk+pDaqHIcp7XqR2Q7SFXUhYVfYWEAIVb+gY2/wW0zQMuRLB2dc66u74 lSRrXxvG+ntLa+sblV3q7s7O7tH7iHR20tM4VJC0smVTdCmjAqSMtQw0g3VQ TxiJFONL6Z+Z0HojSV4t5MUhJyNBQ0oRgZKw3c075OYKDkUCEOa0ENUg1t3i ZIDAdu1at7c8BV4hekCgoEA/erH0uccSIMZkjrnu+lJsyRMhQzMq30M01ShM doSHqWCsSJDvP5FVN4bpUYJlLZJwycq78ncsS1nvDIJjkyI73szcT/vF5mkq swpyLNDBF4sSjJGDQSziqBMVUEGzaxBGFF7V8hHiGFsLHFVWwJ/vLJq6TdqP te3b9rVJvXRR1lcALOwAXwwSVoglsQgBbA4BE8g1fw5jw5L86787GIlpxi5h j8gfP5A11ClzA=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="L54F5CQ0 Kff41ye3EvBjm5E0qBA=">AAACBXicbVC7TsMwFHXKq5RXgBEGixaJqUq6wF jBwhgk+pDaqHIcp7XqR2Q7SFXUhYVfYWEAIVb+gY2/wW0zQMuRLB2dc66u74 lSRrXxvG+ntLa+sblV3q7s7O7tH7iHR20tM4VJC0smVTdCmjAqSMtQw0g3VQ TxiJFONL6Z+Z0HojSV4t5MUhJyNBQ0oRgZKw3c075OYKDkUCEOa0ENUg1t3i ZIDAdu1at7c8BV4hekCgoEA/erH0uccSIMZkjrnu+lJsyRMhQzMq30M01ShM doSHqWCsSJDvP5FVN4bpUYJlLZJwycq78ncsS1nvDIJjkyI73szcT/vF5mkq swpyLNDBF4sSjJGDQSziqBMVUEGzaxBGFF7V8hHiGFsLHFVWwJ/vLJq6TdqP te3b9rVJvXRR1lcALOwAXwwSVoglsQgBbA4BE8g1fw5jw5L86787GIlpxi5h j8gfP5A11ClzA=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="L54F5CQ0 Kff41ye3EvBjm5E0qBA=">AAACBXicbVC7TsMwFHXKq5RXgBEGixaJqUq6wF jBwhgk+pDaqHIcp7XqR2Q7SFXUhYVfYWEAIVb+gY2/wW0zQMuRLB2dc66u74 lSRrXxvG+ntLa+sblV3q7s7O7tH7iHR20tM4VJC0smVTdCmjAqSMtQw0g3VQ TxiJFONL6Z+Z0HojSV4t5MUhJyNBQ0oRgZKw3c075OYKDkUCEOa0ENUg1t3i ZIDAdu1at7c8BV4hekCgoEA/erH0uccSIMZkjrnu+lJsyRMhQzMq30M01ShM doSHqWCsSJDvP5FVN4bpUYJlLZJwycq78ncsS1nvDIJjkyI73szcT/vF5mkq swpyLNDBF4sSjJGDQSziqBMVUEGzaxBGFF7V8hHiGFsLHFVWwJ/vLJq6TdqP te3b9rVJvXRR1lcALOwAXwwSVoglsQgBbA4BE8g1fw5jw5L86787GIlpxi5h j8gfP5A11ClzA=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="L54F5CQ0 Kff41ye3EvBjm5E0qBA=">AAACBXicbVC7TsMwFHXKq5RXgBEGixaJqUq6wF jBwhgk+pDaqHIcp7XqR2Q7SFXUhYVfYWEAIVb+gY2/wW0zQMuRLB2dc66u74 lSRrXxvG+ntLa+sblV3q7s7O7tH7iHR20tM4VJC0smVTdCmjAqSMtQw0g3VQ TxiJFONL6Z+Z0HojSV4t5MUhJyNBQ0oRgZKw3c075OYKDkUCEOa0ENUg1t3i ZIDAdu1at7c8BV4hekCgoEA/erH0uccSIMZkjrnu+lJsyRMhQzMq30M01ShM doSHqWCsSJDvP5FVN4bpUYJlLZJwycq78ncsS1nvDIJjkyI73szcT/vF5mkq swpyLNDBF4sSjJGDQSziqBMVUEGzaxBGFF7V8hHiGFsLHFVWwJ/vLJq6TdqP te3b9rVJvXRR1lcALOwAXwwSVoglsQgBbA4BE8g1fw5jw5L86787GIlpxi5h j8gfP5A11ClzA=</latexit>
Program P is incorrect
<latexit sha1_base64="KspNQzUrB53kyOqRprd8vo2SJeE=">AAACD3icbVC7TsMwFHXKq5RXgJHFogUxVUkXGCtYGINEH1ITVY7jtFYdO7IdpCrqH7DwK ywMIMTKysbf4LQZoOVIlo7Ouff63hOmjCrtON9WZW19Y3Orul3b2d3bP7APj7pKZBKTDhZMyH6IFGGUk46mmpF+KglKQkZ64eSm8HsPRCoq+L2epiRI0IjTmGKkjTS0z30V+1xQHhGuoSfFSKIENrwGpApSjoWUBGs4tOtO05kDrhK3JHVQwhvaX34kcJaYqZghpQauk+ogR1JTzMis5meKpAhP0IgMDOUoISrI5/fM4JlRIhg LaZ7Zaq7+7shRotQ0CU1lgvRYLXuF+J83yHR8FeSUp5kmHC8+ijMGtYBFODCixbVsagjCkppdIR4jibA2EdZMCO7yyauk22q6TtO9a9Xb12UcVXACTsEFcMElaINb4IEOwOARPINX8GY9WS/Wu/WxKK1YZc8x+APr8we4VZvK</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="KspNQzUrB53kyOqRprd8vo2SJeE=">AAACD3icbVC7TsMwFHXKq5RXgJHFogUxVUkXGCtYGINEH1ITVY7jtFYdO7IdpCrqH7DwK ywMIMTKysbf4LQZoOVIlo7Ouff63hOmjCrtON9WZW19Y3Orul3b2d3bP7APj7pKZBKTDhZMyH6IFGGUk46mmpF+KglKQkZ64eSm8HsPRCoq+L2epiRI0IjTmGKkjTS0z30V+1xQHhGuoSfFSKIENrwGpApSjoWUBGs4tOtO05kDrhK3JHVQwhvaX34kcJaYqZghpQauk+ogR1JTzMis5meKpAhP0IgMDOUoISrI5/fM4JlRIhg LaZ7Zaq7+7shRotQ0CU1lgvRYLXuF+J83yHR8FeSUp5kmHC8+ijMGtYBFODCixbVsagjCkppdIR4jibA2EdZMCO7yyauk22q6TtO9a9Xb12UcVXACTsEFcMElaINb4IEOwOARPINX8GY9WS/Wu/WxKK1YZc8x+APr8we4VZvK</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="KspNQzUrB53kyOqRprd8vo2SJeE=">AAACD3icbVC7TsMwFHXKq5RXgJHFogUxVUkXGCtYGINEH1ITVY7jtFYdO7IdpCrqH7DwK ywMIMTKysbf4LQZoOVIlo7Ouff63hOmjCrtON9WZW19Y3Orul3b2d3bP7APj7pKZBKTDhZMyH6IFGGUk46mmpF+KglKQkZ64eSm8HsPRCoq+L2epiRI0IjTmGKkjTS0z30V+1xQHhGuoSfFSKIENrwGpApSjoWUBGs4tOtO05kDrhK3JHVQwhvaX34kcJaYqZghpQauk+ogR1JTzMis5meKpAhP0IgMDOUoISrI5/fM4JlRIhg LaZ7Zaq7+7shRotQ0CU1lgvRYLXuF+J83yHR8FeSUp5kmHC8+ijMGtYBFODCixbVsagjCkppdIR4jibA2EdZMCO7yyauk22q6TtO9a9Xb12UcVXACTsEFcMElaINb4IEOwOARPINX8GY9WS/Wu/WxKK1YZc8x+APr8we4VZvK</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="KspNQzUrB53kyOqRprd8vo2SJeE=">AAACD3icbVC7TsMwFHXKq5RXgJHFogUxVUkXGCtYGINEH1ITVY7jtFYdO7IdpCrqH7DwK ywMIMTKysbf4LQZoOVIlo7Ouff63hOmjCrtON9WZW19Y3Orul3b2d3bP7APj7pKZBKTDhZMyH6IFGGUk46mmpF+KglKQkZ64eSm8HsPRCoq+L2epiRI0IjTmGKkjTS0z30V+1xQHhGuoSfFSKIENrwGpApSjoWUBGs4tOtO05kDrhK3JHVQwhvaX34kcJaYqZghpQauk+ogR1JTzMis5meKpAhP0IgMDOUoISrI5/fM4JlRIhg LaZ7Zaq7+7shRotQ0CU1lgvRYLXuF+J83yHR8FeSUp5kmHC8+ijMGtYBFODCixbVsagjCkppdIR4jibA2EdZMCO7yyauk22q6TtO9a9Xb12UcVXACTsEFcMElaINb4IEOwOARPINX8GY9WS/Wu/WxKK1YZc8x+APr8we4VZvK</latexit>
+ a valid counterexample
<latexit sha1_base64="T5G6bTCAAg9mZjbSqp6wqyeHBAo=">AAACEXicbVA9SwNBEN3zM8avU0ubxSgIQrhLo2XQxjKCiYHkCHN7c7q4t3vs7gVDyF+w8a /YWChia2fnv3ETU2j0wcLjvZnZmRfnghsbBJ/e3PzC4tJyaaW8ura+selvbbeMKjTDJlNC6XYMBgWX2LTcCmznGiGLBV7Ft2dj/6qP2nAlL+0gxyiDa8lTzsA6qecfdk3alYrLBKWl+0f7FGgfBE8oU4W0qPEOslwg7fmVoBpMQP+ScEoqZIpGz//oJooVmZvLBBjTCYPcRkPQljOBo3K3MJgDu4Vr7DgqIUMTDScXjeiBUxKaK u2e22ui/uwYQmbMIItdZQb2xsx6Y/E/r1PY9CQacpkXFiX7/igtBLWKjuOhCdfIrBg4AkxztytlN6CBuShM2YUQzp78l7Rq1TCohhe1Sv10GkeJ7JI9ckhCckzq5Jw0SJMwck8eyTN58R68J+/Ve/sunfOmPTvkF7z3Ly9JnJk=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="T5G6bTCAAg9mZjbSqp6wqyeHBAo=">AAACEXicbVA9SwNBEN3zM8avU0ubxSgIQrhLo2XQxjKCiYHkCHN7c7q4t3vs7gVDyF+w8a /YWChia2fnv3ETU2j0wcLjvZnZmRfnghsbBJ/e3PzC4tJyaaW8ura+selvbbeMKjTDJlNC6XYMBgWX2LTcCmznGiGLBV7Ft2dj/6qP2nAlL+0gxyiDa8lTzsA6qecfdk3alYrLBKWl+0f7FGgfBE8oU4W0qPEOslwg7fmVoBpMQP+ScEoqZIpGz//oJooVmZvLBBjTCYPcRkPQljOBo3K3MJgDu4Vr7DgqIUMTDScXjeiBUxKaK u2e22ui/uwYQmbMIItdZQb2xsx6Y/E/r1PY9CQacpkXFiX7/igtBLWKjuOhCdfIrBg4AkxztytlN6CBuShM2YUQzp78l7Rq1TCohhe1Sv10GkeJ7JI9ckhCckzq5Jw0SJMwck8eyTN58R68J+/Ve/sunfOmPTvkF7z3Ly9JnJk=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="T5G6bTCAAg9mZjbSqp6wqyeHBAo=">AAACEXicbVA9SwNBEN3zM8avU0ubxSgIQrhLo2XQxjKCiYHkCHN7c7q4t3vs7gVDyF+w8a /YWChia2fnv3ETU2j0wcLjvZnZmRfnghsbBJ/e3PzC4tJyaaW8ura+selvbbeMKjTDJlNC6XYMBgWX2LTcCmznGiGLBV7Ft2dj/6qP2nAlL+0gxyiDa8lTzsA6qecfdk3alYrLBKWl+0f7FGgfBE8oU4W0qPEOslwg7fmVoBpMQP+ScEoqZIpGz//oJooVmZvLBBjTCYPcRkPQljOBo3K3MJgDu4Vr7DgqIUMTDScXjeiBUxKaK u2e22ui/uwYQmbMIItdZQb2xsx6Y/E/r1PY9CQacpkXFiX7/igtBLWKjuOhCdfIrBg4AkxztytlN6CBuShM2YUQzp78l7Rq1TCohhe1Sv10GkeJ7JI9ckhCckzq5Jw0SJMwck8eyTN58R68J+/Ve/sunfOmPTvkF7z3Ly9JnJk=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="T5G6bTCAAg9mZjbSqp6wqyeHBAo=">AAACEXicbVA9SwNBEN3zM8avU0ubxSgIQrhLo2XQxjKCiYHkCHN7c7q4t3vs7gVDyF+w8a /YWChia2fnv3ETU2j0wcLjvZnZmRfnghsbBJ/e3PzC4tJyaaW8ura+selvbbeMKjTDJlNC6XYMBgWX2LTcCmznGiGLBV7Ft2dj/6qP2nAlL+0gxyiDa8lTzsA6qecfdk3alYrLBKWl+0f7FGgfBE8oU4W0qPEOslwg7fmVoBpMQP+ScEoqZIpGz//oJooVmZvLBBjTCYPcRkPQljOBo3K3MJgDu4Vr7DgqIUMTDScXjeiBUxKaK u2e22ui/uwYQmbMIItdZQb2xsx6Y/E/r1PY9CQacpkXFiX7/igtBLWKjuOhCdfIrBg4AkxztytlN6CBuShM2YUQzp78l7Rq1TCohhe1Sv10GkeJ7JI9ckhCckzq5Jw0SJMwck8eyTN58R68J+/Ve/sunfOmPTvkF7z3Ly9JnJk=</latexit>
YES
<latexit sha1_base64="OAyMTkgU4OuIw7jjbEPk43cTki0=">AAACAnicbVDLSgMxFM34rPU16krcBIvgqswUsbqRggguK9qHdIaSSe+0oZnMkGSEMhQ3/oobF4q4 9Svc+TemD0SrBwKHc+7h5p4g4Uxpx/m05uYXFpeWcyv51bX1jU17a7uu4lRSqNGYx7IZEAWcCahppjk0EwkkCjg0gv75yG/cgVQsFjd6kIAfka5gIaNEG6lt73oq9IJQgWSgPBEz0QGh8e3FddsuOEVnDOwUj0+PSuUy/lbcKSmgKapt+8PrxDSNTJ5yolTLdRLtZ0RqRjkM816qICG0T7rQMlSQCJSfjU8Y4gOjdHAYS/PM/rH6M5GRSKlBFJ jJiOiemvVG4n9eK9XhiZ8xkaQaBJ0sClOOdYxHfeAOk0A1HxhCqGTmr5j2iCRUm9bypgR39uS/pF4quk7RvSoVKmfTOnJoD+2jQ+SiMqqgS1RFNUTRPXpEz+jFerCerFfrbTI6Z00zO+gXrPcvelSXcg==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="OAyMTkgU4OuIw7jjbEPk43cTki0=">AAACAnicbVDLSgMxFM34rPU16krcBIvgqswUsbqRggguK9qHdIaSSe+0oZnMkGSEMhQ3/oobF4q4 9Svc+TemD0SrBwKHc+7h5p4g4Uxpx/m05uYXFpeWcyv51bX1jU17a7uu4lRSqNGYx7IZEAWcCahppjk0EwkkCjg0gv75yG/cgVQsFjd6kIAfka5gIaNEG6lt73oq9IJQgWSgPBEz0QGh8e3FddsuOEVnDOwUj0+PSuUy/lbcKSmgKapt+8PrxDSNTJ5yolTLdRLtZ0RqRjkM816qICG0T7rQMlSQCJSfjU8Y4gOjdHAYS/PM/rH6M5GRSKlBFJ jJiOiemvVG4n9eK9XhiZ8xkaQaBJ0sClOOdYxHfeAOk0A1HxhCqGTmr5j2iCRUm9bypgR39uS/pF4quk7RvSoVKmfTOnJoD+2jQ+SiMqqgS1RFNUTRPXpEz+jFerCerFfrbTI6Z00zO+gXrPcvelSXcg==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="OAyMTkgU4OuIw7jjbEPk43cTki0=">AAACAnicbVDLSgMxFM34rPU16krcBIvgqswUsbqRggguK9qHdIaSSe+0oZnMkGSEMhQ3/oobF4q4 9Svc+TemD0SrBwKHc+7h5p4g4Uxpx/m05uYXFpeWcyv51bX1jU17a7uu4lRSqNGYx7IZEAWcCahppjk0EwkkCjg0gv75yG/cgVQsFjd6kIAfka5gIaNEG6lt73oq9IJQgWSgPBEz0QGh8e3FddsuOEVnDOwUj0+PSuUy/lbcKSmgKapt+8PrxDSNTJ5yolTLdRLtZ0RqRjkM816qICG0T7rQMlSQCJSfjU8Y4gOjdHAYS/PM/rH6M5GRSKlBFJ jJiOiemvVG4n9eK9XhiZ8xkaQaBJ0sClOOdYxHfeAOk0A1HxhCqGTmr5j2iCRUm9bypgR39uS/pF4quk7RvSoVKmfTOnJoD+2jQ+SiMqqgS1RFNUTRPXpEz+jFerCerFfrbTI6Z00zO+gXrPcvelSXcg==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="OAyMTkgU4OuIw7jjbEPk43cTki0=">AAACAnicbVDLSgMxFM34rPU16krcBIvgqswUsbqRggguK9qHdIaSSe+0oZnMkGSEMhQ3/oobF4q4 9Svc+TemD0SrBwKHc+7h5p4g4Uxpx/m05uYXFpeWcyv51bX1jU17a7uu4lRSqNGYx7IZEAWcCahppjk0EwkkCjg0gv75yG/cgVQsFjd6kIAfka5gIaNEG6lt73oq9IJQgWSgPBEz0QGh8e3FddsuOEVnDOwUj0+PSuUy/lbcKSmgKapt+8PrxDSNTJ5yolTLdRLtZ0RqRjkM816qICG0T7rQMlSQCJSfjU8Y4gOjdHAYS/PM/rH6M5GRSKlBFJ jJiOiemvVG4n9eK9XhiZ8xkaQaBJ0sClOOdYxHfeAOk0A1HxhCqGTmr5j2iCRUm9bypgR39uS/pF4quk7RvSoVKmfTOnJoD+2jQ+SiMqqgS1RFNUTRPXpEz+jFerCerFfrbTI6Z00zO+gXrPcvelSXcg==</latexit>
Construct a proof ⇧0 for
<latexit sha1_base64="QV/DGpk6sP0+tPlpYbyuXaiqsOk=">AAACFHicb VA7T8MwGHTKq5RXgJHFokUgIVVJFxgrujAWiT6kJqocx2mtOnZkO0hV1B/Bwl9hYQAhVgY2/g1umgFabjrdfc8LEkaVdpxvq7S2vrG5Vd6u7Ozu7R/Yh0ddJVK JSQcLJmQ/QIowyklHU81IP5EExQEjvWDSmvu9ByIVFfxeTxPix2jEaUQx0kYa2pceF5SHhGvoqQi2BFdaplhDBBMpRARrXpue12AkJBzaVafu5ICrxC1IFRRo D+0vLxQ4jc10zJBSA9dJtJ8hqSlmZFbxUkUShCdoRAaGchQT5Wf5UzN4ZpQw3xsJc12u/u7IUKzUNA5MZYz0WC17c/E/b5Dq6NrPKE9STTheLIpSBrWA84RgSC XBmk0NQVhScyvEYyQR1ibHignBXX55lXQbddepu3eNavOmiKMMTsApuAAuuAJNcAvaoAMweATP4BW8WU/Wi/VufSxKS1bRcwz+wPr8AaS5nT4=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="QV/DGpk6sP0+tPlpYbyuXaiqsOk=">AAACFHicb VA7T8MwGHTKq5RXgJHFokUgIVVJFxgrujAWiT6kJqocx2mtOnZkO0hV1B/Bwl9hYQAhVgY2/g1umgFabjrdfc8LEkaVdpxvq7S2vrG5Vd6u7Ozu7R/Yh0ddJVK JSQcLJmQ/QIowyklHU81IP5EExQEjvWDSmvu9ByIVFfxeTxPix2jEaUQx0kYa2pceF5SHhGvoqQi2BFdaplhDBBMpRARrXpue12AkJBzaVafu5ICrxC1IFRRo D+0vLxQ4jc10zJBSA9dJtJ8hqSlmZFbxUkUShCdoRAaGchQT5Wf5UzN4ZpQw3xsJc12u/u7IUKzUNA5MZYz0WC17c/E/b5Dq6NrPKE9STTheLIpSBrWA84RgSC XBmk0NQVhScyvEYyQR1ibHignBXX55lXQbddepu3eNavOmiKMMTsApuAAuuAJNcAvaoAMweATP4BW8WU/Wi/VufSxKS1bRcwz+wPr8AaS5nT4=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="QV/DGpk6sP0+tPlpYbyuXaiqsOk=">AAACFHicb VA7T8MwGHTKq5RXgJHFokUgIVVJFxgrujAWiT6kJqocx2mtOnZkO0hV1B/Bwl9hYQAhVgY2/g1umgFabjrdfc8LEkaVdpxvq7S2vrG5Vd6u7Ozu7R/Yh0ddJVK JSQcLJmQ/QIowyklHU81IP5EExQEjvWDSmvu9ByIVFfxeTxPix2jEaUQx0kYa2pceF5SHhGvoqQi2BFdaplhDBBMpRARrXpue12AkJBzaVafu5ICrxC1IFRRo D+0vLxQ4jc10zJBSA9dJtJ8hqSlmZFbxUkUShCdoRAaGchQT5Wf5UzN4ZpQw3xsJc12u/u7IUKzUNA5MZYz0WC17c/E/b5Dq6NrPKE9STTheLIpSBrWA84RgSC XBmk0NQVhScyvEYyQR1ibHignBXX55lXQbddepu3eNavOmiKMMTsApuAAuuAJNcAvaoAMweATP4BW8WU/Wi/VufSxKS1bRcwz+wPr8AaS5nT4=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="QV/DGpk6sP0+tPlpYbyuXaiqsOk=">AAACFHicb VA7T8MwGHTKq5RXgJHFokUgIVVJFxgrujAWiT6kJqocx2mtOnZkO0hV1B/Bwl9hYQAhVgY2/g1umgFabjrdfc8LEkaVdpxvq7S2vrG5Vd6u7Ozu7R/Yh0ddJVK JSQcLJmQ/QIowyklHU81IP5EExQEjvWDSmvu9ByIVFfxeTxPix2jEaUQx0kYa2pceF5SHhGvoqQi2BFdaplhDBBMpRARrXpue12AkJBzaVafu5ICrxC1IFRRo D+0vLxQ4jc10zJBSA9dJtJ8hqSlmZFbxUkUShCdoRAaGchQT5Wf5UzN4ZpQw3xsJc12u/u7IUKzUNA5MZYz0WC17c/E/b5Dq6NrPKE9STTheLIpSBrWA84RgSC XBmk0NQVhScyvEYyQR1ibHignBXX55lXQbddepu3eNavOmiKMMTsApuAAuuAJNcAvaoAMweATP4BW8WU/Wi/VufSxKS1bRcwz+wPr8AaS5nT4=</latexit>
invalidity of everything in Ci
<latexit sha1_base64="Bh/V8WX4jOXGjTDnP7cW9CJONKI=">AAACGnicb VC7TsMwFHV4lvIKMLJYtEhMVdIFxooujEWiD6mJIsdxWquOHdlOpSjqd7DwKywMIMSGWPgb3DYDtBzpSkfn3Kt77wlTRpV2nG9rY3Nre2e3slfdPzg8OrZPTnt KZBKTLhZMyEGIFGGUk66mmpFBKglKQkb64aQ99/tTIhUV/EHnKfETNOI0phhpIwW263FBeUS4hp6KIeVTxGhEdQ5FDImZzPWY8pExYL0d0DqEgV1zGs4CcJ24J amBEp3A/vQigbPE7MAMKTV0nVT7BZKaYkZmVS9TJEV4gkZkaChHCVF+sXhtBi+NEsFYSFPmxoX6e6JAiVJ5EprOBOmxWvXm4n/eMNPxjV9QnmaacLxcFGcMag HnOcGISoI1yw1BWFJzK8RjJBHWJs2qCcFdfXmd9JoN12m4981a67aMowLOwQW4Ai64Bi1wBzqgCzB4BM/gFbxZT9aL9W59LFs3rHLmDPyB9fUD0B2gBA==</la texit><latexit sha1_base64="Bh/V8WX4jOXGjTDnP7cW9CJONKI=">AAACGnicb VC7TsMwFHV4lvIKMLJYtEhMVdIFxooujEWiD6mJIsdxWquOHdlOpSjqd7DwKywMIMSGWPgb3DYDtBzpSkfn3Kt77wlTRpV2nG9rY3Nre2e3slfdPzg8OrZPTnt KZBKTLhZMyEGIFGGUk66mmpFBKglKQkb64aQ99/tTIhUV/EHnKfETNOI0phhpIwW263FBeUS4hp6KIeVTxGhEdQ5FDImZzPWY8pExYL0d0DqEgV1zGs4CcJ24J amBEp3A/vQigbPE7MAMKTV0nVT7BZKaYkZmVS9TJEV4gkZkaChHCVF+sXhtBi+NEsFYSFPmxoX6e6JAiVJ5EprOBOmxWvXm4n/eMNPxjV9QnmaacLxcFGcMag HnOcGISoI1yw1BWFJzK8RjJBHWJs2qCcFdfXmd9JoN12m4981a67aMowLOwQW4Ai64Bi1wBzqgCzB4BM/gFbxZT9aL9W59LFs3rHLmDPyB9fUD0B2gBA==</la texit><latexit sha1_base64="Bh/V8WX4jOXGjTDnP7cW9CJONKI=">AAACGnicb VC7TsMwFHV4lvIKMLJYtEhMVdIFxooujEWiD6mJIsdxWquOHdlOpSjqd7DwKywMIMSGWPgb3DYDtBzpSkfn3Kt77wlTRpV2nG9rY3Nre2e3slfdPzg8OrZPTnt KZBKTLhZMyEGIFGGUk66mmpFBKglKQkb64aQ99/tTIhUV/EHnKfETNOI0phhpIwW263FBeUS4hp6KIeVTxGhEdQ5FDImZzPWY8pExYL0d0DqEgV1zGs4CcJ24J amBEp3A/vQigbPE7MAMKTV0nVT7BZKaYkZmVS9TJEV4gkZkaChHCVF+sXhtBi+NEsFYSFPmxoX6e6JAiVJ5EprOBOmxWvXm4n/eMNPxjV9QnmaacLxcFGcMag HnOcGISoI1yw1BWFJzK8RjJBHWJs2qCcFdfXmd9JoN12m4981a67aMowLOwQW4Ai64Bi1wBzqgCzB4BM/gFbxZT9aL9W59LFs3rHLmDPyB9fUD0B2gBA==</la texit><latexit sha1_base64="Bh/V8WX4jOXGjTDnP7cW9CJONKI=">AAACGnicb VC7TsMwFHV4lvIKMLJYtEhMVdIFxooujEWiD6mJIsdxWquOHdlOpSjqd7DwKywMIMSGWPgb3DYDtBzpSkfn3Kt77wlTRpV2nG9rY3Nre2e3slfdPzg8OrZPTnt KZBKTLhZMyEGIFGGUk66mmpFBKglKQkb64aQ99/tTIhUV/EHnKfETNOI0phhpIwW263FBeUS4hp6KIeVTxGhEdQ5FDImZzPWY8pExYL0d0DqEgV1zGs4CcJ24J amBEp3A/vQigbPE7MAMKTV0nVT7BZKaYkZmVS9TJEV4gkZkaChHCVF+sXhtBi+NEsFYSFPmxoX6e6JAiVJ5EprOBOmxWvXm4n/eMNPxjV9QnmaacLxcFGcMag HnOcGISoI1yw1BWFJzK8RjJBHWJs2qCcFdfXmd9JoN12m4981a67aMowLOwQW4Ai64Bi1wBzqgCzB4BM/gFbxZT9aL9W59LFs3rHLmDPyB9fUD0B2gBA==</la texit>
Let ⇧ = ⇧ [⇧0
<latexit sha1_base64="KQEB05cxYsR7rAPBANJ9xzhW1qQ=">AAACEHicdV C7TsMwFHV4lvIKMLJYtKhMVZKKtgtSBQsDQ5HoQ2qqynGd1qrjRLaDVEX9BBZ+hYUBhFgZ2fgbnDZIgOBIto7Oude+93gRo1JZ1oextLyyurae28hvbm3v7Jp7+2 0ZxgKTFg5ZKLoekoRRTlqKKka6kSAo8BjpeJOL1O/cEiFpyG/UNCL9AI049SlGSksDs+TykPIh4Qq60odXRMGi26TwDKa3i+MoJaXiwCxYZWsOaJUrds2pnWpSd6 pVpwLtzCqADM2B+e4OQxwH+mXMkJQ924pUP0FCUczILO/GkkQIT9CI9DTlKCCyn8wXmsFjrQyhHwp99GRz9XtHggIpp4GnKwOkxvK3l4p/eb1Y+fV+QnkUK8Lx4i M/ZlCFME0HDqkgWLGpJggLqmeFeIwEwkpnmNchfG0K/ydtp2xbZfvaKTTOszhy4BAcgRNggxpogEvQBC2AwR14AE/g2bg3Ho0X43VRumRkPQfgB4y3T2wYmuc=</ latexit><latexit sha1_base64="KQEB05cxYsR7rAPBANJ9xzhW1qQ=">AAACEHicdV C7TsMwFHV4lvIKMLJYtKhMVZKKtgtSBQsDQ5HoQ2qqynGd1qrjRLaDVEX9BBZ+hYUBhFgZ2fgbnDZIgOBIto7Oude+93gRo1JZ1oextLyyurae28hvbm3v7Jp7+2 0ZxgKTFg5ZKLoekoRRTlqKKka6kSAo8BjpeJOL1O/cEiFpyG/UNCL9AI049SlGSksDs+TykPIh4Qq60odXRMGi26TwDKa3i+MoJaXiwCxYZWsOaJUrds2pnWpSd6 pVpwLtzCqADM2B+e4OQxwH+mXMkJQ924pUP0FCUczILO/GkkQIT9CI9DTlKCCyn8wXmsFjrQyhHwp99GRz9XtHggIpp4GnKwOkxvK3l4p/eb1Y+fV+QnkUK8Lx4i M/ZlCFME0HDqkgWLGpJggLqmeFeIwEwkpnmNchfG0K/ydtp2xbZfvaKTTOszhy4BAcgRNggxpogEvQBC2AwR14AE/g2bg3Ho0X43VRumRkPQfgB4y3T2wYmuc=</ latexit><latexit sha1_base64="KQEB05cxYsR7rAPBANJ9xzhW1qQ=">AAACEHicdV C7TsMwFHV4lvIKMLJYtKhMVZKKtgtSBQsDQ5HoQ2qqynGd1qrjRLaDVEX9BBZ+hYUBhFgZ2fgbnDZIgOBIto7Oude+93gRo1JZ1oextLyyurae28hvbm3v7Jp7+2 0ZxgKTFg5ZKLoekoRRTlqKKka6kSAo8BjpeJOL1O/cEiFpyG/UNCL9AI049SlGSksDs+TykPIh4Qq60odXRMGi26TwDKa3i+MoJaXiwCxYZWsOaJUrds2pnWpSd6 pVpwLtzCqADM2B+e4OQxwH+mXMkJQ924pUP0FCUczILO/GkkQIT9CI9DTlKCCyn8wXmsFjrQyhHwp99GRz9XtHggIpp4GnKwOkxvK3l4p/eb1Y+fV+QnkUK8Lx4i M/ZlCFME0HDqkgWLGpJggLqmeFeIwEwkpnmNchfG0K/ydtp2xbZfvaKTTOszhy4BAcgRNggxpogEvQBC2AwR14AE/g2bg3Ho0X43VRumRkPQfgB4y3T2wYmuc=</ latexit><latexit sha1_base64="KQEB05cxYsR7rAPBANJ9xzhW1qQ=">AAACEHicdV C7TsMwFHV4lvIKMLJYtKhMVZKKtgtSBQsDQ5HoQ2qqynGd1qrjRLaDVEX9BBZ+hYUBhFgZ2fgbnDZIgOBIto7Oude+93gRo1JZ1oextLyyurae28hvbm3v7Jp7+2 0ZxgKTFg5ZKLoekoRRTlqKKka6kSAo8BjpeJOL1O/cEiFpyG/UNCL9AI049SlGSksDs+TykPIh4Qq60odXRMGi26TwDKa3i+MoJaXiwCxYZWsOaJUrds2pnWpSd6 pVpwLtzCqADM2B+e4OQxwH+mXMkJQ924pUP0FCUczILO/GkkQIT9CI9DTlKCCyn8wXmsFjrQyhHwp99GRz9XtHggIpp4GnKwOkxvK3l4p/eb1Y+fV+QnkUK8Lx4i M/ZlCFME0HDqkgWLGpJggLqmeFeIwEwkpnmNchfG0K/ydtp2xbZfvaKTTOszhy4BAcgRNggxpogEvQBC2AwR14AE/g2bg3Ho0X43VRumRkPQfgB4y3T2wYmuc=</ latexit>
Is any member of Cf
<latexit sha1_base64="JZofvbFDrLSHvMpsGN2z1D29c4Y=">AAACDnicbVC7TgJBFJ3FF+Jr1dJmIpBYkV0aLYk02mEijwQImR3uwoR5bGZmTQjhC2z8FRsL jbG1tvNvHB6FgieZ5OSce+/ce6KEM2OD4NvLbGxube9kd3N7+weHR/7xScOoVFOoU8WVbkXEAGcS6pZZDq1EAxERh2Y0qs785gNow5S8t+MEuoIMJIsZJdZJPb/YMXFHKib7IC2+NZjIMRYgItBYxbhQ7cWFHO75+aAUzIHXSbgkebREred/dfqKpsINpZwY0w6DxHYnRFtGOUxzndRAQuiIDKDtqCQCTHcyP2eKi07p41hp99xSc/V3 x4QIY8YicpWC2KFZ9Wbif147tfFVd8JkklqQdPFRnHJsFZ5lg/tMA7V87AihmrldMR0STah1CeZcCOHqyeukUS6FQSm8K+cr18s4sugMnaMLFKJLVEE3qIbqiKJH9Ixe0Zv35L14797HojTjLXtO0R94nz+QsJp2</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="JZofvbFDrLSHvMpsGN2z1D29c4Y=">AAACDnicbVC7TgJBFJ3FF+Jr1dJmIpBYkV0aLYk02mEijwQImR3uwoR5bGZmTQjhC2z8FRsL jbG1tvNvHB6FgieZ5OSce+/ce6KEM2OD4NvLbGxube9kd3N7+weHR/7xScOoVFOoU8WVbkXEAGcS6pZZDq1EAxERh2Y0qs785gNow5S8t+MEuoIMJIsZJdZJPb/YMXFHKib7IC2+NZjIMRYgItBYxbhQ7cWFHO75+aAUzIHXSbgkebREred/dfqKpsINpZwY0w6DxHYnRFtGOUxzndRAQuiIDKDtqCQCTHcyP2eKi07p41hp99xSc/V3 x4QIY8YicpWC2KFZ9Wbif147tfFVd8JkklqQdPFRnHJsFZ5lg/tMA7V87AihmrldMR0STah1CeZcCOHqyeukUS6FQSm8K+cr18s4sugMnaMLFKJLVEE3qIbqiKJH9Ixe0Zv35L14797HojTjLXtO0R94nz+QsJp2</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="JZofvbFDrLSHvMpsGN2z1D29c4Y=">AAACDnicbVC7TgJBFJ3FF+Jr1dJmIpBYkV0aLYk02mEijwQImR3uwoR5bGZmTQjhC2z8FRsL jbG1tvNvHB6FgieZ5OSce+/ce6KEM2OD4NvLbGxube9kd3N7+weHR/7xScOoVFOoU8WVbkXEAGcS6pZZDq1EAxERh2Y0qs785gNow5S8t+MEuoIMJIsZJdZJPb/YMXFHKib7IC2+NZjIMRYgItBYxbhQ7cWFHO75+aAUzIHXSbgkebREred/dfqKpsINpZwY0w6DxHYnRFtGOUxzndRAQuiIDKDtqCQCTHcyP2eKi07p41hp99xSc/V3 x4QIY8YicpWC2KFZ9Wbif147tfFVd8JkklqQdPFRnHJsFZ5lg/tMA7V87AihmrldMR0STah1CeZcCOHqyeukUS6FQSm8K+cr18s4sugMnaMLFKJLVEE3qIbqiKJH9Ixe0Zv35L14797HojTjLXtO0R94nz+QsJp2</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="JZofvbFDrLSHvMpsGN2z1D29c4Y=">AAACDnicbVC7TgJBFJ3FF+Jr1dJmIpBYkV0aLYk02mEijwQImR3uwoR5bGZmTQjhC2z8FRsL jbG1tvNvHB6FgieZ5OSce+/ce6KEM2OD4NvLbGxube9kd3N7+weHR/7xScOoVFOoU8WVbkXEAGcS6pZZDq1EAxERh2Y0qs785gNow5S8t+MEuoIMJIsZJdZJPb/YMXFHKib7IC2+NZjIMRYgItBYxbhQ7cWFHO75+aAUzIHXSbgkebREred/dfqKpsINpZwY0w6DxHYnRFtGOUxzndRAQuiIDKDtqCQCTHcyP2eKi07p41hp99xSc/V3 x4QIY8YicpWC2KFZ9Wbif147tfFVd8JkklqQdPFRnHJsFZ5lg/tMA7V87AihmrldMR0STah1CeZcCOHqyeukUS6FQSm8K+cr18s4sugMnaMLFKJLVEE3qIbqiKJH9Ixe0Zv35L14797HojTjLXtO0R94nz+QsJp2</latexit>
a valid counterexample?
<latexit sha1_base64="F8NQ3CROy39vvHhl099/38bOvBg=">AAACD3icbVA9TwJBEN3zW/w6tbTZSDRW5I5GO4k2lpqIkAAhc3tzsGFv97K7RySEf2DjX7 Gx0BhbWzv/jQtSKPiSTV7em5mdeVEmuLFB8OUtLC4tr6yurRc2Nre2d/zdvTujcs2wypRQuh6BQcElVi23AuuZRkgjgbWodzn2a33Uhit5awcZtlLoSJ5wBtZJbf+4aZKmVFzGKC0F2gfBY8pULi1qvIc0E3heoG2/GJSCCeg8CaekSKa4bvufzVixPHVTmQBjGmGQ2dYQtOVM4KjQzA1mwHrQwYajElI0reHknhE9ckpME6Xd c1tN1N8dQ0iNGaSRq0zBds2sNxb/8xq5Tc5aQy6z3KJkPx8luaBW0XE4NOYamRUDR4Bp7nalrAsamAvDFFwI4ezJ8+SuXAqDUnhTLlYupnGskQNySE5ISE5JhVyRa1IljDyQJ/JCXr1H79l7895/She8ac8++QPv4xtt/Zw7</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="F8NQ3CROy39vvHhl099/38bOvBg=">AAACD3icbVA9TwJBEN3zW/w6tbTZSDRW5I5GO4k2lpqIkAAhc3tzsGFv97K7RySEf2DjX7 Gx0BhbWzv/jQtSKPiSTV7em5mdeVEmuLFB8OUtLC4tr6yurRc2Nre2d/zdvTujcs2wypRQuh6BQcElVi23AuuZRkgjgbWodzn2a33Uhit5awcZtlLoSJ5wBtZJbf+4aZKmVFzGKC0F2gfBY8pULi1qvIc0E3heoG2/GJSCCeg8CaekSKa4bvufzVixPHVTmQBjGmGQ2dYQtOVM4KjQzA1mwHrQwYajElI0reHknhE9ckpME6Xd c1tN1N8dQ0iNGaSRq0zBds2sNxb/8xq5Tc5aQy6z3KJkPx8luaBW0XE4NOYamRUDR4Bp7nalrAsamAvDFFwI4ezJ8+SuXAqDUnhTLlYupnGskQNySE5ISE5JhVyRa1IljDyQJ/JCXr1H79l7895/She8ac8++QPv4xtt/Zw7</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="F8NQ3CROy39vvHhl099/38bOvBg=">AAACD3icbVA9TwJBEN3zW/w6tbTZSDRW5I5GO4k2lpqIkAAhc3tzsGFv97K7RySEf2DjX7 Gx0BhbWzv/jQtSKPiSTV7em5mdeVEmuLFB8OUtLC4tr6yurRc2Nre2d/zdvTujcs2wypRQuh6BQcElVi23AuuZRkgjgbWodzn2a33Uhit5awcZtlLoSJ5wBtZJbf+4aZKmVFzGKC0F2gfBY8pULi1qvIc0E3heoG2/GJSCCeg8CaekSKa4bvufzVixPHVTmQBjGmGQ2dYQtOVM4KjQzA1mwHrQwYajElI0reHknhE9ckpME6Xd c1tN1N8dQ0iNGaSRq0zBds2sNxb/8xq5Tc5aQy6z3KJkPx8luaBW0XE4NOYamRUDR4Bp7nalrAsamAvDFFwI4ezJ8+SuXAqDUnhTLlYupnGskQNySE5ISE5JhVyRa1IljDyQJ/JCXr1H79l7895/She8ac8++QPv4xtt/Zw7</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="F8NQ3CROy39vvHhl099/38bOvBg=">AAACD3icbVA9TwJBEN3zW/w6tbTZSDRW5I5GO4k2lpqIkAAhc3tzsGFv97K7RySEf2DjX7 Gx0BhbWzv/jQtSKPiSTV7em5mdeVEmuLFB8OUtLC4tr6yurRc2Nre2d/zdvTujcs2wypRQuh6BQcElVi23AuuZRkgjgbWodzn2a33Uhit5awcZtlLoSJ5wBtZJbf+4aZKmVFzGKC0F2gfBY8pULi1qvIc0E3heoG2/GJSCCeg8CaekSKa4bvufzVixPHVTmQBjGmGQ2dYQtOVM4KjQzA1mwHrQwYajElI0reHknhE9ckpME6Xd c1tN1N8dQ0iNGaSRq0zBds2sNxb/8xq5Tc5aQy6z3KJkPx8luaBW0XE4NOYamRUDR4Bp7nalrAsamAvDFFwI4ezJ8+SuXAqDUnhTLlYupnGskQNySE5ISE5JhVyRa1IljDyQJ/JCXr1H79l7895/She8ac8++QPv4xtt/Zw7</latexit>C: a set of
<latexit sha1_base64="4D3uQfYOCYk4E5tsYM7saL+hxwk=">AAACBHicdVDLSg MxFM3UV62vUZfdBFvBVZmZYltcFbtxWcE+oDOUTJppQzPJkGSEUrpw46+4caGIWz/CnX9j+hBU9EDgcM69N/eeMGFUacf5sDJr6xubW9nt3M7u3v6BfXjUViKVmLSwYEJ2Q 6QIo5y0NNWMdBNJUBwy0gnHjbnfuSVSUcFv9CQhQYyGnEYUI22kvp33uaB8QLiGvopgsVG8gAgqoqGI+nbBKTkLQKdUdqte9dyQmlepeGXorqwCWKHZt9/9gcBpbKZhhpTq uU6igymSmmJGZjk/VSRBeIyGpGcoRzFRwXRxxAyeGmUAIyHNM9ss1O8dUxQrNYlDUxkjPVK/vbn4l9dLdVQLppQnqSYcLz+KUga1gPNE4IBKgjWbGIKwpGZXiEdIIqxNbjk Twtel8H/S9kquU3KvvUL9chVHFuTBCTgDLqiCOrgCTdACGNyBB/AEnq1769F6sV6XpRlr1XMMfsB6+wSVspbC</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="4D3uQfYOCYk4E5tsYM7saL+hxwk=">AAACBHicdVDLSg MxFM3UV62vUZfdBFvBVZmZYltcFbtxWcE+oDOUTJppQzPJkGSEUrpw46+4caGIWz/CnX9j+hBU9EDgcM69N/eeMGFUacf5sDJr6xubW9nt3M7u3v6BfXjUViKVmLSwYEJ2Q 6QIo5y0NNWMdBNJUBwy0gnHjbnfuSVSUcFv9CQhQYyGnEYUI22kvp33uaB8QLiGvopgsVG8gAgqoqGI+nbBKTkLQKdUdqte9dyQmlepeGXorqwCWKHZt9/9gcBpbKZhhpTq uU6igymSmmJGZjk/VSRBeIyGpGcoRzFRwXRxxAyeGmUAIyHNM9ss1O8dUxQrNYlDUxkjPVK/vbn4l9dLdVQLppQnqSYcLz+KUga1gPNE4IBKgjWbGIKwpGZXiEdIIqxNbjk Twtel8H/S9kquU3KvvUL9chVHFuTBCTgDLqiCOrgCTdACGNyBB/AEnq1769F6sV6XpRlr1XMMfsB6+wSVspbC</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="4D3uQfYOCYk4E5tsYM7saL+hxwk=">AAACBHicdVDLSg MxFM3UV62vUZfdBFvBVZmZYltcFbtxWcE+oDOUTJppQzPJkGSEUrpw46+4caGIWz/CnX9j+hBU9EDgcM69N/eeMGFUacf5sDJr6xubW9nt3M7u3v6BfXjUViKVmLSwYEJ2Q 6QIo5y0NNWMdBNJUBwy0gnHjbnfuSVSUcFv9CQhQYyGnEYUI22kvp33uaB8QLiGvopgsVG8gAgqoqGI+nbBKTkLQKdUdqte9dyQmlepeGXorqwCWKHZt9/9gcBpbKZhhpTq uU6igymSmmJGZjk/VSRBeIyGpGcoRzFRwXRxxAyeGmUAIyHNM9ss1O8dUxQrNYlDUxkjPVK/vbn4l9dLdVQLppQnqSYcLz+KUga1gPNE4IBKgjWbGIKwpGZXiEdIIqxNbjk Twtel8H/S9kquU3KvvUL9chVHFuTBCTgDLqiCOrgCTdACGNyBB/AEnq1769F6sV6XpRlr1XMMfsB6+wSVspbC</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="4D3uQfYOCYk4E5tsYM7saL+hxwk=">AAACBHicdVDLSg MxFM3UV62vUZfdBFvBVZmZYltcFbtxWcE+oDOUTJppQzPJkGSEUrpw46+4caGIWz/CnX9j+hBU9EDgcM69N/eeMGFUacf5sDJr6xubW9nt3M7u3v6BfXjUViKVmLSwYEJ2Q 6QIo5y0NNWMdBNJUBwy0gnHjbnfuSVSUcFv9CQhQYyGnEYUI22kvp33uaB8QLiGvopgsVG8gAgqoqGI+nbBKTkLQKdUdqte9dyQmlepeGXorqwCWKHZt9/9gcBpbKZhhpTq uU6igymSmmJGZjk/VSRBeIyGpGcoRzFRwXRxxAyeGmUAIyHNM9ss1O8dUxQrNYlDUxkjPVK/vbn4l9dLdVQLppQnqSYcLz+KUga1gPNE4IBKgjWbGIKwpGZXiEdIIqxNbjk Twtel8H/S9kquU3KvvUL9chVHFuTBCTgDLqiCOrgCTdACGNyBB/AEnq1769F6sV6XpRlr1XMMfsB6+wSVspbC</latexit>
counterexamples
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Fig. 8. Counterexample-guided refinement loop.
• LTA representability of the program and regularity of the proof language imply that the
check can be performed through an emptiness test for the intersection of LTA languages
(Theorem 3.3). There are known algorithms for both tasks [Baader and Tobies 2001].
When the proof is not sufficient, a finite set of counterexamples can be produced as a witness.
These counterexamples are sequences of statements. One can check whether they are feasible
or not. In a standard setting, a feasible counterexample would be a witness for the violation of
the property by the program. In our setting, not every counterexample is a program trace. If a
program trace counterexample is feasible, then the program is unsafe. We stop the loop and return
the counterexample.
The specific construction of our LTA for C-reductions implies that some reductions in the class
may be unsound. Any feasible counterexample that is not a program trace is a witness for the
unsoundness of (at least) one such reduction. We refer to these as invalid counterexamples. These
are therefore spurious counterexamples and are ignored. We address how this does not affect the
termination of the refinement loop in Section 7.1.
If no true counterexample is found, then one can produce proofs of infeasibility of all the infeasible
counterexamples with the aid of any program prover. All new assertions discovered through this
process are then added to the current proof conjecture, and the refinement loop restarts. Note
that proofs of infeasibility of program trace counterexamples contribute towards the discovery
of a program proof, and proofs of infeasibility of the rest would contribute towards discovery of
invariants that expand the set of sound contextual commutativity relations. In our tool, we use
Craig interpolation to produce proofs of infeasibility of these counterexamples. In general, since
program traces are the simplest forms of sequential programs (loop and branch free), any automated
program prover (that can handle proving them) may be used.
7.1 Termination, Soundness and Completeness
Let us assume that the program is correct, and more specifically, there exists a proof Π∗ that
subsumes one of its contextual reductions in CRed∗(P). Ideally, we would like to claim that the
refinement algorithm of Figure 8 succeeds under these conditions.
Note that the convergence of the algorithm depends on two factors: (1) the counterexamples
used by the algorithm belong to L(Π∗) and (2) the proofs discovered by the backend solver for
these counterexamples use assertions from Π∗. The latter is a typical known wild card in software
model checking, which cannot be guaranteed; there is plenty of empirical evidence, however, that
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procedures based on Craig Interpolation do well in approximating it. This problem is orthogonal to
the contribution of this paper.
The former poses a new problem specific to our methodology: if the ideal proof Π∗ is the target
of the refinement loop, since the set of traces proved correct in L(Π∗) is incomparable to the set of
program traces P , then one cannot just use any program trace as an appropriate counterexample.
A key observation from LTA’s can be used to solve this problem. For an LTA M and regular
language L, when there exists no R ∈ L(M) such that R ⊆ L, then there exists a finite set of
counterexamples C such that for all R ∈ L(M), there exists some τ ∈ C such that τ ∈ R and
τ < L [Farzan and Vandikas 2019]. This is very significant, since it means that when we check a
proof candidate L(Π), and it does not cover any program reduction, then there are finitely many
counterexamples that together cover all reductions. This means that if all these counterexamples
are proved infeasible, and Π is updated with these proofs, then the proof has made meaningful
progress for every single reduction.
But what about invalid counterexamples from the setCf (of Figure 8) which our algorithm simply
ignores? Note that these may appear again in subsequent rounds. Fortunately, this behaviour turns
out to be unproblematic: strong progress essentially relies on finding new counterexamples for each
correct reduction. Whether we find new (or even any) counterexamples for incorrect reductions is
of no importance.
Theorem 7.1 (Strong Progress). Assume there exists a reduction P∗ ∈ CRed∗(P) (or alternatively
SRed∗(P)) and a set of assertions Π∗, such that P∗ ⊆ L(Π∗). If the algorithm of Figure 8 uses assertions
from Π∗ to prove the infeasibility of those counterexamples which belong to L(Π∗), then it will
terminate in at most |Π∗ | iterations.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that we learn at least one new assertion in Π∗ every iteration.
Assume we have received a counterexample set C such that, for all P ′ ∈ CRed∗(P), there exists
some x ∈ C such that x ∈ P ′ and x < L(Π) ([Farzan and Vandikas 2019] ensures C exists). Let
x∗ ∈ C be the counterexample for P∗. Then Interpolate(x) will return new assertions Π′ ⊆ Π∗
satisfying x∗ ∈ L(Π′). If Π′ ⊆ Π then x∗ would not have been returned as a counterexample, so
there must exist some ϕ ∈ Π′ (and therefore ϕ ∈ Π∗) such that ϕ < Π. □
Theorem 7.1 ensures that the algorithm will never get into an infinite loop due to a bad choice of
counterexamples. The extra condition on proofs of traces from Π∗ rules out diverging behaviour
that could occur due to the wrong choice of assertions by the backend prover. A wrong choice
of assertions can cause divergence in any standard software model checking algorithm (even for
sequential integer programs with simple proofs) that relies on discovery of loop invariants through
interpolation. The assumption that there exists a proof for a reduction (in the fixed set CRed∗(P)) of
the program ensures that the algorithm is searching for a proof that does exist. Note that, in general,
a proof may exist for a reduction of the program which is not in CRed∗(P). That is, the algorithm is
not complete with respect to all reductions, but only reductions in CRed∗(P). Since checking the
premises of SafeRed for all semantic reductions is undecidable as discussed in Section 3, a complete
algorithm does not exist. The soundness of the algorithm is a straightforward consequence of the
soundness of reductions stated in Sections 4 and 5.
8 AN EFFICIENT ALGORITHM FOR PROOF CHECKING
The proof checking algorithm described in Section 7 boils down to an emptiness check on the
intersection (i.e. product) of the LTAs representing all program reductions and the proof language.
The size of the reduction LTA is exponential on the input program size, both in terms of the number
of states and the number of transitions per state. This can make proof checking prohibitively
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expensive, even though the emptiness test is performed in linear time. In this section, we propose a
new algorithm for proof checking that has a provably better worst-case time complexity and works
better in practice. First, we show how to drastically reduce the number of transitions considered
during proof checking. This also allows us to easily employ antichain-based optimizations (in the
style of [Farzan and Vandikas 2019; Wulf et al. 2006]) to better deal with the exponential state space,
which in turn allows us to further reduce the number of transitions considered and arrive at an
asymptotically better algorithm than the one given in [Farzan and Vandikas 2019].
8.1 Proof-Driven Maximal Independence Relations
Our construction of the reduction LTA enumerates a class of contextual independence relations
and a class of reductions that are induced by them. The key observation of this section is that a
specific proof candidate instigates some additional structure in the state space of all contextual
independence relations that would allow us to soundly and completely choose one maximal relation
instead of exploring them all.
For the purpose of checking a proof candidate Π, it suffices to only consider those independence
relations that are correct according to Π, i.e. all independence relations I : Σ∗ → P(Σ × Σ) such
that sound(I) ⊆ L(Π). The proof checking algorithm will never certify a reduction based on an
unproven independence relation anyways. In fact, even among independence relations that are
correct according to Π, it suffices to consider only a single maximal independence relation IΠ ⊆ IP
induced by the proof Π, defined as
IΠ(σ ) = {(a,b) ∈ IP (σ ) | σ · indepa,b ∈ L(Π)}.
This independence relation declares a pair of statements independent precisely when it is sound
to do so according to Π. By maximal, we mean that any independence relation I that is sound
according to Π is subsumed by IΠ .
Proposition 8.1. For any independence relation I ⊆ IP , if sound(I) ⊆ L(Π) then I ⊆ IΠ .
IΠ can be shown to be regular by modifying the automaton recognizing L(Π). By Theorem 5.2,
CRedIΠ (P) is representable by an LTA. The following theorem states that proof checking against
IΠ is just as good as proof checking against all independence relations.
Theorem 8.2. There exists some P ′ ∈ CRed∗(P) satisfying P ′ ⊆ L(Π) iff there exists some P ′′ ∈
CRedIΠ (P) satisfying P ′′ ⊆ L(Π).
Proof. (→) By the definition of CRed∗(P), we have P ′ = P↓I,O ∪ sound(I) for some I ⊆ IP
and O : Σ∗ → Lin(Σ). Thus P↓I,O ⊆ L(Π) and sound(I) ⊆ L(Π). By Proposition 8.1, we have
I ⊆ IΠ . Using similar reasoning to the proof of Proposition 4.7, we may conclude P↓IΠ,O ⊆ P↓I,O .
Therefore this case is satisfied for P ′′ = P↓IΠ,O .
(←) By the definition of CRedIΠ (P) we have P ′′ = P↓IΠ,O for some O : Σ∗ → Lin(Σ). By the
definition of IΠ we have sound(IΠ) ⊆ L(Π), so this case is satisfied for P ′ = P↓IΠ,O . □
Therefore, we can replace the LTA representing CRed∗(P) with the LTA representing CRedIΠ (P)
in our proof checking algorithm. While this reduces the number of transitions considered expo-
nentially, it also increases the state space of the reduction LTA since CRedIΠ (P) must simulate
the automaton witnessing regularity of IΠ . This turns out to be of no consequence: the proof
automaton already contains the state space of IΠ , so the state space of the product automaton
remains unchanged. Thus we obtain a product automaton with exponentially fewer transitions and
an identical state space, resulting in an exponentially faster proof checking algorithm.
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8.2 Optimizing Emptiness Test Through Antichains
While LTAs can be checked for emptiness in linear time, the size of the checked automaton is
exponential in |Σ| (in the worst case), since the reduction LTA (as described in Section 4.1) must
maintain sleep sets. In [Farzan and Vandikas 2019], this problem is alleviated using antichain
methods [Wulf et al. 2006] for the case of symmetric and non-contextual independence relations.
The idea is that emptiness checking reduces to constructing a set of inactive states from which no
language is accepted. The set of inactive states is shown to be downwards-closed with respect to a
particular subsumption relation, which allows the set to be represented compactly by its maximal
elements (i.e. antichains).
It turns out that with the contextual (and semi-) independence relations, we can also adapt these
methods as an optimization for proof checking. This comes as a positive byproduct of the use
of the maximal independence relation IΠ that we described in Section 8.1. The key observation
is that we can pretend that we are in the non-contextual setting of [Farzan and Vandikas 2019],
but recover all the relevant information about IΠ from the state of the product automaton that
contains information about both program and proof automaton states. Therefore, we can recover
the required information about IΠ and know what transitions are independent at each state of the
product automaton.
Description of Contextual Antichain Algorithm
Assume the program P is represented by the automaton AP = (QP , Σ,δP ,q0P , FP ), and assume
the proof language L(Π) is represented by the automaton AΠ = (QΠ, Σ,δΠ,q0Π, FΠ). We recall the
definition of Fmax : (QP ×QΠ → P(P(Σ))) → (QP ×QΠ → P(P(Σ))) from [Farzan and Vandikas
2019].
FmaxMPΠ (X )(qP ,qΠ) =

{Σ} if qP ∈ FP ∧ qΠ < FΠd
O ∈Lin(Σ)
⊔
a∈Σ
S ∈X (q′P ,q′Π)
S ′ otherwise
where
q′P = δP (qP ,a) X ⊓ Y = max{x ∩ y | x ∈ X ∧ y ∈ Y }
q′Π = δΠ(qΠ,a) X ⊔ Y = max(X ∪ Y )
S ′ =
{
{(S ∪ I (a)) \ {a}} if O(a) ∩ I (a) ⊆ S
∅ otherwise .
and I is the static (symmetric) independence relation. This definition needs no modifications to
support semi-independence; our definitions of sleep and ignore given in the proofs in Section 4 are
identical to the ones given in [Farzan and Vandikas 2019].
Let AIP = (QP , Σ,δP ,q0P , FIP ) be the automaton witnessing regularity of IP (recall from Section
5 that this automaton is identical to AP aside from its final “states”). To accommodate contextuality,
we need only replace I in the above definition with the relation
I ′ = {(a,b) ∈ FIP (qP ) | δ (qΠ, indepa,b ) ∈ FΠ}
which consists of all pairs of statements where P is closed at state qP ((a,b) ∈ FIP (qP )) and soundly
commute according to Π at state qΠ (δ (qΠ, indepa,b ) ∈ FΠ).
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Intuitively, we want to replace I with IΠ(σ ), for some appropriate σ such that δΠ(q0Π,σ ) = qΠ
and δP (q0P ,σ ) = qP . Then we have
IΠ(σ ) = {(a,b) ∈ IP (σ ) | σ · indepa,b ∈ L(Π)}
= {(a,b) ∈ IP (σ ) | δ ∗Π(q0Π,σ · indepa,b ) ∈ FΠ}
= {(a,b) ∈ IP (σ ) | δΠ(δ ∗(q0Π,σ ), indepa,b ) ∈ FΠ}
= {(a,b) ∈ FIP (δ ∗P (q0P ,σ )) | δΠ(qΠ, indepa,b ) ∈ FΠ}
= {(a,b) ∈ FIP (qP ) | δΠ(qΠ, indepa,b ) ∈ FΠ}
= I ′.
As in [Farzan and Vandikas 2019], proof checking passes iff the least fixed-point of Fmax is empty
at states (q0P ,q0Π), i.e. lfp(Fmax)(q0P ,q0Π) = ∅.
Antichain methods do not generally improve the worst-case computational complexity of an
algorithm, since the size of the largest antichain on sets of a finite alphabet is still exponential in
the size of the alphabet. However, antichains are never larger than the sets they represent, and
often exponentially smaller, making antichain-based algorithms very efficient in practice.
8.3 Time Complexity of Proof Checking
The final source of complexity that we would like to eliminate is a factorial component that arises
because our reduction automaton considers all possible exploration strategies of the program
(through enumerations of all order functions). In particular, each state in the reduction automaton
has a transition for all |Σ|! linear orderings over Σ. In conjunction with the optimization of Section
8.2, this translates to an iterated antichain meet over all linear orders, which has exponential-
of-factorial complexity. Fortunately, we can reduce this factor to only exponential in the size of
Σ.
As mentioned previously, LTA emptiness is calculated via a fixed point computation. The com-
plexity occurs within the function over which the fixed point is computed. Therefore, we shall
focus on the complexity of calculating this function. This function, which we call Fmax, has type
Fmax : (QP ×QΠ → P(P(Σ))) → (QP ×QΠ → P(P(Σ))),
where QP and QΠ are respectively the state spaces of the DFAs accepting the program language P
and the proof language L(Π). Since the input of Fmax is itself a function, we define the size of a
function X : QP ×QΠ → P(P(Σ)) to be the maximum size of all its outputs, i.e.
|X | = max{|X (qP ,qΠ)| | qP ∈ QP ,qΠ ∈ QΠ}.
Theorem 8.3. The algorithm as of Section 8.2 computes Fmax(X ) in O((|Σ| |X |)2 |Σ |!) time.
Proof. The definition of Fmax given above involves an iterated antichain meet of an iterated
antichain join. Given two argumentsA and B, antichain meets are calculated in O((|A| |B |)2) time by
finding the maximal elements amongst the pairwise intersections of A and B. Conversely, antichain
joins are calculated in O(|A| |B |) time by finding the maximal elements among A ∪ B. An iterated
antichain meet over n elements of size at-mostm has O(m2n) complexity, and an iterated antichain
join has O(n2m2) complexity.
The inner join in Fmax given above is over |Σ| |X | antichains of size 1, and therefore has (|Σ| |X |)2
complexity. The outer join is over |Σ|! antichains of size Σ| |X |, and therefore has O((|Σ| |X |)2 |Σ |!).
Together, this has O((|Σ| |X |)2 |Σ |! + |Σ|!(|Σ| |X |)2) = O((|Σ| |X |)2 |Σ |!) complexity. □
There is a key observation that allows us to improve these results. The following lemma captures
this by effectively permitting the elimination of the set of linear orders from our calculations:
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Lemma 8.4. Let A ⊆ Σ × P(Σ) be a relation satisfying ∀(a, S) ∈ A. a ∈ S . Then
(∀O ∈ Lin(Σ). ∃(a, S) ∈ A.O(a) ⊆ S) ⇐⇒ (∃∅ ⊂ A′ ⊆ A. ∀(a, S) ∈ A′.Dom(A′) ⊆ S)
where Dom(A′) is the domain of A′.
Proof. (→) Assume ∀∅ ⊂ A′ ⊆ A. ∃(a, S) ∈ A′.Dom(A′) ⊈ S .
We show, by contrapositive, ∃O ∈ Lin(Σ). ∀(a, S) ∈ A.O(a) ⊈ S .
Let B = A. Then we have B ⊆ A. We show
∃O ∈ Lin(Σ). ∀(a, S) ∈ B.O(a) ⊈ S
by induction on |B | while maintaining B ⊆ A.
• If B = ∅, then the
• Assume B , ∅ and B ⊆ A.
For our inductive hypothesis, we assume
∀b ∈ B. ∃O ∈ Lin(Σ). ∀(a, S) ∈ B \ {b}.O(a) ⊈ S .
We instantiate our first assumption withA′ = B to obtain some (a, S) ∈ B such thatDom(B) ⊈
S , from which we obtain some b < S such that ∀T . (b,T ) < B.
By instantiating b = (a, S) in our inductive hypothesis, we obtain someO ∈ Lin(Σ) such that
∀(c,U ) ∈ B \ {(a, S)}.O(c) ⊈ S .
Now define O ′ to be a linear order identical to O , except with b at the bottom of the order.
Then O ′(a) ⊈ S (since b < O ′(a) but b ∈ S).
Also, ∀(c,U ) ∈ B \ {(a, S)}.O ′(c) ⊈ S (since ∀T . (b,T ) < B, and b is at the bottom of O ′).
Thus ∀(c,U ) ∈ B.O ′(c) ⊈ S .
Therefore ∃O ∈ Lin(Σ). ∀(a, S) ∈ B.O(a) ⊈ S , for O = O ′.
(←) Assume ∃∅ ⊂ A′ ⊆ A. ∀(a, S) ∈ A′.Dom(A′) ⊆ S .
Then ∀(a, S) ∈ A′,b < S . ∃T . (b,T ) ∈ A′.
Since A′ , ∅, we have Dom(A′) , ∅.
Assume O is any linear order on Σ.
Let a be the maximal element of Dom(A′) with respect to O .
Then there exists some S such that (a, S) ∈ A′.
Then (a, S) ∈ A (since A′ ⊆ A).
Then O(a) ⊆ S . If this were not the case, then there would exist some b ∈ O(a) such that b < S ,
which (by an earlier fact) implies b ∈ Dom(A′). Necessarily, a , b, since (a, S) ∈ A =⇒ a ∈ S and
b < S . Since a is maximal, we have (b,a) ∈ O . But b ∈ O(a), which is a contradiction.
Thus ∃(a, S) ∈ A.O(a) ⊆ S . □
The equality implied by the lemma is used to improve the fixed point calculation of Fmax, based
on the LTA built using the construction of Theorem 5.2 instantiated by the sound independence
relation of Proposition 8.1. The left-hand side of the equality appears in the fixed point computation,
and the right hand side lets us drop the enumeration of all linear orders from it. This leads us to
the following result of reduced overall complexity for the dominant computation part of proof
checking:
Theorem 8.5. Fmax(X ) can be computed in O(2 |Σ | |Σ| |X |) time.
Proof. Observe that the formula for Fmax given previously ultimately calculates a finite inter-
section of the form
(S1 ∪ I ′(a1)) \ {a1} ∩ · · · ∩ (Sn ∪ I ′(an)) \ {an}
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where
O(ai ) ⊆ Si ∪ I ′(ai )
Si ∈ X (δP (qP ,a′),δΠ(qΠ,a′))
for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Define
Pairs = {(a, S) | S ∈ X (δP (qP ,a),δΠ(qΠ,a))}
Valid = {A ⊆ Pairs | ∀O ∈ Lin(Σ). ∃(a, S) ∈ A.O(a) ⊆ S ∩ I ′(a)}
Then we can rearrange Fmax to
max

⋂
(a,S )∈A
(S ∪ I ′(a)) \ {a}
 A ∈ Valid
Note that a superset of any A ∈ Valid is also inValid , and adding elements to A will shrink the
inner intersection, so we need only minimal elements ofValid .
max

⋂
(a,S )∈A
(S ∪ I ′(a)) \ {a}
 A ∈ min(Valid)
By Lemma 8.4, we have
Valid = {A ⊆ Pairs | ∃∅ ⊂ A′ ⊆ A. ∀(a, S) ∈ A′.Dom(A′) ⊆ S ∪ I ′(a)}.
Consequently, A ∈ min(Valid) =⇒ A , ∅ ∧ ∀(a, S) ∈ A.Dom(A) ⊆ S ∪ I ′(a). The iteration
intersection effectively excludes the domain of A, and since each S ∪ I ′(a) is a superset of Dom(A)
we can simplify the above to
max{Dom(A) | A ∈ min(Valid)}
As pointed out earlier, it matters not whether we useValid or min(Valid). Anything in-between
is just as valid.
max{Dom(A) | ∅ ⊂ A ⊆ Pairs ∧ ∀(a, S) ∈ A.Dom(A) ⊆ S ∪ I ′(a)}
Finally, we expand Pairs and simplify to obtain
Fmax(X )(qP ,qΠ) = max{B | ∀a ∈ B. ∃S ∈ X (δP (qP ,a),δΠ(qΠ,a)). B ⊆ S ∪ I ′(a)}
This version of Fmax can be implemented by iterating over all subsets of Σ, checking whether the
condition in the set comprehension holds for each subset, and then taking the maximal elements.
Obtaining the correct subsets takes O(2Σ |Σ| |X |) time. □
9 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
There are two facts that make an experimental evaluation of the technique worthwhile: (1) Our
reduction sets are necessarily incomplete. There may exist a general semantic reduction of the
program (in the sense of Definition 3.1) with a simple proof, but this reduction may not belong to
the set of S-reductions or C-reductions defined in this paper. Therefore, an experimental evaluation
to see how well the incomplete reductions fare in practice is essential. (2) The worst case time com-
plexity of our algorithm is exponential, and therefore, it is important to know if an implementation
of this algorithm can handle realistic examples.
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9.1 Implementation
We have implemented our approach in a tool called Slacker written in Haskell. Slacker accepts a
program written in a simple imperative language. The input language supports integers, booleans,
arrays, uninterpreted functions, deterministic and non-deterministic branches and loops, parallel
composition, assume statements, and assignment statements. The desired safety property is encoded
in the input program itself in the form of assume statements, and Slacker attempts to prove the
program safe.
Slacker implements all of the optimizations of Section 8. Note that since the algorithm as of
Section 8 computes a fixpoint of a function over the product state space of the program and proof
DFAs, no tree automata are ever explicitly constructed during an execution of the tool.
SMT Solvers. Slacker supports a variety of background solvers. Only a few solvers support
interpolation, but Slacker can use different solvers for interpolation and proof generalization.
For interpolation, Slacker supports Z3, MathSAT, and SMTInterpol. For proof generalization,
Slacker additionally supports Yices and CVC4. The main reason for multiple solver support is
the general fragility of the interpolation tools. For example, MathSAT does well on some of our
arithmetic benchmarks, but bugs out easily with the array benchmarks, while SMTInterpol does
better with array interpolants. On the other hand, MathSAT performs better when it works.
Counterexamples. The set of counterexamples that provide the convergence guarantee of The-
orem 7.1 are often too large to be practically useful. It turns out that the algorithm converges in
the strong majority of the cases if one selects only one counterexample from this set to move
forward. The algorithm may take a few more refinement rounds to converge this way, but each
round executes much faster and the overall time for verification ends up being substantially lower.
The choice of counterexample can have a substantial impact on the total verification time. One
can imagine many heuristics for this selection. We use two specifically for the evaluation in this
section: one that picks a (mostly) sequentialized trace from all available traces (S), and another one
which picks a mostly interleaved (I) counterexample; that is, it uses the counterexample that is
going through the steps of different threads in a round-robin manner.
Recall the example in Figure 1. For verification with contextual (semi) reductions, the time under
the (I) counterexample selection criterion is three times slower than the one under (S), since the
good reduction is the sequential reduction. Big gaps like this one (in either direction) are observed
in most benchmarks.
9.2 Evaluation
The target programs for our approach are those where a proof for the entire program is out of the
reach of current automated verification tools due to the expressivity of the language of required
interpolants. For this reason, Slacker cannot be compared against existing tools, as the premise is
that they should fail on the majority of these benchmarks.
Given the same proof, checking it against an infinite set of reductions, in contrast to a single
program in classic verification, is bound to be (theoretically) more expensive. Therefore, when not
needed, reductions can cause a potentially large overhead on verification time. The exception is
the cases where they are not strictly needed (from the theoretical point of view) but using them
leads to a much smaller proof (in terms of the total number of assertions). In these scenarios, the
smaller proof can offset the overhead of proof checking against reductions and lead to a better
overall verification time.
Benchmarks. We have a diverse set of benchmarks in Table 1 which includes programs that
require the reductions presented in this paper to be verified by an automated prover. In other
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words, they are theoretically beyond the reach of the automated provers. The reason for this is
that a Floyd-Hoare style proof for the entire program (i.e. unreduced) will require a rich language
of assertions that reason about (1) unbounded message buffers, (2) non-linear constraints, or (3)
quantified facts about arrays, or a combination of these features. The benchmarks are arranged
in Table 1 based on the complexity of these required assertions. Slacker manages to prove these
benchmarks correct by discovering a reduction for which the base theories of Linear Integer
Arithmetic (LIA), Uninterpreted Functions (UF), and theory of arrays (unquantified).
Our second set of benchmarks, reported in Table 2, includes programs for which the S/C-
reductions presented in this paper are not strictly required. They either require no reductions at
all or the sleep-set reductions (from [Farzan and Vandikas 2019]) are sufficient for proving them
correct automatically. We use this second set of benchmarks to highlight the fact that the rich set of
reductions presented in this paper can be of practical importance even if not theoretically required.
Benchmark Reduction StyleS + C C S
Unbounded Buffers
channel-sum 1.8 0.8 TO
horseshoe 45.2 45.5 TO
prod-cons 7.5 3.4 TO
prod-cons-3 138.9 26.8 TO
prod-cons-eq 3.4 4.3 TO
queue-add-2 6.2 5.9 TO
send-receive 5.7 4.9 TO
send-receive-alt 1.1 0.5 TO
simple-queue 0.3 0.03 TO
queue-add-3 214.4 TO TO
Nonlinear
Figure 3 TO 0.3 TO
mult-4 TO 25.5 TO
mult-equiv 197.9 TO 194
counter-fun 0.8 TO TO
Arrays
simple-array-sum 52.4 97.4 TO
three-array-min 39.1 74.2 TO
three-array-sum 28.1 58.4 TO
three-array-max TO 34.6 TO
Unbounded Buffers + Nonlinear
buffer-mult 131.5 212.4 TO
buffer-series 62.9 216.7 TO
buffer-series-array 97.9 292.2 TO
queue-add-2-nl 14.4 15.7 TO
queue-add-3-nl 344 314 TO
Queues + Arrays
dec-subseq-array 4.6 7.3 TO
inc-subseq-array 4.5 6.7 TO
Table 1. Experimental Results. Times are in
seconds. Best times are in boldface. TO indi-
cate a timeout (set at 20mins).Weaver is the
tool from [Farzan and Vandikas 2019].
Unbounded buffers are modelled in these benchmarks
using uninterpreted functions. More precisely, a buffer
is modelled using a triple ⟨f , i0, i1⟩ ∈ (Z→ Z) × Z × Z
where f (i) denotes the ith element in the buffer, i0 points
to the first element in the buffer, and i1 points to the last.
Results. We ran Slacker on the benchmarks on a Dell
Optiplex 3050 with an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-7700 CPU (4
cores, 2 threads per core) and 32GB of RAM, running 64-
bit Ubuntu 18.04. The results are reported in Tables 1 and
2. Slacker has an option to turn semi-commutativity on
and off, and we used it to measure the impact of it alone,
and also when added to contextual commutativity rela-
tions. Note that C-reductions (of Definition 5.8) are by
default defined based on contextual semi-commutative
relations, and therefore, they correspond to the “S + C”
option in Table 1. The “C” column corresponds to C-
reductions without semi-commutativity.
The “None” column in the table corresponds to our
implementation of [Heizmann et al. 2009] which does
not perform reductions or any optimizations specific
to handling concurrent programs. Therefore, it can be
considered as a baseline algorithm. Our benchmarks are
not very large programs. It is unlikely that a proof is
not found by this baseline algorithm due to known in-
tractability issues of concurrent program verification
(i.e. state-space explosion). There are two reasons for
failure: (1) the proof for the program is beyond capabil-
ities of state-of-the-art SMT solvers (for interpolation
and verification-condition checking), and (2) the algo-
rithm falls into the well-known divergent behaviour of
automated verification where sufficiently strong loop
invariants are not produced.
All benchmarks in Table 1 fall in category (1). From
Table 2, the benchmarks under Arrays also fall in category (1). Without S-reductions, C-reductions,
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or sleep-set reductions of [Farzan and Vandikas 2019], there would be a need for universal quantifi-
cation over array elements. The rest of benchmarks in Table 2, for which the “None” algorithm
timeouts, fall under category (2). In these instances, Slacker succeeds with reductions because it
gets lucky with the counterexamples of the reduction-based method and sidesteps the divergence
issues. The example in Figure 1 is one of these examples. If we modify the precondition to add the
assertion { M = N } and change the postcondition to { y = N - M }, then interpolation-based
proofs do not diverge. This example is listed in Table 2 as “Figure 1 (alt)”.
The results clearly demonstrate that C-reductions are very powerful in producing proofs in the
majority of cases. There are cases that S-reductions alonemake proving a program possible and there
Benchmark Reduction StyleS + C C S Weaver None
Arrays + Nonlinear
dot-product-array 62.2 105 50.8 54.6 TO
Arrays
max-array-hom 1644 906 756 1483 TO
max-array 232 306 36.2 446 TO
min-array-hom 830 1366 578 578 TO
min-array 151.5 180 51.9 56.9 TO
sum-array-hom 116 167 115 123 TO
sum-array 64 94.5 46.5 50.9 TO
parray-copy 311 407 218 232 TO
mts-array TO TO 1176 1190 TO
sorted TO TO 819 TO TO
Unbounded Buffers
commit-1 3.2 5.3 1.7 1.7 1.9
commit-2 15.9 38.4 6.4 14.4 31.1
two-queue 8.1 2.6 15.1 15.2 57.7
Standard Language of Assertions
Figure 1 0.21 0.2 TO TO TO
Figure 1 (alt) 1.4 2.1 1.2 3.0 3.2
counter-determinism 5.8 10.5 TO TO TO
difference-det 25.9 25.1 12.5 TO TO
nonblocking-cntr 1.3 1.1 TO TO TO
nonblocking-cntr-alt 3.7 3.8 19.3 28.1 TO
min-le-max 3.2 2.7 0.2 0.1 0.4
threaded-sum-2 3.1 3.4 9.5 10 3.4
threaded-sum-3 139 90.7 84.2 TO TO
Table 2. More experimental results. Times are in seconds. Best time
for each benchmark appears in boldface. TO indicate a timeout (set at
30mins). Weaver is the tool from [Farzan and Vandikas 2019]. None
is without any reductions [Heizmann et al. 2009].
are cases that semi-commutativity
substantially boosts contextual
reductions. Theoretically, adding
the option of semi-commutation
specifications should only make
the tool perform better. How-
ever, a change in the indepen-
dence relation could result in a
change in the counterexamples
used in the refinement rounds,
and in four of the benchmarks
(from both tables), this change
seems to be adversarial for the al-
gorithm; in these cases, the con-
textual reductions without semi-
commutativity manage to pro-
duce a proof, but adding in semi-
commutativity causes timeouts.
Other than a few exceptions,
the counterexample selection strat-
egy (I) described before produces
the fastest time over the bench-
marks. With the solvers the re-
sults are mixed. The best times
are split (near half-half) between
MathSAT and SMTInterpol.
On average 13 refinement rounds
are required to verify the bench-
marks, with 43 being the maxi-
mum number. The average proof
size is about 93 assertions and the
largest proof includes 340 assertions. Of the benchmarks that take more than 5 seconds to verify,
the majority are three-threaded programs. For these, on average, 81% of the time is spent in proof
construction, 11% in proof checking, and 8% in interpolation. For the six four-threaded benchmarks,
the averages are different: 38% of the time is spent in proof construction, 54% in proof checking,
and 8% in interpolation. It is expected that as the number of threads increases, the cost of proof
checking should dominate the total verification since it increases exponentially with the number
threads.
Slacker and all of our benchmarks are available at https://github.com/weaver-verifier/weaver.
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The Optimized Proof Checking Algorithm
In Section 8, we proposed a novel way of devising a faster proof checking algorithm. We evaluate
this algorithm separately by comparing the times taken for proof checking a complete proof for
each benchmark in the standard algorithm versus the optimized algorithm. The optimized algorithm
performed 6.7x faster than the standard one in the best case, and 1.7x faster on average. In the
worst case, the optimized algorithm’s performance was the same as the standard algorithm (in
exactly one case). Note that this is an isolated evaluation of the algorithms for poofs that check. In
the refinement loop, most proof checking tests fail, and using the optimized version produces better
overall speedups than these reported numbers. Since the two algorithms may produce different
counterexamples, one cannot compare the overall time of the entire verification process between
the two proof checking algorithm choices. There is no guarantee that the speedups (or slowdowns)
observed are not due to better (or worse) luck with the selection of counterexamples.
10 RELATEDWORK
The contributions of this paper relate to several topics, including automated concurrent program
verification, relational verification, and program reductions. Each topic has a vast literature of
related work. Here, we only explore connections to the most relevant work. Specifically, a large
body of related work using reduction for the purpose of bug finding (in contrast to producing
proofs) is not discussed since the focus of this paper is on sound reductions for verification.
Reductions for Concurrent Program Verification
Lipton’s reduction [Lipton 1975] has inspired several approaches to concurrent program verification
[Elmas et al. 2009; Hawblitzel et al. 2015; Kragl et al. 2018], which fundamentally opt for inferring
large atomic blocks of code (using various different techniques) to leverage mostly sequential
reasoning for concurrent program verification. QED [Elmas et al. 2009] and CIVL [Hawblitzel et al.
2015] frameworks both use refinement-oriented approaches to proving concurrent programs correct.
These semi-automatic systems use a combination of ideas to simplify proofs of concurrent programs.
Specifically, yield predicates (location invariants) are similar to the contexts for commutativity in
this paper. CIVL[Hawblitzel et al. 2015] takes advantage of classic movers wherever applicable,
so as not to have to rely too heavily on yield predicates. QED [Elmas et al. 2009] performs small
rewrites in the concurrent program that have to be justified by potentially expensive reduction and
invariant reasoning. Both systems are more broadly applicable since they deal with functions and
subroutines which are not part of our program model.
In a different direction, program reductions (beyond atomicity specifications) have been used
to simplify concurrent and distributed program proofs by eliminating the need to reason about
unbounded message buffers. In [Genest et al. 2007], the theory of Mazurkiewicz traces is used to
define a category of distributed systems, modelled as automata communicating through channels,
which are existentially bounded. Natural proofs [Desai et al. 2014] and pretend synchrony[von
Gleissenthall et al. 2019] (among many more) use the same fundamental idea to simplify reasoning
about distributed systems. For the programs which are targets of these approaches, large atomic
blocks are not a reduction of choice since the aim of the reduction (i.e. program simplification) is to
simplify the program from an asynchronous to almost synchronous.
Natural proofs [Desai et al. 2014] work for unbounded domains but boundedly many processes.
Pretend synchrony [von Gleissenthall et al. 2019] provides an extension that works with unboundedly
many processes by rewriting the program into an equivalent synchronous one. Tomake this possible,
however, assumptions are made about loops (that there is no loop state) and round non-interference
(no carried state between rounds). These are reasonable assumptions for distributed protocols but
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do not apply to concurrent message-passing programs. We also assume boundedly many processes,
simply to be able to use finite state automata. Limited notions of context appear in some domain-
specific reduction techniques. For example, in natural proofs [Desai et al. 2014], it matters whether
a buffer is empty or not. Contextual reductions, however, are more general than context specific to
buffers.
We emphasize that all these techniques are incomplete, even for the particular domains for which
they were designed. Contextual reductions are also incomplete. As already noted in [Farzan and
Vandikas 2019], the problem of finding a reduction is as difficult as proving safety.
Partial Order Reduction
Partial-order reduction (POR) [Abdulla et al. 2014, 2017; Godefroid 1996] is a class of techniques that
reduces the state space of search (for violation of a safety property) by removing redundant paths.
POR techniques are concerned with finding a single (preferably minimal) reduction of (mostly)
finite-state systems, and their primary application is in reachability/unreachability queries. We
use the underlying ideas in POR in a non-standard way. The design of the LTAs that recognize
S-reductions and C-reductions are informed by them.
Context has been incorporated into POR algorithms before. In [Godefroid and Pirottin 1993;
Katz and Peled 1992], conditional dependence is used as a weakening of the independence relation
to increase the potential for reduction. Conditional dependence adds a third component to the
dependence relation, which is a (single) state. These techniques are exclusively applicable to finite-
state systems. One can view one of the contributions of this paper as providing a way of lifting
these ideas to infinite-state programs. In [Wang et al. 2008], the notion of guarded dependence is
introduced which extends the state to a predicate (i.e. a set of states). This is then used to perform
POR in the context of bounded symbolic model checking of finite state systems.
A language-theoretic notion of context has been previously studied in the context of models of
concurrency [Sassone et al. 1993]. Our language-theoretic definition can be viewed as a weakening
of that notion of Generalized Mazurkiewicz Trace Languages, which have additional consistency
and coherence conditions on relation I.
Partial order reduction has been combined with automated verification methods to tackle the
large state space of multithreaded programs [Cassez and Ziegler 2015; Wachter et al. 2013; Wang
et al. 2009]. In [Wachter et al. 2013], POR is combined with the classic IMPACT algorithm to
lift it to concurrent programs. In [Cassez and Ziegler 2015], POR is applied to the concurrent
control-flow automaton of the program to construct a reduced one, which is then used for proof
construction/checking in a classic refinement algorithm in the style of [Heizmann et al. 2009].
Contexts do not play (a significant) role in pruningmechanisms of either of the approaches presented
in [Cassez and Ziegler 2015; Wachter et al. 2013].
Relational and Hypersafety Verification
Program reductions have been used in relational and hypersafety verification [Barthe et al. 2011;
Goguen and Meseguer 1982; Pnueli et al. 1998; Sabelfeld and Myers 2003; Sousa and Dillig 2016;
Sousa et al. 2014] where reductions are applied to product programs to obtain simple proofs of
relational/hyper- properties. The important observation is that since the copies of the program in
such product programs are completely disjoint, the statements fully commute for the purpose of
constructing a reduction. The contributions of this paper become significant when one does not have
such a trivial commutativity relation. For example, if the goal is to prove a relational/hyper property
of a concurrent program, where beyond the top-level product, commutativity specifications within
a copy become relevant. We have examples of this (for instance proving the determinism of a
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concurrent program) among our benchmarks in Section 9. Neither of the approaches cited can
handle concurrent programs.
The work in [Farzan and Vandikas 2019] is the closest to ours in terms of methodology and in the
fact that it handles concurrent programs. There, in the same style of refinement loop, the space of
non-contextual reductions based on a symmetric dependence relation are explored for the purpose
of verification of hypersafety properties of sequential and concurrent programs. Programs proved
correct in this paper that require reasoning about semi-commutativity and contextual commutativity
are theoretically beyond the scope of the algorithm presented in [Farzan and Vandikas 2019].
Equivalence checking of looped programs has been explored as an instance of relational verifica-
tion [Churchill et al. 2019; Lahiri et al. 2012; Sharma et al. 2013]. In [Sharma et al. 2013] loops are
never unrolled and therefore the approach is limited to cases that a simple proof exists for unrolled
loops. SymDiff [Lahiri et al. 2012] uses (unsound) unrolling of the loops for a fixed number of itera-
tions for verification. And, finally and most recently, in [Churchill et al. 2019], concrete executions
are used as a guide to guess a good correspondence between (potentially unrolled) executions of
the loops to push the frontier further. In our approach, arbitrary (unbounded) unrollings of loops
are considered for constructing proofs through the reduction automaton. As long as the correct
invariants are guessed through the interpolation method, the approach can succeed in finding the
right correspondence and a proof for it if one exists.
11 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
The notion of context for program reductions had not received much attention before this paper.
C-reductions provide a solution to incorporate contextual reductions in the automated program
verification tool. The preliminary experimental results (Section 9) are promising. Nontrivial ex-
amples, that previously could not be proved automatically, can be verified using Slacker . There
is, however, much more work left ahead to explore the full potential of program reductions for
automated program verification.
First, in Section 8, we presented algorithmic optimizations that ensure no additional complexity
is incurred for contextual reductions over the simpler reductions of [Farzan and Vandikas 2019].
The proof checking algorithm however still has a high complexity. This may be acceptable as a
worst-case complexity for proof checking, but the construction of section 8 implicitly requires a
construction of the program control flow automaton, whose size exponential on the number of
threads. Consider the case of a very simple parallel programs where all threads are disjoint and
the postcondition refers only to the variables in a single thread. Slacker can handle proving this
program for a small number of threads, but as the number of threads grows, Slacker ’s verification
time grows exponentially with it. It will be interesting to explore alternative ways of defining
the reduction LTAs and/or the exploration algorithms to find solutions with better average case
complexity when the number of threads grows but the verification task remains simple. For example,
exploiting symmetry for replicated code is one possible avenue of investigation.
Second, it would be interesting to see how the idea of abstraction used by QED [Elmas et al.
2009] and CIVL [Hawblitzel et al. 2015] can be incorporated in the framework put forward by this
paper to gain more powerful reductions. Briefly, a non-commuting statement can be abstracted in
way that the new program still satisfies the property of interest and the new abstract statement
commutes against more statements than the old concrete one. These abstractions are suggested
manually in [Elmas et al. 2009; Hawblitzel et al. 2015] and it will be interesting to investigate if the
same insight can be inferred automatically.
Another limitation of the current approach is that it works for a fixed number of threads. It would
be interesting to explore if predicate automata [Farzan et al. 2015] or nominal automata [Boja’nczyk
et al. 2014] can be used to formulate reductions for parameterized concurrent programs.
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